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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: ELICITATION OF PATIENT PREFERENCES 
Summary 
In this chapter it is argued that patients should have the possibility to participate in 
treatment decisions in those cases where treatments are deemed 'medically equivalent'. 
Three conditions are given that are to be met to allow such a possibility. Conflicts about 
treatment decisions that may occur within a patient, or between physician and patient are 
described. Examples are given how pair comparisons can account for individual 
differences. 
]. Introduction 
In the last decade medical decision analysis has become a new branch of medical 
research. Methods to elicit patient preferences among treatment strategies is one of the 
topics in this branch (Pliskin, Shepard & Weinstein, 1980; Weinstein & Fineberg, 1980; 
McNeil, Weichselbaum & Pauker, 1981; Miyamoto & Eraker, 1985, 1988). Patient 
preferences are usually inferred from direct or indirect questions on how patients value 
life years and quality of life. These (subjective) values are usually called utilities. Several 
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methods of utility elicitation, and hence treatment preference assessment, have been 
developed. The elicitation of utilities has been given much attention and research. 
Examples of methods are direct ratings (e.g., Essink-Bot, Bonsel & van der Maas, 
1990), standard gambles, also called the certainty equivalent method (e.g., Llewellyn-
Thomas et al., 1982), and the time tradeoff method (McNeil, Weichselbaum & Pauker, 
1981). The latter two methods will be discussed in Chapter 2. 
In this chapter we will describe what the main tradeoff is for several forms of cancer, 
namely a tradeoff of quantity versus quality of life. We aim to show that the method of 
pair comparisons has an intuitive appeal for revealing such a tradeoff. Guided by the 
theory of Coombs & Avrunin in The Structure of Conflict (1988), we will also study 
conflicts within and between individuals in this chapter. Such conflicts may occur during 
a decision process in which both patient and physician participate. 
In Section 2 we will describe the general structure of medical problems in oncology. 
In Section 3 a possible conflict within a patient is described, and we will exemplify what 
considerations may lead to a preference for one of two alternatives. Section 4 elaborates 
on a possible conflict between patient and physician. Section 5 concludes and discusses. 
In Section 6 the contents of this thesis are given. 
2. Medical decision making 
In everyday medical practice physicians make treatment choices for patients. Often 
such choices are not difficult, since they are led by medical considerations in terms of 
most desirable consequences. That is, if there are two treatments A and B, and there is a 
significant difference in life expectancy between A and B, the treatment with the higher 
life expectancy is chosen. Whether a difference is significant is not a statistical question, 
but is usually a judgment made by a physician. 
In this thesis, we will confine ourselves to choices between (usually two) cancer 
treatments. In oncology the necessity of a decision between two treatments, e.g., 
radiotherapy and surgery, may occur in many cancers, such as breast cancer and 
laryngeal cancer. The choice of treatment is usually based on life expectancy. If the life 
expectancies of both treatments are not considered to be significantly different, another 
criterion may come to the fore, usually quality of life. That is, if treatment A offers a 
better quality of life than does treatment B, while both treatments have the same life 
expectancy, then A will be chosen. It is justified that a physician chooses the treatment, 
since (s)he is the only person who is capable of assessing medical consequences. 
However, every physician will agree that in some instances there is no clearly led 
decision. For instance, if treatment A [B] is not preferred to treatment В [A] on the basis 
of criteria like the ones mentioned above, then none of the treatments is preferred a priori. 
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We will refer to such a situation as medical equivalence of the treatments. The definition 
of medical equivalence for two treatments with two important outcome attributes is the 
following1 : Let £= denote a preference-or-indifference relation, and let ~ denote an 
indifference relation. Let Ai and A2 be treatments, and let m and л be outcome attributes. 
Let Vi(m) [ І(Л)] denote a subjective evaluation of m [η] after treatment A;, i=l,2. Let 
Vi(m)^V2(m) and 2(л)^ і(л). Two treatments are medically equivalent if [Vi(m)-
2(/я)]~[ 2(л)- і(п)]. The function values of V are, usually implicitly, assessed by the 
physician, often based on experience. Hence, the judgment whether two treatments are 
medically equivalent is a matter of subjective evaluation. That is, a physician Ρ may say 
that treatments A and В are medically equivalent, while a physician Q states that one of 
the treatments should be preferred (on whatever grounds). This would mean that Ρ and Q 
have assessed different values to points of the functions Vi and V2. When treatments are 
medically equivalent, the physician usually makes a choice on what we will call 
secondary criteria. An example of such a criterion may be a remark of a patient indicating 
a preference for one of the treatments; another example of a criterion is that one of the 
treatments is significantly cheaper. The use of such secondary criteria indicates that in 
cases of medical equivalence physicians are searching for some ground on which to base 
a decision. However, it is possible that a patient will not consider the treatments 
medically equivalent, but may have a preference for one of them. In the following 
chapters we offer a procedure that elicits a patient's treatment preference by means of 
normative decision theory. This procedure may provide an advisory role in case a 
physician judges two treatments to be medically equivalent. Such a procedure implies that 
the patient would participate in the decision making of his/her own treatment. This, of 
course, is not beyond dispute. We think there are three conditions that are to be met in 
order to let patients participate in a treatment decision: 
1. In general, patients will not have enough knowledge of cancer treatments to take 
part in a treatment decision. Physicians can pass on their knowledge of cancer treatments 
and the consequences of these treatments to a patient. This knowledge is usually 
incomplete: A physician may know all possible consequences, but not, of course, which 
one actually will occur. Patients have to be informed about this uncertainty of possible 
consequences, in order to give them as much information as possible for the difficult 
decision to make. Especially under uncertainty there is an upsurge of superstitions 
(Frijda, 1986), i.e., dubious or implausible information is often not recognized as such. 
Hence, the need of good and reliable information is great. There are two important types 
of information, namely 
a. about future quality of life, and 
b. about expected quantity of life. 
This defmilion can easily be extended to >2 treatments and >2 important outcome attributes. 
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Ad a: In Chapter 3, existing knowledge firom the literature about quality of life after 
laryngectomy2 is integrated, resulting in the proposal of a model for quality of life after 
laryngectomy. Explaining such a model to patients may be fruitful and informative, and 
can be done on several levels: from a very basic to a very detailed description of possible 
future events, depending on how much a patient can comprehend. The reason for not 
modelling quality of life after radiation is explained in Chapter 3. 
Ad b: We think that the best way to inform patients about quantity of life is giving them 
the available figures, e.g. 5- and 10-year survival rates of surgery and radiotherapy, for 
the specific age of the patient. Egbert et al. (1964) reported that patients to whom 
information was given about postoperative pain, and the most appropriate coping with the 
pain, needed significantly less medication to reduce the pain than uninformed patients. 
Other research (Cohen & Lazarus, 1973) indicates, however, that information is useful 
only to the extent that patients are able to use it positively. 
2. A second condition is that patients should be emotionally capable to participate in 
making a treatment decision. Emotional (in)capability may sometimes be obvious. For 
instance, a proposal from the physician to the patient to participate in the treatment 
decision may give clarity. If a patient is not willing, there should be no urge from the part 
of the physician. If a patient is willing to participate, the procedure that is described in 
Chapter 2 can start, i.e., pair comparisons will be presented. Of course, willingness of 
the patient does not imply emotional capability, it is a conditio sine qua non. A definition 
of emotional capability is not (and probably cannot be) given. An obvious sign of 
emotional incapability is, for instance, refusal to start or to continue the test. More 
subjective signs may be confusion, preference shifts, etc. A possibility to detect 
emotional incapability that is not objectively observable, but may be inferred from 
subjective signs, is by examining the consistency of the answers that are given by a 
patient. All pair comparisons are presented once in a so-called replication. Replications 
occur on different days, and three replications altogether are held. The consistency of the 
answers can be examined by comparing the three choices (in different replications) that 
are made in the same pair comparison. A measure and a test of consistency are given in 
Chapter 2. We presume that emotionally incapable people will show more inconsistencies 
than emotionally capable people. Emotional (in)capability may be influenced by 
personality traits as well as situation characteristics. Often, the situation will activate an 
emotion which is normally not experienced by the patient. According to Frijda (1986), 
the term situation "refers to more than the event that elicits the emotion [...]. It refers to 
everything that event carries with it or around it". 
Laryngeal cancer is the case to which our procedure is applied in the following chapters. 
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3. The third condition we mention is rather obvious: patients who are asked to 
participate should have a choice between, according to the physician, medically 
equivalent treatments. 
We conclude this section with three remarks: 
1. Decision-analysts often meet some reluctance from the part of the physicians to 
allow patient participation in a treatment decision. Such reluctance may come from the 
physicians' unfamiliarity with decision-analytic methods. It should be made clear to 
physicians that they do not lose control over the decision process: They are given a 
decision-analytic tool that may help them by accounting for patient preferences in very 
difficult decisions. 
2. Of course, the simplest way of eliciting patient preferences is by asking them which 
treatment they would prefer. There are two dangers in asking this. First, patients may 
give a spontaneous, rather than a deliberate, reaction. It is our experience that patients 
start to realize what the essential problem is, namely trading off quality and quantity of 
life3, after having answered several pair comparisons. Second, it is very difficult to test 
whether the patient's answer is consistent. That is, once a patient has stated a preference, 
(s)he may be reluctant to change it; rather (s)he may search for a posteriori reasons to 
found his/her preference. Indeed, Koriat, Lichtenstein & Fischhoff (1980) emphasized 
the degree to which people search for confirmation, and not disconfirmation, of an 
initially favored answer. 
3. Since a treatment is chosen to avoid a certain death of the patient within a short 
period, we will shortly elaborate on the concept of death. The principal question that 
cancer patients have to deal with is whether or not they will stay alive. Whether patients, 
or humans in general, are capable of considering and valuing death is debatable. The 
French writer Marcel Proust, for instance, writes about "the mind's inability, when it 
ponders death, to picture something other than life". Apparently the state of being dead is 
unimaginable, despite its ontological conjugation. In essence the valuation of death can be 
summarized by the simple observation of the Greek philosopher Epicurus: "When I am, 
death is not and when death is, I am not". Usually death is thought of as a state-to-be-
avoided, though apparently it is generally agreed that there are states which are worse 
than death. This agreement has resulted in the connivance at euthanasia in many 
countries. Whether this agreement can be justified, in whatever sense, is never verifiable 
because of the inherent incomparability of any health state with death: no one will ever 
know 'what death is like'. 
Any valuation of death is strongly, if not only, related to belief. Therefore, a patient 
with severe pains may value death better than the actual state if (s)he believes in going to 
In the case of, for instance, laryngeal cancer (see later in this chapter). 
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paradise, and worse if (s)he believes in going to hell. If (s)he believes in going to a state 
of 'being nowhere', his/her valuation may go either direction (worse/better) depending on 
how the state 'being nowhere' is valued. It may be supposed that something as abstract 
and vague as being dead cannot be compared to something as concrete as being alive. 
Therefore, in our alternatives we did not incorporate alternatives explicitly stating death in 
the near future. Next to the presupposed inherent incomparability of death with other 
health states, an alternative 'death' may induce many biases because of its content. 
In Chapter 7 we will reckon with the possibility of health states worse than death. 
Such health states can be detected when patients indicate that they prefer smaller to higher 
numbers of life years in a certain health state. That the occurrence of such health states is 
possible, may be suggested by the fact that some laryngectomees commit suicide (see 
Chapter 3), which can be regarded as an irreversible escape from their current health 
state. Suicide is another situation, next to euthanasia, where it is likely that patients value 
death higher than the current health state. Hence, as argued in Chapter 7, a multiplicative 
model cannot be rejected a priori. Though we will argue that for laryngeal cancer an 
additive representation of utilities may be assumed, there may be patients for whom a 
multiplicative representation is more likely. Considerations favoring a multiplicative 
model are given by Miyamoto & Eraker (1988). However, we never encountered patients 
in our experiments who violated additivity but did not violate multiplicativity. Therefore, 
we will suppose that an additive model will not be violated by most laryngeal cancer 
patients. 
In the following we will elaborate on conflicts that may occur within the patient or 
between padent and physician during the decision process. 
5. An intra-individual conflict of the patient 
Two concepts, developed in Coombs & Avrunin (1988), which we will use are 
simply called Type I and Type II conflicts. A Type I conflict is a conflict that arises 
within individuals because they are torn between incompatible goals. A Type ¡I conflict is 
a conflict that arises between individuals because they want different things and have to 
settle for the same thing. 
The decision process which we will now sketch is the most common for cancer 
treatments: There are two treatments A and B. Treatment A has a better life expectancy L, 
and treatment В offers a better quality of life Q. If a patient is given the possibility to 
participate in the decision of his/her own treatment, (s)he has to solve a Type I conflict. 
That is, a patient will prefer to live as long as possible with the best possible quality of 
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life. However, in this example a higher life expectancy means a worse quality of life, and 
a better quality of life means a lower life expectancy. 
The difficulty of stating or eliciting a preference varies between patients. Patients who 
have the least difficulty are those who are lexicographic, i.e., patients who always choose 
on the basis of one of the attributes. For instance, a patient who always chooses for a 
higher life expectancy, will prefer the treatment with the highest expected life expectancy. 
The tradeoff between quality and quantity of life can at best be measured by simultaneous 
measurement of Q and L. In Chapter 2 it is tested by conjoint measurement whether Q 
and L are independent attributes. In our study, independence of Q and L is not rejected 
(see also Miyamoto & Eraker, 1988, who concluded that L and Q are utility 
independent). Common methods to elicit utilities in medical problems are (von 
Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986) 1. the gamble method, and 2. the time tradeoff method. 
These methods do not measure Q and L simultaneously (gambles) or do not test whether 
Q and L are independent (time tradeoffs). Both shortcomings are overcome by using 
conjoint measurement (Stalpers & Maas, 1991; Chapter 2). We will elaborate on the 
method of pair comparisons, which we use to elicit utilities, and try to put its intuitive 
appeal across to the reader. One of the conspicuous advantages of this method is that it 
does not presuppose assumptions, but allows the testing of these. 
The decision between treatments A and B, with, say, A giving a higher life expectancy 
and В a better quality of life can be split up into partial questions. For instance, treatment 
A may result in living m years with quality of life r, and В may result in living (fewer) η 
years with (better) quality of life s. A patient can be asked which outcome (s)he will 
prefer. By asking more of such questions (pair comparisons), it will be deducible what 
number of life years a patient is or is not willing to give up in order to gain quality of life. 
If the assumptions of conjoint measurement are satisfied, it is also possible to estimate 
utility functions of Q and L, and combine them into an overall utility function, i.e., a joint 
additive utility for Q and L, taken as a pair {Q,L}4. The combination of utilities is done 
according to some prespecified combination rule; for instance, an additive, multiplicative, 
or other combination of utilities can be specified. In the following chapters we will 
mainly concentrate on an additive combination rule. The utility functions are then used in 
a Markov model that simulates the medical choice at hand. One of the treatments will have 
the highest expected utility, and this treatment will be the advice that is given to both the 
patient and the physician. In Chapter 2 this procedure is extensively explained. By this 
time the Type I conflict is resolved. 
We will first elaborate somewhat more on this resolution process. A typical 
oncological decision problem occurs in the case of large T2- and small Tj-laryngeal 
4
 In the literature, also the terms marginal utility and utility, or partworths and utility, are current to 
distinguish between the separate and combined utility functions. 
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tumore. Here two medically equivalent treatments are available, namely radiotherapy and 
surgery, and there are two main attributes on which these treatments differ, namely life 
expectancy and quality of speech. After treatment of laryngeal cancer, several levels of 
speech may result, two of which are used in the discussion below. These are normal and 
artificial speech, resulting from radiotherapy and surgery, respectively. As an example, 
two patients who have participated in our study5 are introduced: Patient X is female, 69 
years old, and housewife; she was 44 years old when she was diagnosed having 
laryngeal cancer. Patient Y is male, 58 years old (also at the time of diagnosis), and a 
Jehovah's Witness. We will give considerations of X and Y on quality and quantity of 
life. 
Considerations of patient X. At the time of diagnosis, patient X has six children 
growing up. To her, the most important thing is to stay with the children as long as 
possible. So, the number of years to live becomes predominant, and quality of speech is 
of secondary importance. Of course, there must be some indifference point. For instance, 
if a pair comparison is presented with (1)15 years with artificial speech and (2) 15 years 
minus one minute with normal speech, everyone including patient X will choose 
alternative (2). However, she could not indicate an indifference point i, such that she 
would be indifferent between (1) and living i years with normal speech (which, by the 
way, indicates unsuitability of the time tradeoff method for patient X, since this method 
asks for such indifference points). Patient X said that even if she can live one month 
longer over a period of 15 years with a worse quality of speech, she would choose to do 
so. Of course, her perception of life with an artificial speech may have been influenced by 
her adjustment to such a life. However, the point is clear: people like patient X have 
reasons to choose for a longer life, no matter what quality of speech this might entail. 
Considerations of patient Y. Also the case of patient Y is very clear: He is a Jehovah's 
Witness, and he says his sole duty on earth is to preach the Gospel. Since this can only 
be done properly with a normal voice, patient Y is willing to give up any amount of life 
years in order to preserve the best possible quality of voice. He is absolutely not afraid to 
die, since he knows he is going to be saved. So, patient Y has reasons to choose for a 
better quality of speech, no matter how long his life (on earth) will be6. 
Both X and Y are practical examples of lexicographical decision makers. They both 
represent rather extreme positions: Patient X, in the sense that she was relatively young 
and had young children to bring up at the time of diagnosis; Patient Y, in the sense that he 
5
 This research has been done in collaboration wilh the St. Radboud Hospital, Nijmegen, The 
Netherlands. 
6
 Many people do not believe that this patient did not want to tradeoff quality of voice. I urged him 
several limes to rethink his statement, but he did not change his opinion. Our belief is not relevant here: 
we have to respect his statement, and we should not try to persuade him to think differently. 
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has a very explicit answer to the question why he is on earth, an answer that almost 
directly points at a voice-preserving treatment. Of course, many patients will be 
somewhere between these two: there will be reasons to preserve the quality of the voice, 
there will also be reasons to live as long as possible. Patients can thus be torn between 
incompatible goals, a Type I conflict. The tradeoff between these two attributes is a 
personal one: How strong are the reasons for, say, a teacher, to give up life years to 
preserve a normal voice (and hence to be able to go on teaching). What does it mean for, 
say, a tailor to lose the normal voice (and still be able to do the tailoring). 
The perception of the number of life years may differ interpersonally. That is, 
someone who has a life expectancy of 25 years may have a different opinion about living 
ten years than a person with a life expectancy of 12 years. Therefore, in the construction 
of alternatives one should reckon with the life expectancy of the patient at hand. If 
someone has a life expectancy of ten years, to most patients it is meaningless to 
incorporate a number of life years significantly exceeding this expectancy. 
So, for each person the question whether or not to give up life years, and, if so, how 
many, may be answered on the basis of personal opinion, belief, attitude, etc. For 
instance, a male patient may mention the following aspects to account for choosing 
surgery: his wife, his children, and a study he had just started. To choose in favor of 
radiotherapy, the following aspects may be important to him: the ability to talk with 
family and friends, the ability to talk at his office (he would lose his job if he would not 
be able to talk), being afraid of having an altered facial appearance. Some of these aspects 
will be mentioned by many patients. But again, they will value each aspect by its own 
merits, and hence may come to different assessments of these aspects. Such a valuation 
of aspects may underlie a choice between two alternatives (i.e., one pair comparison). 
We will describe two such valuations below. Suppose that two patients, W and Z, 
consider the same aspects to be of importance in the choice between treatments, namely 
their wives, and their ability to talk with a normal voice at work. Suppose they have to 
judge the pair comparison in which alternative (1) is living 10 years with artificial speech, 
and alternative (2) is living 6 years with normal speech. Imagine the following lines of 
reasoning for patients W and Z: 
Patient W has worked 15 years to arrive at the position at which he is now, in which 
conference work is vital. It means a lot to him to stay in this position for some years. He 
has been married for 26 years, and his wife ended up in a wheelchair after a car accident. 
An extra four (i.e., ten minus six) years to spend with his wife is not very tempting to 
him7. Patient W has a number of years in mind that he would minimally like to live, say 
7
 Of course, the helpless position of his wife could also have led to the desire to stay with her as long as 
possible to help her. However, this (fictitious) person has a different opinion. 
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five years8. Neither of the alternatives endangers this minimum. Hence, in this 
comparison patient W need not pay much attention to the number of life years. The other 
attribute, quality of speech, is essential in this comparison: alternative (1) does not enable 
him to stay in his function, but alternative (2) does. This difference means a lot to him: 
hence he will choose for alternative (2). 
Patient Ζ has been married for 10 years to his second wife and is very happy in this 
marriage, which yielded two children. He has been a lawyer for almost thirty years; he 
still enjoys it, but is not as motivated as he used to be. He is convinced that his wife will 
be devoted enough to help and encourage him to leam artificial speech, and that it does 
not matter much to her with what voice he speaks. It is important to him to be with her 
for a long time, and to raise the children. He thinks the children will eventually get used 
to an artificial voice. So the difference between artificial and normal speech to him is of 
minor importance, as compared to a difference of four years to live. Hence patient Ζ will 
choose for alternative (1). 
Valuations of quality and quantity of life may be different for each individual patient. 
The pair comparisons as asked in our test do account for such differences. Moreover, 
they may lead to lines of reasoning as sketched above for patients W and Z. It is our 
experience that patients are often not capable to put their problems in perspective, but 
consider them more rationally after the presentation of some pair comparisons. That is, it 
becomes clearer to patients what the relevant tradeoffs are. Such a realization has been 
reported before, see for instance Delver, Monsuur & Storcken (1991). Though this 
objective approach of the problem of treatment choice may at first be confronting, patients 
rather easily pick up the rationale underlying the pair comparisons. In general, the method 
leads to a solution of the Type I conflict. 
In this chapter only Type I conflicts within patients are considered. It is probable that 
physicians have such conflicts too. Based on their experience, they will have their own 
ways of handling such conflicts. It makes no sense to present pair comparisons to 
physicians, since they cannot know how their patients value the alternatives. If 
physicians answer the pair comparisons, this would only reveal whether they are 
prepared to make tradeoffs, but this does not reveal anything about a patient's 
preferences. 
4. An interindividual conflict between patient and physician 
When a Type I conflict is resolved, the outcome is presented to both patient and 
physician. They will decide together whether the advice is followed. Let us first sketch 
In Miyamoto & Erakcr (1988) this minimal number is called the aspiration level. 
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the ideal situation: the physician completely agrees with the advice, resulting from the 
decision analysis on the basis of the patient's preferences (or the physician is completely 
indifferent between the treatments). Then, the advice will immediately indicate which 
treatment to choose. On the other hand, the most delicate situation occurs if the patient 
has a preference for treatment A, and the physician has a preference for treatment B9. In 
this case, a Type II conflict has to be resolved. 
The decision between radiotherapy and surgery, as made by physicians, is mainly led 
by the tumor classification. That is, in general a patient with a T3- or T4-tumor10 is 
operated, a patient with a smaller (Tj or T2)-tumor is radiated. In a situation where 
surgery and radiotherapy are medically equivalent, we almost always deal with a large 
T2-tumor, or a small Тз-tumor. Suppose a patient X has a large Тг-штог, and that the 
physician in attendance, Ρχ, has indicated to prefer treating X with radiotherapy. 
Figure 1. Scale of difference values U(surgery) - U(radiotherapy). The shaded area 
indicates the area in which the difference value of X lies, as determined by a sensitivity 
analysis. In this Figure, -00 corresponds to a (lexicographic) preference for surgery, and 
м to a (lexicographic) preference for radiotherapy. 
1 ψ/mm. 
0 
U(surgeiy) - U(radiotherapy) 
In Figure 1, the treatment preference of X, elicited by the method described in Chapter 2, 
is set out on a difference scale. This scale can be constructed as follows: the Markov 
model gives the expected utilities of radiotherapy and surgery, U(radiotherapy) and 
U(surgery), respectively. The difference U(surgery) - U(radiotherapy) can be computed, 
giving a negative difference if radiotherapy is preferred, and a positive difference if 
surgery is preferred. People who are not willing to give up life years or are not willing to 
give up quality of speech, have differences °o and - » , respectively. The shaded area can 
be determined by a sensitivity analysis: manipulating utilities and probabilities in order to 
determine what effect slight changes have on the difference value. For instance, if the 
difference value 0 is included in the shaded area, then this means that, for instance, with a 
slightly different preference ranking, one would give a different advice. Patient X is 
depicted on this difference scale; clearly, X has a strong preference for surgery. In this 
case, the shaded area does not include the difference value 0. Hence, a genuine Type Π 
Of course, such a preference must be based on secondary criteria. 
0
 The T-classification is directly related to the extent and volume of the tumor. 
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conflict occurs, since patient X and physician Ρχ have different opinions, but must settle 
for the same treatment. 
Of course, it is not possible to solve a Type II conflict here, but we will give two 
considerations on the resolving process. First, Ρχ has indicated a preference for 
radiotherapy, and (s)he should explain to the patient on what criteria this preference is 
based. Since the treatments are medically equivalent, primary medical reasons will not 
underlie this preference. As we have argued before, there will be secondary criteria on 
which Px's preference is based. Second, in our example, radiotherapy will be very 
unattractive to X because X has a strong preference for surgery. It may be that surgery is 
less unattractive to Ρχ than radiotherapy is to X. Here we find ourselves in the area of 
interpersonal (non)comparability of utilities. Though this area is very interesting, it is not 
the subject of this chapter. We only note that X and Ρχ should openly discuss their 
preferences and finally come to a treatment choice. Especially, the second consideration 
may lead to a choice for surgery, since radiotherapy may be unacceptable to X. 
5. Conclusions and discussion 
We have given an outline of a decision process in which patients are allowed to 
participate in treatment decisions. We have argued that patients should be given the 
possibility to take part. It is then up to the patient whether (s)he joins in. During the first 
stage, the elicitation of a patient's preference, it should be checked whether the patient is 
consistent in his/her choices. A patient who is very inconsistent does not seem able to 
make decisions. If the intra-individual conflict is satisfactorily solved, the second stage, 
namely a joint decision by physician and patient, can be completed. 
In oncology, there are several forms of cancer where the decision structure is the same 
as in the case of laryngeal cancer (quality versus quantity of life). We will give two 
examples. 
- T2/T3-bladder cancer. Surgery gives a better life expectancy than radiotherapy, but 
cystectomy and urethrectomy result in loss of bladder and potency, and hence surgery 
offers a lower quality of life. 
- T2/T3-prostate cancer. Surgery gives a higher chance of curing the patient than 
radiotherapy does, though there is some operation mortality. However, surgery also 
gives a higher chance of impotence, and hence may offer a lower quality of life. 
In all these cases patients should have the possibility to make their own personal 
tradeoffs whether they prefer a longer life of lower quality, or a shorter life of better 
quality. This is of course only appropriate when treatments are medically equivalent. 
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6. Structure of this thesis 
The formal procedure of solving a Type I conflict for a patient is given in Chapter 2 
(this is a slightly rewritten version of Maas & Stalpers, 1992; an abstract of this chapter 
has appeared in Maas, 1990; a Dutch version of this chapter can be found in Stalpers & 
Maas, 1991). In this chapter, the medical problem of treatment choice for laryngeal 
cancer is introduced, a formal definition of additive conjoint measurement is given, and 
the analysis of the pair comparisons is explained. The test has been presented to 9 
patients, and the results of these experiments are also given in this chapter. 
Chapters 3 to 6 elaborate on various problems that go with the application. Chapter 3 
(Maas, 1991a) elaborates on the concept of quality of life for laryngectomees. These 
problems are diffuse, but can be classified into speech, vocational, and psycho-social 
rehabilitation. Problems that patients may encounter should be explained to patients 
before the test is applied. The model of quality of life for laryngectomees, which is given 
in this chapter, is based on stress theory. 
Chapter 4 considers the problem of violations of transitivity. Transitivity, one of the 
assumptions of additive conjoint measurement, is rather often violated in our study (see 
Chapter 2). Chapter 4 gives a measure of circularity which is based on Kendall & 
Smith's measure (Kendall & Smith, 1940), but is adjusted to cases with prior 
knowledge, such as in the problem considered here. If a patient violates transitivity but, 
according to the measure given in Chapter 4, is not judged to be too circular, his/her 
circular answers can be resolved into a transitive ordering of the alternatives at hand. 
The procedure of this process of solving intransitivities is described in Chapter 5 (an 
intuitive description of this method is given in Maas, 1991b). This chapter gives 
intuitively reasonable axioms about strength of preference, on which the method of 
finding a transitive preference order is based. Some convincing examples are given which 
show the practical usefulness and tractability of the method. 
Pair comparisons deal with riskless outcomes. This means that the elicited utility 
function is a riskless one. It is an old debate whether the riskless and risky utility 
functions are equal. In Chapter 6 it is argued that they are not equal; a convincing 
example for this argument is given. Further, we will use a theorem (Maas & Wakker, 
1991, Theorem 3.1) stating that it suffices to present risky gambles with one of two 
attributes held constant to establish a risk parameter that reflects risk attitude. Results of 
experiments are also given. 
Chapter 7 gives a generalization of the procedure described in Chapter 2 to other 
cancers and, if known, the relevant attributes. In this chapter the model of multiplicative 
conjoint measurement is also discussed. Multiplicativity is suggested by other studies 
(see e.g., Miyamoto & Eraker, 1988). 
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Chapter 8 discusses the preceding seven chapters. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ASSESSING UTILITIES BY MEANS OF CONJOINT MEASUREMENT: 
AN APPLICATION IN MEDICAL DECISION ANALYSIS1 
Summary 
A method is presented for helping patients who suffer from laryngeal cancer to decide 
between laryngectomy and radiotherapy in cases where these treatments are deemed 
medically equivalent. The method is based on the model of additive conjoint 
measurement. The treatment with the highest utility is determined from pair comparisons 
among outcomes that vary in quality and quantity of life. Pair comparisons enable a 
(partial) test of the axioms of additive conjoint measurement. This is in contrast with 
earlier work on decision making for patients with laryngeal cancer, and with most of the 
work in medical decision making in general, in which underlying axioms were almost 
never tested. Besides testing the axioms, another important advantage of pair 
comparisons is that they avoid difficulties with other, risk-based assessment procedures 
by presenting only riskless alternatives. Encouraging results have been found in a study 
among patients. 
1
 This is an adapted version of a Dutch paper that has appeared in the Nederlands Tijdschrift voor de 
Psychologie, 46,139-145 (1991); an abstract has appeared in Theoretical Surgery, 5,160 (1990). 
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I. Introduction 
In this chapter we apply the additive conjoint measurement model (described in the 
next section) to a medical decision problem, in which one of two treatments must be 
chosen. We aim to show that by presenting pair comparisons, in which quality and 
quantity of life are to be traded off, a preference for one treatment can be derived. It is 
emphasized that this preference is the preference of the patient and not of the physician, 
and that it is based on individual analysis. We will report empirical findings from a study 
among patients, which show that the additive conjoint measurement model is a useful 
model for choosing between medical treatments on the basis of a patient's tradeoffs. 
Two methods for eliciting utilities, currently used in medical decision analysis, are 1) 
the time tradeoff method and 2) the certainty equivalent method (Weinstein & Fineberg, 
1980). In the time tradeoff method, respondents are asked to indicate how many life 
years from a given number of years they are prepared to give up in order to gain an 
improved quality of life. For example, the first option may be 'living 25 years in a bad 
health', and the second option 'living 25 minus χ years in a good health'. People have to 
indicate a number χ such that they are indifferent between the two options. In the 
certainty equivalent method, respondents are asked to indicate indifference between a 
gamble and a number of years for certain. An example is a gamble in which there is a 
50% chance to live 10 years and a 50% chance to live 2 years. A respondent then 
indicates the duration of a certain survival, i.e., the certainty equivalent, that he/she 
considers equivalent to the gamble. Slight alterations of this method are possible. For 
example: the certainty equivalent may be given and people are asked to fill in the 
probabilities such that they are indifferent. For a good and extensive survey of these and 
other possibilities, see von Winterfeldt & Edwards (1986). 
Both methods suffer from shortcomings, which can be avoided or mitigated by using 
conjoint measurement, developed in Luce & Tukey (1964). It is a type of (fundamental) 
measurement, in which respondents directly compare two or more attributes 
simultaneously with regard to their preferability. Conjoint measurement permits levels of 
attributes to be nominal and enables researchers to test axioms. These are reasons why 
conjoint measurement has become popular in, especially, psychology and marketing 
research. We will mention shortcomings of the time tradeoff and certainty equivalent 
methods, and explain how they are handled by conjoint measurement: 
1. Consistency (within a judge) of indifference measures is difficult to determine. For 
example, to this end it is not clear how to interpret a reliability measure such as the 
correlation between two sets of indifference values, with respect to acceptability. Other 
difficulties with a measure such as a correlation is that its precision depends on the 
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number of observations on which it is based, and that it is rather insensitive to 
systematical errors. In this study, another measure of consistency is used, since the 
answers of the patients are preference judgments. This measure tests against randomness 
of choices, and will be introduced in Section 3. 
2. In problems of everyday life, people often choose one of several options (for 
whatever reasons). However, the statement of complete indifference is a rare occurrence 
in practice. Thus, asking for preferences is more in accordance with people's experience, 
and this is what is done in our method. 
3. Both the time tradeoff and the certainty equivalent methods are almost never tested 
against assumptions. For instance, both methods aggregate utilities of levels of different 
attributes into an overall utility, but the implicit assumption of independent attributes, 
necessary for such an operation, is rarely tested. In the procedure we propose, 
assumptions of conjoint measurement are tested. 
4. The attribute which is traded off, or gambled with, becomes salient. That is, people 
tend to give more weight to this attribute. This phenomenon is demonstrated by 
experiments in which respondents first had to indicate their indifference point (certainty 
equivalent). In preference judgments this certainty equivalent later was preferred to the 
gamble with which it was judged to be equivalent (von Winterfeldt, 1980; Tversky, 
Sattath & Slovic, 1988). The most likely explanation for this phenomenon is that the 
attribute that is traded off or gambled with is weighted differently (i.e., higher) from a 
situation in which a choice is made. It is obvious that a priori neither attribute should 
receive more weight just by posing a question. 
Additional disadvantages of the certainty equivalent method are: 
5. Risk, as represented in gambles, often induces unknown subjective expectations of 
probability (Machina, 1987). Hence, if we present a 50%-50% gamble, we cannot be 
sure that probabilities of events are perceived and processed as equal. 
6. Though subjective expected utility theory is assumed to be justified for normative 
purposes, it is unacceptable for description of actual choice behavior (Machina, 1987; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
Disadvantages 5 and 6 are avoided by conjoint measurement since it does not include 
risky decisions. For the inclusion of risky decisions into our procedure, see Chapter 6. 
Our study concerns the choice of treatment (radiotherapy or surgery) for laryngeal 
cancer. In many cases the choice of treatment depends largely on the size of the tumor. 
That is, in general, if the tumor is small (size Ti or T2), radiotherapy is chosen. If the 
tumor is large (size T4), surgery is chosen. If the tumor has size T3 (total immobility of 
the vocal cords, but no extension to adjacent structures), the choice is less obvious: both 
treatments are deemed medically equivalent (Stalpers, Verbeek & van Daal, 1987). 
Surgery implies that the larynx is removed; this forces patients to leam artificial speech, 
20 
in which they sometimes do not succeed and hence remain mute. Impairment of speech 
may cause severe problems on the social-psychological and vocational levels (see Chapter 
3). Radiotherapy preserves normal (sometimes hoarsened) speech, but has a higher 
probability of recurrence of the tumor, and hence yields a lower life expectancy than does 
surgery. In Figure 1 part of the decision tree for this problem is given, with hypothetical 
but typical probabilities. The possibility of no speech has been omitted for the sake of 
clarity. 
Figure 1. Decision tree of medical problem in case of laryngeal cancer. RT = 
radiotherapy, S = surgery. 
DIAGNOSIS Πι 
cure 
recur 
rence 
NORMAL 
SPEECH 
ARTIFICIAL 
SPEECH 
DEATH 
ARTIFICIAL 
SPEECH 
ARTIFICIAL 
SPEECH 
DEATH 
So, the crucial question is how to assess a patient's tradeoff of life expectancy against 
quality of speech. The analysis checks whether patients make tradeoffs according to the 
assumptions of the additive conjoint measurement model. If a patient satisfies the 
assumptions, it is possible to deduce which treatment he or she prefers. It is noted that 
such a procedure is based on assumptions of how to choose rationally. The deduction of 
a prefeired treatment can only be regarded as an advice, based on a patient's tradeoffs and 
the mentioned assumptions. 
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2. Additive conjoint measurement 
In the sequel we apply the additive form of conjoint measurement to utilities. That is, 
we have two attributes Y and Q, with levels a, b, c,... and p, q, r,..., respectively; these 
levels may be nominal. Y can be thought of as number of life years, and Q can be thought 
of as quality of voice. For convenience we let (αφ), (b,q), or (c,r), (a, ft, с 6 Y and ρ, q, 
r e Q), denote generic elements of the Cartesian product Υ χ β. Let ^ be a binary 
preference relation on the set of pairs (aj>) to which we will refer as objects. Let - be the 
symmetric and >- the asymmetric part of P. For instance, (αφ) & |>] (b,q) means that a 
patient considers living a years with quality of speech ρ at least as good as [better than] 
living b years with quality of speech q. The axioms of additive conjoint measurement 
have first been given by Luce & Tukey (1964). The axioms are: 
Al: ^ is a weak order, that is: 
(la) ^ is connected: either (a,p) > (b,q) or (b,q) *= (a,p) or both for all pairs 
{(a,p),(b¿i)) that may be formed from Y χ Q. 
(lb) & is transitive: (αφ) Ъ= (b,q) and (b,q) > (c,r) imply (αφ) & (c,r) for all triples 
((a/>),(i>,i),(c,r)) that may be formed from У χ β. 
Say, we present three pairs of objects {A,B), (A,C] and {B,C} to patients 
(respondents). They have to indicate for each pair which object they prefer (this is the 
method of pair comparisons). They violate transitivity (A 1(b)) if their preferences are A 
>• В, В >- С, С >• A, or В >• А, С >• В, A >• С. Such violations are called circular triads 
or 3-cycles. In Section 4, we will use a measure of circularity based on these circular 
triads. Of course, a circular structure of choices may also occur with m > 3 objects, and 
is then called an m-cycle. 
A2: Independence: (αφ) P= (a,q) implies (b,p) & (b,q), and (αφ) 2= (b,p) implies 
(a,q) > (b,q) for all quadruples {(αφ),(α^),φ,ρ),φ^)} that may be formed from Υ χ 
ß. 
For instance, let a be 2 years, b 5 years, ρ perfect health, and q moderate health. As an 
example of the first part of A2: if 2 years in perfect health is preferred to 2 years in 
moderate health, this implies that 5 years in perfect health is preferred to 5 years in 
moderate health. This axiom would be violated if the premise holds and the conclusion 
does not hold. The second part of A2 can be clarified similarly. 
A3: Double cancellation: (a,q) *= (b,r) and φφ) > (c,q) imply (αφ) ï= (c,r) for all 6-
tuples {(a,<7),(í>,r),(¿>,p),(c,^ ),(a,p),(c,r)} that may be formed from Κ χ β. 
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As an example, let a, b, p, and q be the same as in the example of A2, and let с be 10 
years, and r bad health. Then, double cancellation requires that if 2 years in moderate 
health is preferred to 5 years in bad health, and S years in perfect health is preferred to 10 
years in moderate health, then this implies that 2 years in perfect health is preferred to 10 
years in bad health (see also Figure 2a). If the premises hold, but the conclusion does not 
Figure 2. Double cancellation axiom; Figure 2a represents the axiom, Figure 2b is a 
violation of the axiom. The white arrows represent the implications. 
2a 2b 
hold (see Figure 2b), then this is a violation of double cancellation. Double cancellation 
can also be exemplified by addition of scale values: 
UYW + UQWäUYOO + UQO-) <=> UY(a)-UY(b);>UQ(r)-UQ(<7) 
UY(fc) + UQ(P) > UY(C) + UQ(<7) <=> U Y ( ¿ ) - U Y ( C ) > U Q ( < 7 ) - U Q ( P ) 
+ + 
UY(a) + UQ(p)>UY(c) + UQ(r) <=> υγ(α) - UY(C) > U Q W - UQ(P) 
A4: Solvability: The equation (a,p) ~ (ai,q) has a solution for а\ e Y, and the 
equation (aj)) - (b,pi) has a solution forpi G Q. This is a technical assumption (i.e., not 
testable), and requires that both attributes are sufficiently dense. Stated otherwise, this 
axiom requires that a solution exists for specific classes of equalities (the axiom can also 
be formulated for inequalities). 
Together with a so-called Archimedean axiom, these axioms are necessary and 
sufficient for additive conjoint measurement. As shown in Luce, Krantz, Suppes & 
Tversky (1990), and Adams, Fagot & Robinson (1970), the Archimedean axiom has no 
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empirical content, hence has no relevance for applications. Therefore we will not give its 
definition. If the axioms of additive conjoint measurement are satisfied, there exist 
functions f and g such that for all a, b € Y and p, q e Q 
(a,p)*(b,q) iff f(a) + g(p)>f(b) + g(<7), (1) 
and ^ is said to be additively represented by >. If f and g' are two other functions with 
the same property, then there exist constants α > 0, βι, and ß2 such that 
f = af + ßi and g' = ecg + ß2 (2) 
(see Krantz et al, 1971, Theorem 2, p.257). The utility U(a,p) for the combination (aj)) 
is: 
U(a,p) = f(û) + g(p). (3) 
Axioms Al, A2 and A3 can be tested empirically, and are necessary for an additive 
representation. The above description of conjoint measurement is the so-called axiomatic 
approach. The numerical approach, often used in marketing research (Green & Rao, 
1971; Johnson, 1974), does not test the axioms of conjoint measurement but assumes 
that these axioms are (more or less) satisfied. In this sense, conjoint measurement can be 
used as a method to find the best fitting additive representation. In our case, however, 
conjoint measurement is used as a nonnative decision-analytic tool to help those patients 
who exhibit no or minor violations of the model (see Section 4). Patients who exhibit 
severe violations do not justify use of the model. As Krantz & Tversky (1971, p. 167) 
put it: "if one is primarily interested in psychological theory, rather than in scaling, the 
axiomatic approach has much to offer. It usually provides not only an explicit and precise 
formulation of the theory, but often a deeper and a more penetrating analysis of the 
structure under study". 
The additive model is a special case of the more general multiplicative model (see also 
Chapter 7). Situations in which a health quality is perceived worse than death are not 
allowed in the additive case. Such a valuation would lead to violation(s) of the 
independence axiom. In the application to laryngeal cancer, the independence axiom was 
never violated. The most violated axiom is transitivity, which is also an axiom of the 
multiplicative model (see for the axioms of the multiplicative model. Chapter 7, 
Appendix). Hence, in the application to laryngeal cancer apparendy nothing is won by 
using the more complicated multiplicative model. The additive model and its axioms are 
indeed easier to explain to patients than the multiplicative model. Using an additive 
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model, however, leads to the strange situation that living 0 years in a good health is 
valued better than living 0 years in a bad health (see also Miyamoto & Eraker, 1988). 
This implication is not used in the practical application, since the Markov simulation 
evaluates per year, starting at one year after the treatment took place. Whenever a patient 
does value one or more health states as worse than death, then the multiplicative model 
has to be used. This can be investigated formally, by presenting pair comparisons in 
which the same health quality appears, but the number of years is varied. As soon as a 
patient prefers the alternative with the lower number of years a multiplicative model 
should be used. It also can be investigated informally, just by talking with the patient. We 
have experienced that patients may say valuable things during a preparatory conversation. 
(Of course, when a multiplicative model is used, the pair comparisons need to be 
adjusted, see Chapter 7.) 
Figure 3. Examples of utility functions for good and bad health. 
good health 
bad health 
utility of + 
life years 
0 
Another plausible utility function is the following: suppose the subjective valuation of 
life years in a particular (bad) health state is at best represented by a single peaked utility 
function (see Figure 3). For instance, there is a maximum of five years one wants to live 
in a bad health, and after these five years one would rather die. Coombs & Avrunin 
(1988) state that the underlying process for a single peaked function is that the good 
satiates, and the bad escalates. In our case, we may interpret 'the good' as the number of 
's \ \ l0 life years 
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years to live, and 'the bad' as the troubles and difficulties one may have due to the bad 
health. In this chapter we assume that all utility functions are monotonically increasing, 
i.e., the higher the number of life years in a particular health state, the higher the utility of 
that combination. If a particular health state induces a single peaked utility function, it is 
not known beforehand which pair comparisons are redundant, and which pair 
comparisons contain relevant information. For instance in Figure 3, six years in bad 
health has to be compared to four years in bad health, and both alternatives have to be 
compared to two years in good health. In general patients will not be able to indicate at 
which number of life years their peak in the utility function will lie. Hence, it is 
impossible to determine which of the pair comparisons are to be presented. Furthermore, 
if a (bad) health state with a single peaked utility function for life years occurs together 
with a (better) health state with a monotonically increasing utility function for life years, 
the multiplicative model is not appropriate to estimate the overall utilities. 
3. Application to laryngeal cancer 
In previous studies (McNeil, Weichselbaum & Pauker, 1981; Stalpers, Verbeek & van 
Daal, 1989), two attributes were identified to be very important, namely number of life 
years and quality of speech. To verify this, we interviewed five laryngectomees (see 
Chapter 3). Some of them were active in a union of laryngectomees, and had much 
experience with laryngectomees' problems. It was concluded that number of life years 
and quality of life are the most important attributes. However, if the possible 
consequences of treatments are extensively explained, then quality of life may be reduced 
in this case to quality of speech (Chapter 3). 
Based on previous experiments, we decided to use three levels of speech quality: 
normal speech, artificial speech, and no speech (mute). The first level results from 
radiotherapy, the other two result from surgery. It can be argued that one should include 
hoarse speech (resulting from radiotherapy) and distinguish two levels of artificial speech 
(namely esophageal and electrolaryngeal speech). However, in previous experiments, 
utilities of hoarse and normal speech appeared to be relatively close; this also holds for 
the utilities of the two types of artificial speech. We used six levels of number of life 
years. Often the utility function of number of life years is steeper in the first years than in 
the later years. To have a reliable estimate of this function, levels of the first, say 8, years 
are chosen close to each other, while the intervals between levels representing a high 
number (say, > 8) of years, are larger. The specific levels of number of life years depend 
on the life expectancy of a patient. With 3 levels of speech quality and 6 levels of number 
of life years, 18 different objects (i.e., combinations of speech quality and life duration) 
can be created. 
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To establish a preference ranking of these objects, the method of pair comparisons is 
used, since this method enables us to test the axioms Al, A2, and A3. Of course, trivial 
pair comparisons were left out. That is, if a J? e A andp.q e Ρ and a>- b,p >• q, then it 
is trivial to compare (α,ρ) and (.b,q), since certainly (α,ρ) >• (b,q). However, the 
comparison between (a,q) and (bp) is not trivial. Note that trivial questions only can be 
traced if the levels of the attributes are ordered at least ordinally, which is the case for 
number of life years and quality of speech. In our case, with 3 x 6 levels, we have 45 
nontrivial pair comparisons altogether2. The choice of the number of levels has, as 
explained, emerged from previous experiments. There is no requirement in the method 
with respect to the number of levels to be chosen, though one should take care not to use 
too many levels, since the number of nontrivial pair comparisons would then grow 
rapidly. The preference ranking of numbers of life years is always clear, i.e., the higher 
of two numbers of life years is always preferred. The ranking of health qualities may not 
always be clear. In such cases it is advisable to establish this ranking by asking a patient 
before presenting the pair comparisons. This will significantly reduce the number of 
nontrivial pair comparisons. Though 45 pair comparisons seems large already, it is the 
author's experience that patients far more easily answer these comparisons than time 
tradeoffs or certainty equivalents. The task is a so-called forced-choice task, that is, 
patients are not allowed to give an indifference answer. In all pair comparisons 
respondents have to pick the object they prefer. This results in questions like: 
What do you prefer? 
A. Living six years with artificial speech, 
or 
B. Living four years with normal speech. 
Both options A and В imply that after the given number of life years one will die. 
There is equivalence if one is prepared to give up precisely two life years to preserve 
normal speech instead of artificial speech. If one is prepared to give up more than two 
years, one will choose option B. If one is not prepared to give up two years, one will 
choose option A. If respondents always choose to maximize life years (i.e. are not 
willing to give up life years), or always choose to maximize quality of speech, they are 
said to show a lexicographic choice pattern. In such cases one attribute definitely 
outweighs the other (without a shadow of a doubt). Such people would have no 
(cognitive) problem in choosing between radiotherapy and surgery. The test then only 
2
 In Chapter 4 it is derived that, for two attributes with m and η ordinally ordered levels, the number of 
nontrivial pair comparisons is ("X")· 
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serves to detect the lexicographic choice pattern at hand, but the data are not analyzed any 
further, since the choice between treatments for such respondents is always obvious: 
maximizing life years indicates a preference for surgery, and maximizing quality of 
speech indicates a preference for radiotherapy. This lexicography should be interpreted in 
the context of the applied test: For instance, there may be pair comparisons in which a 
person who is lexicographic on life years would trade off, say, one month of 15 years in 
order to gain quality of speech. Such comparisons with small differences in life years are 
not incorporated in the test, because they are not relevant in practice. If we henceforth use 
the term lexicography, this should be understood in the context of the used test 
To test whether respondents give consistent answers, i.e., do not change preferences 
over time, the test is applied three times. These three so-called replications are assumed to 
be mutually independent, given the (unknown) true preference. This may be disputable, 
but experience has shown that people, during a certain replication, usually cannot recall 
which answer they have given to the same question in a previous replication. 
Consistency of answers can be estimated by the proportion of comparisons in which a 
respondent gives the same answer to the same question in all replications. In case of three 
replications, formula (4) (Coombs, Bezembinder & Goode, 1967) can be used for the 
estimation of consistency: 
π =0.5 + [3(4Х-1)] 1 / 2/б· (4) 
λ is the proportion of pair comparisons to which the same answer is given in all three 
replications, π is a maximum likelihood estimate of π, and can be interpreted as a 
measure of consistency, π lies in the interval [.5,1]. Since π = .5 represents the 
randomness of a fair coin it should be required that π exceeds .5 significantly, say, to the 
extent of three standard deviations. Hence, since the number of nontrivial pair 
comparisons is 45 in our case, it is required that 
π > .5 + 3[(.5)(.5)/45]1/2 = .63. 
Solving (4) for λ with π ä .63, the minimal consistency may also be expressed by λ S 
.30, which is equivalent to a same answer in all three replications to at least 14 pair 
comparisons. We will refer to answers that are the same in all replications as stable 
answers. In practice π is usually much higher, i.e., π > .85, corresponding to at least 28 
stable answers. Hence instability of answers usually is no problem in our study. Note 
that the estimation of consistency does not use (estimated) utilities, but is estimated 
directly from the observations. 
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Tests of axioms are based on majority preferences, i.e., the answer that is given to a 
certain pair comparison in a majority of the replications is said to be the (majority) 
preference. Note that the object which is majority preferred can always be determined, 
since the number of replications is odd, and indifference judgments are not allowed. If a 
respondent satisfies all axioms, a preference ranking of the 18 objects can be derived. 
Utilities are then estimated by Ordmet (Roskam, 1991; McClelland & Coombs, 1975). 
Ordmet uses a system of linear inequalities, which is derived from the data; this results in 
a solution space, rather than one solution. Hence, by using Ordmet one has a measure of 
how tight the solution is. That is, the solution space consists of a polyhedral convex cone 
which represents the general solution. This general solution can be described by a 
particular subset of solutions, called extreme solutions. An extreme solution is a solution 
that cannot be written as a positive linear combination of any set of other solutions. A 
maximin criterion searches for one solution, the so-called maximin vector. The minimal 
correlation between this solution and the (minimal set of) extreme vectors of this space is 
maximized. Ordmet does not accept conflicting inequalities. 
In principle, any program can be used in which data are assumed to be represented by 
the (in our case) additive conjoint effect of several attributes. Usually, this is done by 
transforming the observed ordinal values (e.g., rankings), and finding the best fitting 
scale values. Programs designed for finding such solutions are widely available, such as 
Monanova (Kruskal, 1965; see also Coxon, 1982) and Unicon (Roskam, 1974). These 
programs optimize a goodness-of-fit criterion such as Kruskal's stress (Kruskal, 1965). 
If a patient satisfies all (testable) axioms Al to A3 of additive conjoint measurement, this 
will usually result in perfect fit, that is, Kruskal's stress will be 0. These programs accept 
all preference rankings, also if assumptions are not satisfied. If a perfect additive 
representation exists, this will be given by both Monanova and Unicon, and the solution 
space of Ordmet will contain this additive representation. 
Utilities of quality and quantity of life lie on an interval scale with a common unit for 
all (in our case both) attributes (see (2)). For convenience, utilities are transformed such 
that the highest and lowest marginal utility are 1 and 0, respectively. After estimation of 
utilities (of several, in our case six, numbers of life years) by Ordmet, the utility function 
for life years is estimated, since for the Markov simulation a utility for each life year is 
necessary. This utility function is usually logarithmic. Though the choice of the 
logarithmic family of functions is, in principle, rather arbitrary, it is intuitively appealing. 
That is, a priori the subjective difference between living 1 and 2 years is likely to be 
larger than the subjective difference between living 10 and 11 years. This intuition is 
adequately represented by a logarithmic function and is not unusual in the literature (e.g., 
Pliskin, Shepard & Weinstein, 1980). Indeed, in the history of measurement the 
logarithmic function is one of the most occurring. For instance, Fechner's (1860) 
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psychophysical law, that should cover a large class of psychological variables, was 
logarithmic. In his Elemente der Psychophysik (1860) he states that "Das Gesetz, dass in 
der höheren Theilen der Reizskala grössere Reizzuwüchse erfoderlich sind, als in den 
niederen, um noch eine gleiche Verstärkung der Empfindung hervorzubringen, ist längst 
bekannt gewesen, indem es eine Sache täglicher Erfahrung ist" [Translated as (1966): 
"The law that Stimulus increments for equal increases in sensation are larger at the upper 
end of a stimulus scale than at the lower, has been known for a long time, since it is a 
matter of everyday experience"]. In utility theory, Bernoulli's (1738) attempt to solve the 
Petersburg paradox consisted of assuming a logarithmic utility function for money. 
It is debatable whether the (riskless) utility function as determined by additive conjoint 
measurement can be used in a risky context, i.e., in a situation where no outcome will 
occur for certain. We will extensively discuss the possible difference between riskless 
and risky utilities in Chapter 6. For the moment, we assume that on the basis of the 
estimated utilities the overall utilities of all relevant treatments can be computed: 
U(T) = Ip(yi,qj)*U(yi,qj), (5) 
where U(T) is the utility of a treatment, 
p(yi, qj) is the probability of living y, years with speech quality qj and 
U(y¡, qj) is the utility of the combination of yi and qj, as computed in (3). 
The treatment with the highest utility then can easily be determined. Utilities of treatments 
are computed by 'folding back' a decision tree (see below for an example of folding 
back). An example of such a decision tree is given in Figure 1. We note that with additive 
conjoint measurement we measure the certain outcomes, e.g., living 4 years with normal 
speech. The transition from one quality of speech to another is not explicitly measured. In 
the computation of treatment utilities we assume that such transitions influence neither the 
valuation of quality of speech, nor the valuation of life duration. 
Folding back can be done by the program Decision Maker (Sonnenberg & Pauker, 
1987). In Decision Maker, a Markov process can be simulated. That is, there are several 
states a patient can be in (e.g., normal speech, dead), and there are (transition) 
probabilities to go from one state to another. Note that such transitions in our study are 
irreversible: once a patient goes from a particular state to another state (e.g., from normal 
to artificial speech due to recurrence of the tumor), there is no possibility to return to the 
previous (in our study better) state. The transition probabilities are age-dependent (i.e., if 
a patient gets older, the age-specific mortality increases), and depend on the previous 
state only (and not on the previous sequence of states). Since all patients will finally be 
dead (which is called the absorbing state), we have a finite probabilistic system. 
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Figure 4. An example of folding back a branch of a decision tree. The probability that 
this branch occurs is .002. RT = radiotherapy, S = surgery, N = normal, A = artificial, 
U(4 years) = .3, U(N) = .8, U(A) = .4. 
YEAR 0 1 2 3 4 
N N N 
Once the transition probabilities are estimated, it is possible to compute the utility of 
the treatments. This is done by folding back all branches belonging to a treatment. We 
will give a worked-out example of folding back for one such branch, see also Figure 4. 
For instance, a patient receives radiotherapy, and lives 3 years with normal speech, then 
there is a recurrence of the tumor, resulting in surgery, and the patient lives one more 
year with artificial speech. The utility for living 4 years (altogether) is, say, .3. Further, 
suppose the utilities of normal and artificial speech are .8 and .4, respectively. The 
computation of utilities of treatments is rather complicated, and needs further research. In 
our case, the following heuristic is applied to compute the utility for quality of life: 75% 
of the life after radiotherapy is lived with a normal voice, and, after surgery, 25% is lived 
with an artificial voice. Hence, the utility for quality of life is (.75)(.8) + (.25)(.4) = .7. 
Going by (3), the utility of the combination then is .3 + .7 = 1.0. This value is multiplied 
by the probability that this particular branch occurs. For instance, if the sequence, living 
3 years with normal speech and then living one year with artificial speech, has probability 
.002 of occurring, then the utility of this particular branch is (.002)(1.0) = .002. This 
branch now has been folded back. Folding back all the branches that start from a 
particular treatment, and adding the utilities of the branches, gives the overall utility for 
that treatment. So-called sensitivity analysis is applied to check whether small changes in 
utilities and probabilities cause a change of treatment preference. If sensitivity analysis 
does not show such a change, the treatment with the highest utility will be advised. 
It is noted that by simulating a Markov model, we can better approach reality. That is, 
one can reckon with events such as recurrences of tumors, age-specific mortalities etc., 
whereas the computation used in McNeil, Weichselbaum & Pauker (1981) does not 
reckon with changes of health states. 
4. Results 
A pilot study among 45 students was carried out to uncover possible shortcomings of 
the test On the basis of this pilot study we concluded that with more information about 
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the results of the treatments and the purpose of the test, it would be possible to present 
the test to patients. 
We presented the test to nine (ex-) patients. Three of them had been laryngectomized 
more than a year ago, six were following radiotherapeutic treatment at the time of testing. 
We considered especially the latter group to be of importance, since they were going 
through a rather unstable and uncertain period, very similar to the situation before the 
choice of treatment. All patients were explicitly informed about the experimental and 
voluntary character of the test. It is noted that for these patients the treatment already had 
been determined at the time of testing. In the appendix a practical application is given, in 
which the result of the test was used to give an advice to physicians and patient what 
treatment to choose. In this section we will concentrate on the nine patients who were 
first tested. 
Three patients were lexicographic: two were not prepared to give up life years, one 
was not willing to give up quality of speech. One patient did not complete the test, but 
stopped after one replication. Two patients were transitive and also satisfied the other 
testable axioms of additive conjoint measurement. So, including the lexicographic 
patients, altogether five out of eight patients satisfied the axioms. The remaining three 
patients showed cycles in their answers. The degree of circularity can be measured by 
Kendall & Smith's ζ (Kendall & Smith, 1940). An adjusted measure ζ 3 has been 
developed (see Chapter 4) which is, like ζ, based on circular triads. The difference 
between ζ and ζ 3 is that ζα is
 m
ore general in the sense that it can reckon with prior 
knowledge in a design. The values of ζ and ζ
ϊ
 lie in the interval [0,1]. Both are to be 
interpreted as to mean the proportion of the triads that can be circular, but are observed 
not to be circular. The circularity of preference structures is difficult to interpret 
statistically, since, as Bezembinder (1981) has shown, a test with a null hypothesis of 
circularity is very weak, i.e., the null hypothesis is nearly always rejected. It seems 
straightforward to reject circularity for those structures in which less than 5% of the triads 
is circular. This corresponds to the requirement that ζ 3 ä .95. On the basis of this 
criterion patient 5 is judged to be too circular (see Table 1). The other two patients who 
showed cycles were not too circular. If patients are not too circular in their answers, their 
intransitivities must be solved such that a transitive ordering of the alternatives is created. 
This can be done by a solving procedure (Chapter 5; see also Maas, 1991b). After the 
solving of intransitivities the three patients also satisfied the other axioms of conjoint 
measurement. 
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Table 1. Degrees of circularity ζ
Β
 and consistency π, the advised treatment, and the 
maximin correlation of the Ordmet solution of five nonlexicographic patients. 
(¡a π advised1 maximin 
patient treatment correlation3 
.97 
1.0 
.99 
1.0 
.86 
.94 
.94 
.95 
.95 
.61 
RT 
S 
RT2 
RT^ 
NO2 
.823 
.930 
.954 
.935 
.829 
1
 This advice would have been given (RT = radiotherapy, S = surgery, NO = no advice). 
As stated before, these results were without any implications for the patients. 
2
 These patients had a Ti-carcinoma and will always be treated with radiotherapy. 
3
 The maximin correlation can be interpreted as a measure of the tightness of the 
solution. 
The adjusted measure of circularity ¡¡a, the consistency A, computed by (4), and the 
treatment that is determined to have the highest utility, and hence is the advised treatment, 
are given in Table 1. Patients 1 and 2 in Table 1 were offered another version of the test, 
with five levels of speech (mute, electrolaiyngeal, esophageal, hoarse, and normal 
speech), and five levels of life years (3,6,9,12,15). Patient 5 in Table 1 had a higher life 
expectancy than patients 3 and 4. Since it is possible in our procedure to adjust the 
presented levels of life years in the pair comparisons to the life expectancy of a patient, 
other levels of life years were presented to patient 5. All patients but one were more 
consistent than expected under randomness. Patient 5 was judged to be too circular, and 
also did his answers not exceed randomness; it is possible that the observed circularity in 
the answers can be attributed to this randomness. This is mainly due to the fact that his 
answers in the first replication completely differed from his answers in the second and 
third replication. That is, in the first replication he was prepared to give up many life 
years in order to gain quality of speech, whereas in the later replications he was not so 
willing to give up life years. It is possible that, after the first replication, he reconsidered 
the questions and draw the conclusion that he would manage to overcome a 
laryngectomy. 
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Figure 5. Utilities of patient 2. Illustration of tightness of the solution space, computed 
byOrdmet. 
Uy Uy + Uq Uq 
Utilities for 3 years 0 
numbers of 
life years 
6 years .319 
9 years .638 
12 years .850 
15 years ι Q 
U(15 years, esophageal speech) = U(15,ES) = 1.0 + .128 = 1.128 
U(12 years, normal speech) = U(12,N) = .850 + .298 = 1.148 
Hence, U(12,N) is preferred to U(15,ES). If .021 is subtracted from U(normal speech), 
resulting in .277, then this preference is reversed, i.e., U(15,ES) is preferred to 
U(12,N). 
Usually, in our study, the solution space is rather tight, i.e., there is little room for the 
utilities to take on different values such that a monotone relation between the utilities and 
the preference ranking is kept intact (see Figure 5). The tightness of the solution can 
practically be observed by slightly changing utilities. In Figure 5, a solution of Qrdmet 
(i.e., the centroid of the solution space) is given for patient 2. On the left and right 
vertical axes the marginal utilities of life years and quality of speech are given, 
respectively. The middle axis represents the sum of these marginal utilities, and hence 
ranges from 0 to 2. The ranking of the sums on the middle axis represents the preference 
ranking of the alternatives as elicited by our procedure. Thus, the line connecting 3 years 
0 mute Utilities for 
electro- qualities of 
.106 laryngeal speech 
.128 esophageal 
.234 hoarse 
.298 normal 
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of life and mute intersects the middle axis at the point Uy + UQ = 0, and is the first 
intersection on the axis. Going down, the second intersection is at .106, which is the line 
connecting 3 years and electro-laryngeal speech. The order in which the alternatives 
appear on the axis Uy + UQ corresponds to the preference ranking of patient 2. The 
tightness of this solution can be exemplified by subtracting .021 from the utility for 
normal speech, which would disturb the ordering of the combinations (12 years, normal 
speech) and (15 years, esophageal speech). Hence, there is few room for the utilities to 
have different values. 
Since the main goal of our procedure, namely giving an advice on treatment choice 
based on patient preferences, is very delicate, our conclusion about this procedure must 
be very careful. The results of this application lead us to believe that the procedure may 
be very useful and meaningful for many patients. This belief is also encouraged by 
findings of Llewellyn-Thomas et al. (1984), who found that laryngeal cancer patients are 
stable in their preferences for aspects of voice quality, despite the fact that they 
experienced a deterioration in their voice quality during radiotherapy. 
J. Discussion 
In this chapter we have shown that application of additive conjoint measurement to a 
medical decision problem is fruitful. Compared to other popular methods in medical 
decision analysis (time tradeoff and certainty equivalent method), additive conjoint 
measurement does not have the disadvantages mentioned in the introduction. The main 
disadvantage of our method is that many questions are to be asked, a number that rapidly 
increases as the number of relevant levels of attributes increases. Moreover, the three 
replications, as advised in this chapter, mean a tripling of time needed to determine a 
patient's treatment preference. On the other hand, the three most important advantages, 
from a methodological point of view, are (1) The possibility of testing axioms, (2) No 
saliency of attributes, and (3) Estimation of consistency. Advantage (1) offers the 
possibility to justify or reject the use of the additive model, (2) means an avoidance of 
saliency, i.e., an artificially higher subjective weight, of the attribute that is traded off or 
gambled with, and (3) enables us to test the answers of patients against randomness. 
Consistency may be regarded as an indication of reliability. Reliability is a concept mostly 
used in test theory, in which a construct is assumed to be measurable by a fixed, pre-
given procedure. In the case of preference judgments, a priori assumptions about 
measurability are not made, hence the term reliability seems inappropriate. However, 
consistency is a concept which is similar to reliability, in the sense that it reflects stability 
of answers (over time). A high consistency cannot be established by the certainty 
equivalent or time tradeoff method, but in our method an estimation can be made. So 
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altogether, all mentioned disadvantages of the time tradeoff and certainty equivalent 
method are mitigated or avoided by using additive conjoint measurement, instead of using 
probabilities and/or indifference questions. 
Going by the adjusted measure of circularity, one patient, who completed the test 
during radiotherapeutic treatment, was judged to be too circular. The same patient also 
did not exceed randomness of answers. It is advisable to give such patients a fourth 
replication; their first replication should be considered as a trial session, necessary for 
them to get used to the questions. Such a trial session is supported by patients' statements 
that during the first replication they begin to realize what the essential tradeoff between 
the treatments entails. The low number of patients who violate transitivity (i.e., ζ
β
 < .95) 
or do not exceed randomness of answers (i.e., π > .63) is rather encouraging, since 
especially the patients who were under radiotherapeutic treatment had many mental 
difficulties to cope with. That is, their diagnosis was made only a few weeks before the 
test was applied. 
We note that there is a difference between conjoint measurement and Thurstone's Case 
V model (TC) (Thurstone, 1927): TC assumes that objects are elements of one set This 
set in our study comprises pairs of life duration and quality of speech. However, to use 
the utilities in a Markov model, utilities must have been unravelled into (marginal) utilities 
of life duration, and (marginal) utilities of quality of life. This cannot be done by TC, but 
it can be done by using conjoint measurement. 
The model we used in our analysis is an additive one. This is not distinguishable from 
a multiplicative model if all utilities are positive. However, when a health state q is 
possible which is perceived worse than death, this would mean that a shorter life duration 
with this quality q is preferred to a longer duration in this same quality. If this occurs, an 
additive model will not adequately represent the preference structure. In such a case the 
more general multiplicative model is called for (Miyamoto & Eraker, 1988). 
The application of additive conjoint measurement to the problem of choosing a 
treatment for laryngeal cancer may rather easily be applied to similar decision problems 
that may occur in other cancers such as bladder and prostate cancer. The same decision 
structure, quality versus quantity of life, shows up in many other diseases for which 
several medical treatments are available. In future research, other areas of medical 
decision making will be considered. 
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Appendix: Actual application in the hospital 
In Stalpers' (1991) thesis, the first research using the procedure described in this 
chapter has been done. This procedure has been developed because at the department of 
Radiotherapy at the St. Radboud Hospital the possibility of patient participation in 
decision making was recognized. The idea was that, as described in Chapter 1, patients 
can participate if treatments are medically equivalent. Stalpers' research has been done 
among physicians, students, and laryngectomees. In this chapter further research has 
been reported that has been done among laryngectomees, and patients following 
radiotherapeutic treatment. For all of these patients, the outcome of the procedure was 
without any consequence because a decision had already been made at the time of testing. 
The first 'real' application has recently, i.e., January 1992 been done. The department 
of Otorhinolaryngology of the St. Radboud Hospital brought up the first patient: a 
woman of 73 years with a Тэ-tumor. If the medical protocol would be followed, the 
woman would be operated. However, the otorhinolaryngologist in attendance expected 
some surgery-related problems due to the poor state of heart and lungs. He estimated that 
the medical advantage of surgery with respect to duration of life (relative to radiotherapy) 
is nullified by the surgery-related problems. Hence, this was judged to be a case of 
medical equivalence of treatments. The patient was very willing to cooperate, and the 
physicians judged her to be emotionally capable to cope with the procedure. Her life 
expectancy was about 12 years. In consultation with the patient it was decided that she 
would cooperate with the procedure. The maximum number of life years we used in the 
alternatives was 10 years. The other levels of number of life years were 0.5,1, 2,4, and 
7 years. The used levels of quality of voice were no, artificial, and normal speech. 
The patient saw two videos containing information about radiotherapy and 
laryngectomy. It was explained that the test played a purely advisory role, and that the 
information elicited from the test could help the physicians in making a decision, together 
with the patient. The actual presentation of the test, i.e., the pair comparisons as 
described in this chapter, was done by the author. At the patient's request, her daughter 
was present at the time of testing. Except the author, no one else was in the room. 
Previous to the first replication, some pair comparisons were presented to the patient to 
get her familiar with the type of questions. The first replication began immediately after 
this trial. During the first replication, the patient got very emotional about some of the 
alternatives, especially those referring to having no speech. She made it very clear that 
she would have enormous problems when she would never be able to speak again. These 
outbursts of emotion reduced during the second and third replication, but her statements 
about muteness stayed as strong as in the first replication. Consequently, she never 
preferred an alternative containing this quality of voice. Her statements convinced all 
involved persons that radiotherapy would be the best treatment in her case. In all three 
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replications two control questions (i.e., trivial pair comparisons) were incorporated to 
check whether the patient was alert, and whether she understood the questions; all these 
control questions were answered as expected. The patient was intellectually not able to 
answer a certainty equivalent gamble (see Chapter 6), because she had troubles 
interpreting the probabilities. Consequently, this gamble was skipped, and hence no risk 
parameter could be estimated for this patient; we accounted for this shortcoming in the 
sensitivity analysis. 
The circularity of the answers, as measured by ζ 8 (see Chapter 4), was .95. Since .95 
is considered the minimum to accept transitivity, the method in Chapter 5 could be used 
to solve the observed intransitivities. The emerged transitive order was analyzed by 
Unicon, and the utilities were used in the Markov simulation. The treatment with the 
highest expected utility appeared to be surgery. This was against expectation. Also after 
sensitivity analysis, in which the utility for no speech, the probability that the event of no 
speech occurs, and the risk parameter (which, unfortunately, had not been estimated) 
were varied, surgery remained the most preferred treatment. Sensitivity analysis was 
particularly necessary, because one circumstance could not be incorporated in the Markov 
model, namely the poor state of heart and lungs. The reason for this is that at the moment 
no medical data are available which contain information about, for instance, 5-year 
survival rates for this specific group of people. The reason that surgery turned out to be 
the most preferred treatment can be explained as follows: though the patient was very 
negative about being mute, the probability that mute actually occurs is rather low, namely 
about 10%. The other outcome of voice after surgery, artificial voice, has a probability of 
about 90%, and this patient had no problems with this quality of voice. Furthermore, 
even if she would be irradiated, the probability that she will live for some years with a 
normal voice is rather low: First, since the 5-year survival rate after radiotherapy is rather 
low, and second, since a relatively large proportion of patients will develop a recurrence 
of the tumor, which still will result in surgery, and hence in the possibility of having no 
speech. It may be stated that all involved persons, including the author, were misled by 
the dislike of this patient for being mute. 
An interesting observation is the following: after one year the utility difference 
between radiotherapy and surgery for this patient is negligible; this difference tends to 
become larger and in favor of surgery when more years are taken into account. This is 
depicted in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. Utilities for surgery and radiotherapy for the 73 year old patient. 
utility of 
treatment Radiotherapy 
Surgery 
1 2 3 4 5 years of life 
In Table 2, the probability for this patient to be in a particular health state after five years 
is given for both radiotherapy and surgery. 
Table 2. The probability to be in a particular health state after five years for a 73 year old 
patient, after both radiotherapy and surgery. 
Radiotherapy 
Health state 
Normal speech 
Artificial speech3 
No speech13 
Dead 
Probability 
.21 
.10 
.01 
.68 
Surgery 
Health state 
Normal speech 
Artificial speech4 
No speech14 
Dead 
Probability 
.00 
.45 
.05 
.50 
The analysis was presented by the author in a conversation with the otolaryngologist 
and the radiotherapist, and on the basis of this conversation surgery was advised to the 
patient, who agreed with this advice. 
•'These patients have had a recurrence of the tumor and were then operated. 
4This mcludes patients who have had a recurrence of the tumor. 
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CHAPTERS 
A MODEL FOR QUALITY OF LIFE AFTER LARYNGECTOMY1 
Summary 
In this chapter we propose a theoretical model for quality of life after laryngectomy. 
By combining findings from literature, relevant factors for determining quality of life are 
presented. The importance of these factors is exemplified by interviews with 
laryngectomees. The practical purpose is to embed this model in a patient's choice 
process between surgery and radiotherapy, the two main treatments of laryngeal cancer. 
It is argued that such a decision is at best made by a collaboration of patient, physician 
and social worker or psychologist. 
1. Introduction 
Deciding whether laryngeal cancer is treated with radiotherapy or surgery is mainly 
based on the size of the tumor. That is, if the tumor is restricted to the cord (stage Ti 
or T2) it is often treated with radiotherapy. Sometimes partial laryngectomy is chosen, 
which preserves one of the vocal cords, such that a normal or hoarsened speech and 
no stoma result. If adjacent structures are affected (stage T4), surgery is usually 
'This chapter has appeared in Social Science and Medicine, 33,1373-1377. 
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chosen. Surgery for the higher stages results in a higher life expectancy than 
radiotherapy, while radiotherapy preserves a more or less normal voice. In the case of 
T3 lesions2, a tradeoff can be made between quality and quantity of life, since both 
treatments are deemed medically equivalent. Methods have been proposed how this 
tradeoff can be investigated by means of decision theory (McNeil, Weichselbaum & 
Pauker, 1981). This research has focused upon tradeoffs of patients. However, these 
methods reduced quality of life to quality of speech. This reduction is not beyond 
dispute. In this chapter we propose a theoretical model for quality of life after 
laryngectomy, which can be used together with some decision-analytic method. This 
model is based on a literature study and we presented the model to some 
laryngectomees in an interview. We will argue that, together with a decision-analytic 
method, this model will lead to a more realistic and individually based decision 
making, guided by a physician and a social worker or a psychologist. Such a 
collaboration can only succeed when a patient is able to take part in a treatment 
decision. That is, a patient who is acknowledged to suffer from cancer is in a very 
stressful situation, and may be not willing or able to collaborate. It may be assumed 
that such patients would give inconsistent answers. Decision-analytic methods are 
available that have the possibility to control whether answers given by patients are 
(in)consistent (see Chapter 2). 
Decision-analytic methods often use utility theory. Utilities may be regarded as 
subjective values attached to objects, such as treatments. Usually it is assumed that 
patients are not able to attach utilities directly to a treatment. (This would imply they 
could immediately make a decision, since the treatment with the highest utility is 
thought to be the preferred one.) Therefore, methods aim at an indirect assessment of 
utilities via tradeoff questions between quality and quantity of life. From such 
questions, marginal utilities for different levels of quality and quantity of life can be 
derived. These marginal utilities can then be combined to estimate utilities of 
treatments (Chapter 2). In this estimation is accounted for all kinds of occurrences. 
For instance, there is a certain probability that a patient who is radiated has to be 
laryngectomized after some time due to a recurrence of the tumor. When a tumor 
recurs, there is no choice between radiotherapy and surgery, since surgery then is 
usually indicated. 
As research has shown, in general people are not capable of regarding many 
aspects at the same time (Green & Srinivasan, 1978). Hence, reduction of the number 
of attributes is necessary in order to keep the decision-analytic method useful. This is 
the main reason for reducing quality of life to quality of speech. Indeed, quality of 
speech is easily defined, whereas quality of life is a multi-attributed concept. The 
And large Tj-tumors. 
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crucial question then becomes: Is a patient willing to give up a certain number of life 
years in order to preserve a certain quality of speech? After radiotherapy, quality of 
speech may be regarded as a realistic reduction of quality of life, since this treatment 
does not appear to result in other important side-effects. However, research (Natvig, 
1983a; Dhooper, 1985; Shapiro & Kornfeld, 1987; Nahum & Golden, 1963; Gates et 
al., 1982; Gilchrist, 1973) has shown that, after laryngectomy, next to impairment of 
speech, also social, psychological and vocational problems may arise. 
If patients are given the opportunity to indicate which treatment they prefer, they 
have to face the possible consequences of their choice. This can, for example, 
partially be done by showing videos of different qualities of speech. However, other 
problems cannot be shown on video, but can only be explained in a conversation 
between patient, physician, and social worker or psychologist 
To let a patient make a deliberate decision between treatments, we think it is 
necessary to present a model of quality of life and its determinants after surgery. This 
model will be presented before a decision-analytic method is applied. The method we 
use is described in Chapter 2; in this chapter we will describe the model for quality of 
life after laryngectomy. To the best of our knowledge, such a model has not been 
described elsewhere in the literature. Most research focuses on speech rehabilitation, 
some also reckons with other problems. None of the research, however, combined 
results into a convenient model. To gain insight in quality of life after laryngectomy, 
such a model seems necessary. 
We will combine findings from literature in Section 2. In Section 3 we will report 
some interviews with laryngectomees, to whom we presented our model. Section 4 
contains the discussion. 
2. A theoretical model of quality of life after laryngectomy 
We define a stressor as an aspect of reality that is perceived as threatening or 
problematic. Obviously, after laryngectomy, the stoma and artificial speech are 
stressors. Stressors may lead to strains, which is a general term encompassing 
physiological, psychological, and behavioral changes. These strains may lead to 
stress, defined as the perceived imbalance between individual and environment. We 
distinguish three forms of rehabilitation: a. Speech rehabilitation, b. Vocational 
rehabilitation, and с Psycho-social rehabilitation. These three forms of rehabilitation 
may be used as an indication of how stressful the laryngectomy event is experienced. 
Henceforth 'stress' is referring to cancer-specific stress, i.e., stress attributable to the 
laryngectomy event. It seems natural to connect the three forms of rehabilitation with 
the three types of strains. That is, speech impairment is a physiological change, 
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unemployment is a behavioral change, and change of lifestyle due to laryngectomy 
implies behavioral and psychological changes. We assume that, if a laryngectomee 
shows poor rehabilitation in all three forms, the laryngectomy event will be perceived 
as very stressful. On the other hand, if a laryngectomee has no or few problems, 
he/she will experience no or few stress. The extent to which stress occurs, depends, 
among other factors, on the extent to which one is able to solve personal problems. 
Two types of problem-solving strategy can be distinguished: coping and defensive 
strategy. Coping strategy is a method of direct problem-solving, which is virtually 
impossible after laryngectomy due to the nature of the problem. Defensive strategy is 
behavior aimed at defending oneself against anxiety when faced with a problem. One 
common defensive strategy, which is often found among laryngectomees (Nahum & 
Golden, 1963; Gates et al., 1982) is denial, which means that unacceptable impulses 
or ideas are not perceived or allowed into full awareness. That is, laryngectomees 
often deny the fact that they cannot speak in a normal way, and/or that they have an 
altered appearance. 
Quality of life is a broad concept that encompasses attitudes, beliefs, psychological 
and physical factors, and hence is very difficult to measure as such. In this chapter 
quality of life is defined as lack of cancer stress, which is decomposed into three 
forms of rehabilitation. That is, if the laryngectomy event is perceived as very 
stressful, then this is equivalent to having a low quality of life. 
2.1. Speech rehabilitation 
After surgery, artificial speech can be attained. Three types of artificial speech can 
be distinguished: speaking by belching up air from the stomach (esophageal speech), 
by using a tracheoesophageal puncture (Groninger button), or by using an electronic 
device (electro-laryngeal speech); some patients remain mute (circa 10%). There are 
many ways of defining the acquisition of artificial speech, and many researchers have 
used different categorizations. We will use two categories, namely Socially 
Acceptable Speech (SAS), rated by skilled listeners as good or excellent speech, and 
non-SAS, rated as fair or poor speech. Gilchrist (1973) indicated that 60% of 50 
laryngectomees were rated SAS, Natvig (1983b) reported a percentage of 61 (л = 
183). A common finding is that esophageal speakers are more intelligible than electro-
laryngeal speakers (McCroskey & Mulligan, 1963). 
The important predictors of speech rehabilitation are problem-solving behavior, 
age and marital status. Problem-solving behavior is found to be of influence by 
several authors (e.g., Natvig, 1983b). The meaning of the relation between problem-
solving behavior and speech rehabilitation is: One has to cope with the fact that no 
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normal speech can be produced. This may affect acquisition of artiñcial speech, for 
example: after not having coped sufficiently, one may be ashamed of talking 
'strange'. 
Although findings are contradictory (Gates et al.,1982; Gilchrist, 1973; Natvig, 
1983b), speech rehabilitation seems to depend on age. This may be a subjective 
perception: if one believes to have only a few years to live, it may be judged 
unnecessary to acquire artificial speech. 
In some studies (e.g., Goldberg, 1975) marital status was found to have a 
significant effect on speech rehabilitation. This seems sensible, since if one lives with 
a partner, it is more useful to acquire artificial speech than if one does not. We like to 
see this in a broader perspective: one may not have a partner, but may have family or 
close friends to whom one is closely tied. This may also be a reason to acquire 
artificial speech. Hence, if one is married and/or has family or close friends, this will 
enlarge the need to speak and thus has a positive effect on speech rehabilitation. We 
will refer to this broader concept as social environment. 
22. Vocational rehabilitation 
Vocational rehabilitation is only relevant for those who do want to work after 
laryngectomy. Vocational rehabilitation is defined as job satisfaction, relative to the 
previous job. 
Natvig (1983c) found that 63% of 110 laryngectomees resumed their work after 
laryngectomy, Goldberg (1975) reported that only 30% (16 of 53 laryngectomees) 
were still employed after the operation, and Gilchrist (1973) found 80% of 40 
laryngectomees re-employed. Predictors of re-employment are residence, education, 
social group, problem-solving behavior, and age. 
The three demographic factors residence, education and social group will generally 
be highly correlated. They are joined, and refeired to as socio-economic status. The 
higher this status is, the more chance one has to resume work (Goldberg, 1975; 
Natvig, 1983c). A second important factor is problem-solving behavior (Natvig, 
1983c): a good coping process seems to be of significant positive influence on re-
employment. Age, a third important factor, will also be related to vocational 
rehabilitation, since older patients will often choose not to resume work, or are retired 
at the time of treatment 
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23. Psycho-social rehabilitation 
Psycho-social rehabilitation can be decomposed into social and psychological 
rehabilitation. Psychological rehabilitation covers questions like "Has the 
laryngectomee adequately coped with the situation", "Are there problems due to an 
altered self-appearance", etc. Social rehabilitation is the extent to which 
laryngectomees are able to resume their former life with respect to social contacts, 
unions, etc. Some examples of bad psycho-social rehabilitation have been given in 
literature: Initially, facial disfigurement results into depression (Nahum & Golden, 
1963) and isolation (Dhooper, 1985). Burton (1965, η = 50) showed that 
consequences of depression and isolation may be alcoholism (16%) and suicide 
(10%). These consequences illustrate that patients did not rehabilitate successfully 
(psychologically and/or socially). Natvig (1984) also reported that 15% of 76 married 
couples stated their relationship was more problematic than before the operation, 
though Gilchrist (1973) stated that operation had little effect on marriage. Gates et al. 
(1982) found that for 59% (я = 86) the social activities were reduced, Natvig (1984) 
found that social ties were often reduced or changed. We take the terms together here 
since from literature it appears that the factors influencing social and psychological 
rehabilitation are the same, and there is much overlap and interaction between the two 
types. We will therefore adopt the term psycho-social rehabilitation. Factors that may 
have influence on this form of rehabilitation are surgery-related problems (facial 
disfigurement, stomal breathing and cleaning), social environment and problem-
solving behavior. 
Natvig (1984) reported surgery-related problems as difficult for patients to accept 
for themselves as well as for others. Social environment is obviously of importance to 
psycho-social rehabilitation, since care-taking and understanding family and friends 
may very well have a positive effect on psycho-social rehabilitation. Problem-solving 
behavior is also obviously related, because part of its definition refers to psycho­
social rehabilitation. 
2.4. Rehabilitation as indication of stress 
The three forms of rehabilitation, as described in the Sections 2.1 to 2.3, serve as 
indicators of how stressful life after laryngectomy is experienced. This is rather 
straightforward: the less one rehabilitates, the more stress will be experienced. 
Presumably, vocational rehabilitation is the least important if we look at a large 
sample of laryngectomees, since many of them will be retired at the time of 
occurrence of the tumor. However, in individual cases it may indeed be an important 
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Stressor. Of course, it is possible that the three forms of rehabilitation are interrelated. 
That is, speech rehabilitation may affect vocational and psycho-social rehabilitation, 
since the latter two forms may be better if speech is better. Also, if vocational and 
psycho-social rehabilitation are good, this will presumably force patients to speak 
better. Furthermore, if a laryngectomee resumes work, this may have effect on 
psycho-social rehabilitation. However, an effect from psycho-social to vocational 
rehabilitation seems not very likely. 
Figure 1. A model for quality of life after laryngectomy. 
AGE 
SOCIAL 
ENVmONMEOT 
PROBLEM-SOLV-
ING BEHAVIOR 
SOCIO-ECONO-
MIC STATUS 
SURGERY-RELA-
TED PROBLEMS 
SPEECH 
REHABILTTATION 
VOCATIONAL 
REHABILITATION 
PSYCHO-SOCIAL 
REHABILITATION 
QUALITY OF UFE 
Our study led to the model as depicted in Figure 1. In this model all relevant 
variables are incorporated. An arrow from one variable to another indicates an effect 
(from the one to the other). Interactions between variables are represented by arrows 
pointing at both variables. The signs of relations in the figure must be interpreted in 
the obvious way: the higher one variable, the higher (+)Aower (-) the other will be. 
Quality of life after laryngectomy can now be defined as lack of stress. 
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It is interesting to present this model to laryngectomees in an interview to see 
whether this model adequately describes their experiences. This has been done in five 
interviews which are used as examples in Section 3. 
3. Interviews 
We interviewed five persons (four males, one female), who were laiyngectomized 
1-25 years prior to the interviews. The mean age was 65 (ranging from 52-73), three 
of them were married, one was divorced and one not married. On the average, the 
interviews lasted well over two hours. Prior to the interviews, patients were visited 
three times in order to test them (Chapter 2). During these visits a confidential 
atmosphere could be created. We chose to have open interviews without 
questionnaires to avoid skipping important points of view. The interviews were done 
by a psychologist. It is noted that interviews with patients before a treatment decision 
would yield additional information. This, however, was not feasible practically 
because the time between diagnosis and treatment decision is at most one week. In 
this week, the patients are put to many medical tests, and there is little time for an 
interview that would, on the average, last over two hours. 
We will not give an extensive description of the interviews with laryngectomees, 
but prefer to exemplify the relations, as given in the model, by the interviews. It is 
noted that none of the laryngectomees mentioned any relation not incorporated in the 
model; neither did one of them mention all relations to be of importance. We will 
successively exemplify factors possibly important for speech, vocational and psycho­
social rehabilitation. 
- Age and speech rehabilitation. One laryngectomee (henceforth Α., male, age 60) 
said to believe age is important since if one expects to have only a few years to live, it 
may not be worthwhile to acquire artificial speech. He speaks very understandably 
and was operated at the age of 49. He is involved in a union of laryngectomees, and 
stated that the relation between age and speech rehabilitation was generally accepted 
among laryngectomees. 
- Social environment and speech rehabilitation. Laryngectomee B. (male, age 73) 
communicates with very few people, and stated therefore not to try to speak more 
intelligibly. (His electro-laryngeal speech is difficult to understand, especially after 
having spoken for some time.) All other laryngectomees were involved in social 
relations (friends, family, unions) and spoke more intelligibly. 
- Problem-solving behavior and speech rehabilitation. Laryngectomee C. (male, 
age 53) did not like the voices of people with esophageal speech. Initially, C. had 
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problems to learn this speech himself. After a period of nine months, he got used to 
the idea of speaking artificially and started to learn esophageal speech. 
- Age and vocational rehabilitation. It is evident that age is at least to some extent 
related to vocational rehabilitation, since in many countries a retirement age exists. At 
the time of diagnosis, a number of patients is already retired. Only one of the 
interviewed laryngectomees (B.) had been retired at the time of diagnosis. Three of 
the others resumed work, the fifth remained housewife. 
- Problem-solving behavior and vocational rehabilitation. A. stated to have very 
few problems with his appearance and resumed work as soon as he was able to. 
- Socio-economic status and vocational rehabilitation. С used to be self-employed 
and was eager to resume (different) work. A. was working in public relations and 
resumed his previous work. Contrarily, laryngectomee D. (male, age 71) was a shop 
floor employee, and did not resume work. In accordance with other literature, С and 
Α., being from a higher socio-economic class than D., resumed work, while D. did 
not. 
- Surgery-related problems and psycho-social rehabilitation. B. mentioned 
problems with stomal breathing and cleaning as a cause for stopping with social 
activities. E. (female, age 69) stated that she is ashamed of talking in a store with 
other people who may notice her stoma. 
- Problem-solving behavior and psycho-social rehabilitation. Immediately after 
surgery, E. started to found a union for laryngectomees and contacted other people 
being in the same situation. To get recognition was important for her own self-
esteem, and a way to cope with the new situation. 
- Social environment and psycho-social rehabilitation. All married laryngectomees 
(Α., D., and E.) mentioned their partners as being very important to accept their new 
life and appearance. B. stated to get much support from his sister. 
All laryngectomees judged the model to be realistic. According to their views, no 
relevant variables had been left out. Their own experiences were in accordance with 
the model. They were asked what attributes are the most important in making a 
decision between treatments, and they all answered that no doubt speech quality and 
life expectancy are. However, a model as proposed here was thought relevant, since 
during the treatment nothing or little is said about possible future experiences. (For 
the sake of clarity, it is stated that none of the interviewed laryngectomees had the 
possibility to choose between treatments.) 
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4. Discussion 
On the basis of literature, we have constructed a theoretical model that is believed 
to represent quality of life after laryngectomy. All relations as specified by the model 
were mentioned by at least one of five interviewed laryngectomees. Moreover, none 
of the laryngectomees mentioned any relation that was not incorporated in the model. 
In addition to the findings from literature, on which this model is mainly based, this 
may serve as a further indication that the model represents the actual rehabilitation 
process and quality of life. We consider the construction of the model to be a 
significant progress, since all former studies on rehabilitation of laryngectomees either 
focused on one particular form of rehabilitation or did not propose a model on the 
basis of reported findings. Nowadays, it is generally accepted that quality of life can 
only be defined when all relevant aspects, as perceived by cancer patients, have been 
embedded in a theoretical model (de Haes & van Knippenberg, 1985). For the case of 
laryngeal cancer, we think our model may serve as such. In future research it would 
be advisable to use this model as a starting point of investigation. A test of such a 
model by LISREL (an acronym for Linear Structural RELations) has been proven 
useful before (Giesen, Maas & Vriens, 1989). 
The main merit of our model, however, is its usefulness in medical decision making. 
We will use this model in forthcoming situations in which patients have the possibility to 
state, indirectly, whether they prefer radiotherapy or surgery. This decision will be 
conducted by principles of utility theory and the preferences are analyzed by a 
probabilistic model in which all probabilities on events (e.g. living two years with a 
normal voice, and three years with esophageal speech) are represented (Chapter 2). The 
model proposed in this chapter will help patients to think more deliberately about possible 
complications that may arise after laryngectomy. In our experience, often patients only 
think of how to get rid of the tumor, and do not consider the possible consequences of 
both treatments on a longer term. We think our model can only be used appropriately if 
relations between concepts are explained and exemplified by a skilled social worker or 
psychologist, who is well-informed about quality of life after laryngectomy. Therefore, 
we consider this model to be of significance as a guide in the decision process. 
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CHAPTER 4 
AN ADJUSTED MEASURE OF CIRCULARITY 
TOR DESIGNS WITH PRIOR KNOWLEDGE1 
Summary 
In this chapter a measure of circularity is presented that is appropriate for designs in 
which some preferences are known a priori. This measure is an adjustment of the well-
known measure of circularity of Kendall & Smith (1940). The case of two attributes with 
ordered levels is fully elaborated: Mean and variance of the adjusted measure for this case 
are theoretically derived, and strong evidence is given that our measure then is 
asymptotically normally distributed. 
1. Introduction 
A generally accepted coefficient of circularity of preferences is Kendall & Smith's ζ 
(1940). For the definition of this coefficient, it is assumed that, in principle, every 
'This chapter is the paper of Maas, A. (1991): An adjusted measure of circularity for designs with prior 
knowledge. University of Nijmegen, NICI, Department of Mathematical Psychology, Nijmegen, The 
Netherlands. 
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preference is possible. That is, if two objects χ and y are presented to a judge in a pair 
comparison task, it is possible that the judge prefers either χ to y or y to x. In many 
practical applications, however, usually some judgments are known beforehand, i.e., 
there is prior knowledge in the sense that χ is a priori known to be preferred to y (and not 
y preferred to x) for some pairs {x,y). Where this prior knowledge comes from is not 
relevant for our analysis. It may be the result of a previous experiment, a commonly 
known ordering, or an assumption. A typical example is the case where the objects under 
scrutiny are composed of two attributes, say A and B, which are a priori known to be 
ordered with, respectively, levels i = l,...,r, and y = l,...,c. Let such objects in a pair 
comparison task consist of combinations of levels i of A and j of B, and be denoted by 
0У). These objects can be adequately represented by an rxc-matrix. Let the levels be 
ordered such that level i is preferred to level /-1, and level j is preferred to level j '- l . 
Then, some information is known a priori. For instance, alternative (rj) will a priori be 
preferred to r/'-l alternatives. In a pair comparison design such a priori relations need not 
be asked. We present an adjusted measure of circularity for general designs with prior 
knowledge. This measure is applicable to all asymmetric, complete preference structures, 
irrespective of the design by which this structure is induced. Pair comparison designs 
with ordered levels of two attributes will be analyzed in detail in this chapter. 
Designs with ordered levels of attributes are common in psychology, marketing and 
medical research (Coombs, 1964; Johnson, 1974; Maas & Stalpers, 1992). Hence, the 
adjusted measure of circularity that we propose may prove useful in such research. Some 
examples of prior knowledge are the following: 
1. In a flock of white-fronted geese, the rank order of subgroups (parents, mated pairs 
without goslings, free juveniles) is superimposed over the rank order within each of the 
subgroups (Boyd, 1953). 
2. Suppose the preference for a car is determined by top speed, price, and color. 
Then, it is very likely that the levels of top speed and price are a priori ordered, namely a 
higher top speed is preferred to a lower top speed, and a lower price is preferred to a 
higher price. Hence, some preferences between two different cars of the same color will 
be known a priori. 
3. In establishing a preference between surgery and radiotherapy as a treatment for 
laryngeal cancer, two attributes are considered important: length of life and quality of 
voice (McNeil, Weichselbaum, & Pauker, 1981). Two possibly resulting qualities of 
voice are normal and artificial speech, which are clearly ordered in preference. Then, 
asking preferences between two alternatives of which one alternative has a better quality 
of voice and a higher number of life years is redundant, since such preferences can be 
assumed to be known a priori. 
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Our adjusted measure pertains to the designs in the above examples. Although the 
prior knowledge as considered here may concern (the a priori ordering of) several 
attributes, in this chapter we will mainly concentrate on the two-attribute case with each 
of the attributes having an a priori preference ordering of levels. A coefficient which 
gives the same results as ζ in a pair comparison design is Durbin's (1951) coefficient of 
consistency. This coefficient is particularly useful in balanced incomplete block designs 
(BIBDs). Hence, if prior knowledge is such that a BIBD would only elicit the 
information that is not known a priori, Durbin's coefficient may be preferable. However, 
a BIBD will often not be usable, since prior knowledge is usually not restricted to exactly 
those pairs that are absent in a BIBD. Furthermore, in a BIBD every object has to occur 
an equal number of times in the experiment as a whole. Often the amount of prior 
knowledge per object varies; hence some objects have to occur more often in the 
experiment, because less is a priori known about them. 
Designs with prior knowledge may be considered as designs in which not all pair 
comparisons are made, i.e., if pair comparisons that contain prior knowledge were also 
presented to the judge, this would have constituted a complete preference structure. Bauer 
(1978) shows that in designs in which not all pair comparisons are made, the number of 
circular triads (see below for a definition) is a meaningful measure of circularity of a 
respondent's preference structure. However, the number of circular triads cannot be used 
when results from different designs (of which at least one design contains prior 
knowledge) are to be compared. The coefficient we will propose is, like ζ, easily 
interpretable, as long as a complete preference structure can be created. 
In this chapter we will also deal with designs other than pair comparisons designs. For 
instance, triple comparisons designs refer to designs in which three objects x, y, and z 
are presented to a judge. The judge then has to rank order these objects. Obviously, these 
triple comparisons can be decomposed into three pair comparisons [x,y), [χ,ζ], and 
[y,z). Having observed the triple comparison, it can a posteriori be stated which of the 
three pair comparisons has been redundant. Obviously, triple comparisons impose 
transitivity within the triple; hence the number of possible circular triads is reduced. (For 
a general survey of designs in which objects are rank ordered, see Coombs, 1964, 
Chapter 2). Though in the case of imposed transitivity we cannot speak of prior 
knowledge, the proposed adjusted measure can be used to judge the circularity of such 
preference structures as well. 
After the preliminaries in Section 2, a generalization for ζ that immediately applies to 
general domains will be introduced in Section 3. In Sections 4 to 6 the adjusted measure 
is worked out for the two-attribute case with an a priori ordering of the levels. In Section 
4, an algorithm for finding (an approximation to) the most circular preference structure, 
given an a priori ordering of the levels of two attributes, will be presented. In Section 5 
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the number of triads that may be circular is identified for two attributes. Section 6 gives 
strong evidence that the adjusted measure is, like ζ, asymptotically normally distributed 
for large numbers of objects. Section 7 contains the discussion. 
2. Preliminaries 
Let Ζ = [χ, y, z,... J be a nonempty set of л £ 3 objects. A preference is denoted by 
>-. The binary relation >- on Ζ is 
(i) asymmetric if x>-y ^> not y>-x, for all x, у e Ζ, 
(ii) transitive if x>-y, y>-z^ x>-z, for all x, y, z ε Ζ, 
(iii) complete ifx>-y or y>x, for all χ * у e Ζ. 
>• is a tournament if it satisfies (i) and (iii). The following is restricted to tournaments. 
A score &x is the number of objects that χ is preferred to. The score vector i of a 
tournament is the η-tuple {s
x
, Si,...,s
n
), with s
x
<,s2 U...U sn. If a tournament is 
transitive, then its score vector is (0,1,...,и-1) (Moon, 1968). If x>-y>-z>-x or 
;c>-z>-y >-x, we will say that the triad encompassing x,y, and z is circular. The number d 
of circular triads is given by 
η η 
d = (])- \ Σ s((s,· - 1) = ^я(и-1)(2я-1) - \ Σ s;2. (1) 
(Kendall, 1962; Berge, 1962). Kendall & Smith's coefficient of circularity is defined by 
lAd 
ζ = 1 , for η even, and 
л
3
 — An 
(2) 
ζ = 1 , for η odd. 
и
3
 - η 
If ζ = 1, there are no circular triads; if ζ = 0, then it is known (see Kendall, 1962) that the 
number of circular triads is maximal. With if
max
 the maximal number of circular triads, ζ 
can also be expressed by \-{dld
mwL). 
3. Kendall & Smith's coefficient of circularity 
The coefficient as formulated by Kendall & Smith (1940) assumes that, in principle, 
every triad can be circular. However, due to a priori known relations some triads can 
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never be circular. That is, if objects χ and y are known to be a priori preferred to z, then 
the triad {x,y,z) will never be circular. It is obvious that if several triads can never be 
circular, d
ma
x will decrease. However, ζ gives no correction for such decreases. Hence, 
if a design contains prior knowledge, computing ζ never reveals whether the observed 
preference structure is maximally, very, or moderately circular, since we do not know 
what the lowest possible value of ζ is. Obviously, this reduces the possibility to interpret 
intransitive data. Therefore, an adjusted measure of circularity, which reckons with prior 
knowledge, is desirable. To derive this adjusted measure, the following theorem gives a 
generalization of ζ. This theorem will then be applied to designs with prior knowledge. 
Theorem 1. 
Σ s.» - ¿ g y 1 s'2) 
max(Is^)-jrw ( I s i 2 ) 
ζ = : ^ ^ . (2*) 
ve Ψ 
where Ψ is the set of all 2^2 ' possible tournaments, min ( Σ s¡2) is the minimally 
possible sum of squared scores, and ιη3χ(Σ s,-2) is the maximally possible sum of 
squared scores, and the summation is over all η objects. Throughout this chapter, the 
value of πΐ3χ(Σ s?) only depends on n, hence it is independent of the a priori relations in 
a tournament, because the transitive score sequence does not change. Of course, prior 
knowledge does not preclude transitivity. 
Proof. If a tournament contains no circular triads, it follows from Moon (1968, 
Theorem 9) that it is transitive while 
πΐ3χ(Σ s,2) = 2n(n-l)(2n-l). (3) 
о 
If all scores are as nearly equal as possible, the tournament is called regular (Moon, 
1968), and its sum of squared scores has a minimum value: 
n
a
- 2n 2 +2n 
n
3
- 2n2+n 
min ( Σ s/») = іл<§ - I)2 + і я ф * =- 4 " ' f o r П e v C n , and ( 4 ) 
• /V чч /Я К, η'-ζη'+η , , , . . . 
mm (2. Si2) = η(
τ
 - й
2
 = j , for η odd. (5) 
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Substituting (3), (4), and (5) in (2*) gives 
- 1 2 Σ 5 І 2 + 4 Л 3 - 6 Л 2 + 2n 
ζ = 1 , for η even, and 
n
3
 - 4л 
- 1 2 Σ 5 ; 2 + 4 Л
3
- 6 Л 2 + 2Л 
ζ = 1 , for л odd. 
и
3
 - л 
(6) 
The fractions in either formula have an equal numerator. This numerator may be 
written as 24(- TL· S,·2 + ттл(л-1)(2л-1)), which is 24 times the number of circular 
triads (see (1)). So, the numerator in either fraction is 2Ad. This shows equality of (2*) 
and (2). • 
A redefinition of ζ for designs with prior knowledge, such that it is defined on [0,1], 
can be obtained by substituting another value for min ( Σ si1). This value should be 
taken such that the adjusted coefficient of circularity, denoted by Ca, can assume the value 
0. Let Ψρ с Ψ be a set of tournaments with prior knowledge and let its minimal sum of 
squared scores be denoted by min ( Σ s,7). In designs with prior knowledge the 
possible number of circular triads, d
ma
x, is smaller than in designs without prior 
knowledge. Note that a reduction of <i
max
 means that min ( Σ s¿2) increases. Let Ψη be 
a set of tournaments with prior knowledge such that min ( Σ s;2) > min ( Σ s,·2), then 
>-e Ψρ >-e Ψ 
Σ s¿2 - min ( Σ S;2) 
ь i = * . С) 
πΐ3χ(Σ s,·2)- min ( Σ s,·2) 
>-6Ψ
ρ 
The expression is applicable to all designs that can be represented by a tournament, and 
allow circular triads to occur. The difference between (7) and (2) (or equivalendy (2*)) is 
that ¡¡a gives values on the interval [0,1], while the minimal value of ζ increases when the 
number of a priori known relations increases. Ca is also applicable if other than pair 
comparisons designs are used. For instance, if triple comparisons are presented to a 
judge, which are to be ordered in preference, then the presented triple [a,b,c} will never 
constitute a circular triad. Hence, also in such designs the maximally possible number of 
circular triads decreases, and this can be accounted for by Ca- It is noted that here the term 
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a priori knowledge is not appropriate (see Section 1). For all designs, the problem is to 
find min ( Σ s/2). An approximation to finding this sum in the case of two attributes 
with ordered levels is given in the following Section. 
4. An algorithm for approximating the minimal sum of squared scores in the case of 
two attributes with a priori ordered levels 
We will henceforth deal with two-attribute objects with a priori ordered levels of both 
attributes. Let these attribute sets be A and В with а,еА, í=l,2,...,r, b/eB,y=l,2,...,c, 
г,с ä 3, with typical objects (a,,by), and with a,- >- a,-i, and by >• b/-i for all ij. 
We know from Moon (1968) that a regular tournament will not have a score that 
exceeds л/2. Since the sets of objects considered here have n = rc objects, a regular 
tournament on such a set cannot have a score that exceeds rc/2. However, if / = r-l and 
j= c, the cell (r-l,c) will a priori be preferred to (r-l)c -1 other cells, thus having a score 
of at least (r-l)c —1, which is higher than rc/2 for all r,c à 3. Hence a tournament on a 
set of re objects as here considered cannot be regular. 
Each score s* of an object χ in a design with prior knowledge can be considered to be 
composed of two partial scores. Indeed, on the basis of a priori knowledge it is known 
that χ is preferred to some, say q, objects; hence s* £ q. So, q is the minimum value of 
Sj. The value q is an example of a score that is only based on all trivial relations that 
object χ has in a tournament, and will henceforth be called an incomplete score, denoted 
by 5χ. Necessarily, s* ^ s*; it is noted that s* = s
x
 only occurs when not all relations 
with χ are incorporated, but incorporation of these relations does not result in an increase 
of s*. An incomplete score possibly increases due to a nontrivial preference of χ over 
other objects. These nontrivial preferences are commonly observations from experiments. 
For example, consider an object χ that is a priori preferred to three objects, and χ has a 
nontrivial relation with an object y. The incomplete score of χ then is 3. The score of χ 
either is increased by 1, due to the observation that χ is preferred to y, or remains 3 due 
to the fact that y is preferred to χ (which necessarily means that Sy is increased by 1). In 
both cases the relation between χ and y is said to be incorporated in the preference 
structure (shortly incorporated). If all л-1 relations of one object with all other objects are 
either incorporated or known a priori, its score is said to be complete(d). As the 
preference structure we consider is a tournament, so that the scores of all objects are 
complete, the score vector can be established. Our aim now is to find the minimal sum of 
squared scores, given the a priori known relations. This is an integer optimization 
problem, with a quadratic goal function. We adopted the following simple algorithm to 
approximate the solution. 
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After establishing incomplete scores on the basis of a priori knowledge, the nontrivial 
relations between objects are incorporated, such that the sum of squared scores is 
minimal, since the lowest sum of squared scores corresponds to a preference structure 
with a maximal number of circular triads, which we will henceforth call the maximally 
circular preference structure. Each time one nontrivial relation between two objects is 
incorporated, one incomplete score is increased by 1. Let the objects χ and y have 
incomplete scores s* and s*, respectively, and let the relation between χ and y be 
nontrivial. Without loss of generality, let s* S s*. Incorporating their relation leads to an 
increase of the sum of squared scores. This increase is either 2&*+\ or 2s*+l. Since s* й 
Sy, an increase of s
x
 by 1 should be chosen in order to keep the new sum of squared 
scores, i.e., the sum computed after incorporation of the relation between χ and y, 
minimal. This means that the relation χ > у is incorporated. (Of course, if s* = Sy, 
incorporation of у >• χ can also be chosen.) In this way, all nontrivial relations are 
incorporated. The sequence of incorporating relations is the following: start with any pair 
with the highest scores between whose corresponding objects a nontrivial, not 
incorporated, relation exists. Incorporate this relation in the way described before. Then 
find a next pair with highest scores between whose corresponding objects a nontrivial, 
not yet incorporated, relation exists, and incorporate this relation. Repeat this until all 
relations have been incorporated. 
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Table 1. Number dof circular triads and its frequency in a 12xl2-matrix, with two 
attributes with three and four levels, respectively, that are both a priori ordered. 
d 
frequency 
d 
frequency 
d 
frequency 
0 
462 
8 
16860 
16 
16712 
1 
904 
9 
17648 
17 
12098 
2 
2040 
10 
22369 
18 
11041 
3 
3132 
11 
20298 
19 
6548 
4 
5524 
12 
23751 
20 
5596 
5 
6962 
13 
21008 
21 
3194 
6 
10856 
14 
21519 
22 
1997 
7 
12444 
15 
17402 
23 
1062 
d 
firequency 
24 
470 
25 
170 
26 
66 
27 
10 
28 
1 
The total number of 12xl2-matrices is 262144 = 2 1 8, since there are 18 unknown 
relations in this particular 12xl2-matrix. 
Score vector belonging to d = 28, as found by the procedure in Section 4: 
(0,3,3,5,5,5,6,6,6,8,8,11) 
For r = 3, с = 3, and r = 3, с = 4 (or, equivalently, r = 4, с = 3) we generated all 
possible data matrices; our algorithm in both cases found the maximally circular 
preference structure (with 9 and 28 circular triads, respectively). In Table 1, the number 
of circular triads and their frequencies for a 12xl2-matrix with a priori ordered levels of 
attributes are given. If we use the minimal sum of squared scores in (7), ζ 3 can be 
obtained. As an example of the difference between ζ and Ça, consider Figure 1. Here, a 
preference structure is given for r = 3, с = 3. In this structure, min ( Σ s,·2) = 144, Σ 5,л 
= min ( Σ s,2) = 186, and πΐ3χ(Σ 5,*)= 204. Hence, ^  = (186- 186)/(204 - 186) = 0, 
>e4'p 
and ζ = (186 - 144)/(204 - 144) = .70. Thus, ζ seems to indicate a moderately circular 
preference structure, while Ca reveals that this preference structure in fact is maximally 
circular. 
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Figure 1. Two attributes A and B, with levels a, b, с of A with a >b >-c, and levels p, 
q, r of B, with p>q>-r. A typical combination of these levels from the Cartesian product 
AxB is denoted (α,ρ). A 1 indicates a preference of the row element over the column 
element, and a 0 indicates a preference of the column element over the row element. A 
bold number denotes a nontrivial relation, the others are a priori known. 
(c,r) (с,?) (c,p) (b,r) {b,q) ψφ) (a,r) (a,q) (α,ρ) s,· 
ics) 
(c,q) 
(fifi) 
(Ь,г) 
(b,q) 
Φ,ρ) 
(a,r) 
(a,q) 
iflfi) 
- 0 
-
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
-
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
-
0 
0 
1 
0 
-
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
-
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
-
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-
0 
3 
4 
2 
4 
6 
4 
5 
8 
J. The number of circular triads in designs with prior knowledge 
We assume that for nontrivial relations between objects χ and y, the probability that 
either χ >~уоту>-х occurs, is .50; this probability is independent of other (non trivial or 
a priori) relations. We will henceforth call this randomness of choices. To find the mean 
and variance of ¡^ under randomness of choices, the number of triads that can be circular 
must be enumerated. This is done in the sequel, in which attributes A and В are defined 
as in Section 4. If, in case of two attributes, all levels of both attributes are ordered, then 
certain triads cannot be circular. Obviously, the objects (a
r
,b
c
), (aj^), and (ai.bi) will be 
a priori ordered in this order. Also, the objects (a
r
,b
c
), (аг.Ьг), and (аі.Ьз) will never forni 
a circular triad, since two pairs of objects are ordered a priori, namely (a
r
,b
c
) >• (аг.Ьг) 
and (a
r
,b
c
) >• (аьЬз). Neither fe.bj) >- (з^Ьз), nor (з^Ьз) >- (a2,b2) will constitute a 
circular triad. A pair of objects χ and y, in which the level of the first attribute of object χ 
is preferred to the level of the first sttribute of object y, snd the level of the second 
attribute of object у is preferred to the level of the second sttribute of object χ is 
henceforth celled a dilemma. It is easy to see that to form a circular triad at lesst two of 
the three pairs of objects must be dilemmas. An example of a circular triad with two 
dilemmas is (a^bj) >• (ai,b2) >• (з^ЬО >• (a ,^); the triad ((а1,Ь2),(а1,Ьз),(а2,Ь1)] is 
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henceforth called a 2-dilemma triad. A typical example of a circular triad with three 
dilemmas is (а,,Ьз) > (a2,b2) >• (аз.Ь,) >- (а„Ьз); the triad [(л^Ъ^Х^МХиз^о) is 
henceforth called a 3-dilemma triad. 
Figure 2. Numbering of cells, and types of 2- and 3-dilemma triads. Tl and T2 use two 
rows and three columns, T3 and T4 use three rows and two columns, T5, T6, and T7 
use three rows and three columns. Tl to T6 are 2-dilemma triads. T7 is a 3-dilemma 
triad. 
аз 
аг 
ai 
1 
4 
7 
2 
5 
8 
3 
6 
9 
bi Ih Ьз 
Tl 
±Zi 
^ 
4 
T2 
ν , \¿ ^ 
T3 
^ 4 
T4 
Л Ï 
T5 T6 
^ 
if 
- k 
Without prior knowledge, the number of triads that can be circular is, obviously, ("), 
with η = re. If prior knowledge is available, this number reduces to the number of 2- and 
3-dilemma triads. To establish this number, six elementary types of 2-dilemma triads are 
identified. In Figure 2, a ЗхЗ-matrix is given, with its cells numbered from 1 to 9. These 
numbers are used to refer to objects to shorten notation. So, for example, 2 refers to 
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(aj.bj). Circular triads are denoted, for instance, 9549, meaning (аі.Ьэ) >- (аі.Ьг) > 
(Эг.Ьі) >- (а,,Ьз). Four of the types of 2-dilemma triads are Tl: 2162, T2: (£.16, Ti: 
MSI, and T4: SS.15, in which the relations between underlined objects are known a priori 
(see Figure 2). Tl and T2 use two different rows and three different columns, T3 and T4 
use three different rows and two different columns. There are also two types of 2-
dilemma triads that use three different rows and three different columns; these are T5: 
6816 and T6:2492. There is also one type of 3-dilemma triads with three different rows 
and three different columns, consisting of cells 1, S, and 9, yielding two possible circular 
triads (see Figure 2). It is obvious that three objects can never use more than three 
different rows and three different columns. In an rxc-matrix the number of 2x3-
submatrices is (^Дз). the number of 3x2-submatrices is (3X2), the number of 3x3-
submatrices is (3X3). Hence, altogether iQQ + 2(3X2) + 3 (з)(з) 2 " o r 3-dilemma 
triads are possible. 
6. The distribution ο/ζα 
Theorem 2. In designs with ordered levels of two attributes, the number of circular 
triads d, under randomness of choices, has mean μ = - [2(^(3) + 2(3)(^) + 3(3X3)]. 
Proof. In accordance with Kendall (1962), let the random variable Pjjk = 1 if a triad 
comprising objects i,j, and к is circular, and 0 if it is not circular. Here it is always 
understood that tejïtei. The number of circular triads d then is Σ Pij^. All triads 
comprising at most one dilemma are not considered since they can never be circular, so 
the summation is over all 2- and 3-dilemma triads. In a 3-dilemma triad, two of eight 
possible sets of relations are circular; in a 2-dilemma triad one of four possible sets of 
relations is circular. So, in both cases the expectation of Pijk under randomness of 
choices is E[Pijk] = т. Hence, the expected number of circular triads is E[d\ = Ε[Σ PijjJ 
The difference between this proof and Kendall's is that he only used 3-dilemma triads, 
because he did not consider prior knowledge. 
In order to determine the variance σ2 of d in designs with two ordered attributes, it is 
noted that σ2 = Eld2] - (E[d])2. Since E[di is known from Theorem 2, only Е[<А] has to 
be established. Because d = Σ Pijk, Eld2] = Ε[(Σ Pijk)2]. The summation is over all 2-
and 3-dilemma triads, since other triads cannot be circular and hence do not contribute to 
Eld2]. As (x+...+y+z)2 =x'2+...+y2+z2+...+2xy+2xz+...+2yz, it is easily seen that in 
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(Σ Рук)2 all terms of type (Р
ч
к)2 occur once, and all other types РцкРітп (in which Р
ч
к 
and P|mn do not refer to the same triad) occur twice. Note that all terms in (Σ Pijk)2 refer 
to pairs of triads, and hence these pairs need to be distinguished for the contribution to 
Bid1]. Let С be the number of 2-dilemma triads, and D the number of 3-dilemma triads, 
then the total number of terms in (Σ Р
ц
іс)2 is (C+D)2. The total number of pairs of type 
(Рук)2 then is (C+D). Hence, the number of pairs that occur twice in (Σ Рук)2, denoted 
by Q, is [(C+D)2 - (C+D)]/2. Either triad in a pair of triads has two or three dilemmas. A 
pair thus consists of two 2-dilemma triads, two 3-dilemma triads, or one 2- and one 3-
dilemma triad. 
Four different types of pairs of triads can be distinguished: PykPyk = (Pijk)2· РцкРцп. 
РцкРітп. and PykPlmn (all i j,k,l,m,n distinct), which are pairs with three, two, one, and 
no objects in common, respectively. The expectation of (Рук)2, under randomness of 
choices, is 1/4. The expectation of PykPlmn and PykPimn is the product of the individual 
expectations, which is 1/16. Only for pairs of triads with two objects, i.e., one relation, 
in common, the expectation can be unequal to 1/16. In the sequel we will show that such 
pairs PykPyn have expectations 0, 1/8, or 1/16. The contributions to Eld1] thus stem 
from types of pairs of triads with different expectations. Let Si, S2 and S3 be the 
contributions stemming from the pairs of triads with expectation 1/4, 1/8, and 1/16, 
respectively. 
The only type of pair of triads that has expectation 1/4, is (Рук)2. Its contribution Si to 
Eld1] is (C+D)/4, which is equal to μ. 
We will enumerate the pairs of triads PykPyn that have expectation 0 or 1/8. PykPyn 
is a pair of triads with one relation in common. If at least one of these triads is a 3-
dilemma triad, the expectation of PykPyn will be 1/16. Indeed, the relation that the triads 
have in common is a dilemma; otherwise neither of those triads would be a 3-dilemma 
triad. For one of the triads there are, except the (ij) pair, 2 2 = 4 possible sets of relations, 
of which one is circular if it is a 2-dilemma triad, and 23 = 8 possible sets of relations, of 
which two are circular if it is a 3-dilemma triad. For the other triad there remain 22 = 4 
possible sets of relations of which one is circular. Therefore, the expectation that both 
triads are circular, i.e., PykPyn = 1 equals (2*l)/(8*4) = 1/16 for two 3-dilemma triads; 
while it equals (l*l)/4*4) = 1/16 for one 2- and one 3-dilemma triad. Hence we will now 
focus on pairs of 2-dilemma triads with one relation in common, since these triads may 
have an expectation which is unequal to 1/16. 
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Figure 3. Combinations of 2-dilemma triads with one relation in common. 
<i>o 
In Figure ЗА, a pair of 2-dilemma triads with an a priori known common relation is 
depicted. The total number of possibilities to direct the remaining four relations is 24 = 
16, and only one of those gives two circular triads (see Figure 3B). So, its expectation is 
1/16. In Figure 3C, a pair of 2-dilemma triads with a nontrivial relation in common is 
depicted, and hence two relations, other than the common relation, of this pair are known 
a priori. This leaves 23 = 8 possibilities to direct the remaining relations, of which one 
gives two circular triads (see Figure 3B). Hence, the expectation of this type is 1/8. In 
Figure 3D, another type of pair of 2-dilemma triads is given. Again, it has a nontrivial 
relation in common, but none of the 8 possibilities to direct the remaining relations yields 
two circular triads. Hence, the expectation is 0. It is noted that in Figures 3C and 3D only 
one particular example is given, which is typical for the expectation. The important thing 
to notice is that both are 2-dilemnia triads with a nontrivial relation in common; we will 
denote this nontrivial common relation as {(kj)Xi,I)}, with к >• i, and l>-j. 
Figure 4. Areas of cells that form a dilemma with (kj) [(i,/)] and have an a pnon 
relation with (¿,/) [(кJ)]. 
1 j 1 с 
We now consider a (conjoint measurement) design with two attributes with ordered 
levels. We will count the number of pairs of 2-dilemma triads with a nontrivial relation in 
common, examples of which are given in Figures 3C and 3D. In Figure 4, rows and 
columns of a matrix represent ordered levels of two attributes. Rows are denoted by 
l,...,i,...,k,...,r, and columns are denoted by i,...j,...,l с Levels are ordered from 
worst (row 1 and column 1) to best (row r and column c). It is noted that we do not 
follow the conventional matrix notation by letting the bottom row be row 1. This is done 
because of a coherent presentation of Figures 2 and 4, which otherwise would have to be 
interpreted differently, thereby confusing the reader. All cells that form a dilemma with 
(kj) [(».OL and form an a priori known relation with (/,/) [(kj)] give 2-dilemma triads, 
since {(kj),(i,l)) is a dilemma itself. If all these dilemmas [(kj),(i,l)) are examined, 
then all possible pairs of 2-dilemma triads with a nontrivial relation are enumerated. 
In Figure 4, the
 V \ W -shaded area gives all cells that are a dilemma with (kj) and have 
a priori known relations with (ι,/). The number of such cells is i(l-j) + (c-l+l)(k-i) - 2. 
Furthermore, the //// -shaded area gives all cells that are a dilemma with (/,/), and 
have a priori known relations with (kj). The number of such cells is (r—k+l)(l-j) +j(k— 
i) - 2. Suppose that in Figure 2 (kj) is cell 4, and (/,/) is cell 8. Then, in the Type T2 
circular triad 23.49, cell 8 is preferred to cell 4, i.e., (i,[)>~(kj). However, in the Type T3 
circular triad 1481, cell 4 is preferred to cell 8, i.e., (ij)>(k,[). Both 1481 and 9549 are 
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2-dilemma triads; in this example they have one nontrivial relation in common. It is 
obvious that the circular triads ¡481 and 9849 cannot occur in the same set of pairwise 
preferences as (kJ)>-(.U) in 1481 whereas (i,l)>-(kj) in 9849. Hence, the relation 
between (Ay) and (i,0 is essential for the expectation of a pair of 2-dilemma triads. 
Hence, EfP.^P,«] = 0. 
From Figure 4, it can easily be derived that the number of pairs of triads with 
(kj)>-(i,l) (with k>-i, If-j) for a particular pair of objects {(¿ΛΟ'.Ο) is the number of 
cells in areas 1 and 2 in Figure 4, which is (l-j)(r-k+\+ï) — 2. Analogously, the number 
of pairs of triads with (i,l)>-(kj) for a particular pair of objects ( (kj)Xi,l)} is the number 
of cells in areas 3 and 4, which is (ifc-i)(c-/+l+/) - 2. Note that triads with (kj)>-(i,I) or 
(i,f)>-(kj) are distinguished; this will turn out useful for the computation of expectations. 
The number of pairs of 2-dilemma triads with expectation 0 (i.e., one triad should have 
(.kj)>-(i,I) to be circular, and the other should have (i,l)>-(kj) to be circular) then is 
E - £ Σ Σ Ж-Л(г-к+1+і)-2}[(к-і)(с-1+1+Л-2]. 
The number of pairs of 2-dilemma triads with expectation 1/8 then is 
Ρ = Σ Σ Σ ¿[(<'-Λ^+ Ι +0)
 + ((*-0(-'+ι+;))]. 
,=1 ; = ! jt=l+l/=y+l 
Hence, the contribution to Efd2] of pairs of 2-dilemma triads with one, not a priori 
known, relation in common is S2 = F/8. 
All pairs of triads that have not been enumerated will have expectation 1/16. Q is the 
number of pairs of triads with expectation unequal to 1/4; hence if the number of pairs 
with expectation 0 and 1/8 are subtracted from Q, then this will give the number of pairs 
with expectation 1/16. Hence the number G of pairs of triads with expectation 1/16 is G 
= Q - E - F. Their contribution to Eld1] is S3 = G/16. 
Since all pairs with an expectation unequal to 1/4 occur twice in (Σ Рцк)2, σ2 = Efd2] 
- (E[d])2 = (Si + 2S2+2S3) - μ2. For all r = 3,...,6 and с = г, r+l,...,6, μ and σ 2 are 
given in Table 2. 
65 
Table 2. Mean μ and variance σ2 of the number of circular triads in rxc-matrices with 
two attributes with ordered levels. 
r 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
6 
с 
3 
4 
5 
6 
4 
5 
6 
5 
6 
6 
μ 
3.75 
12 
27.5 
52.5 
36 
80 
150 
175 
325 
600 
α
2 
5.0625 
19.75 
53.125 
116.25 
73.5 
193.75 
419.375 
506.25 
1090.625 
2343.75 
Since the number of circular triads is asymptotically normally distributed if no prior 
knowledge exists (Kendall, 1962), we conjectured this might also be the case for the 
number of circular triads with a priori ordered levels of two attributes. Hence, a x2-test 
was performed to test the null hypothesis of normality of this distribution of circular 
triads. Random preference matrices with two attributes with six levels each, both a priori 
ordered, were simulated to test this supposition. Under the assumption of normality with 
μ = 600 and σ 2 = 2343.75, ten classes with intervals of d with each an expected 
frequency of about ten percent of the total number of 25000 simulations were established. 
The expected and observed frequencies are given in Table 3. The mean of this simulation 
was 600.3, the variance 2337.57, χ 2 = 6.545 with df=9, and ρ = .684. Hence, the 
hypothesis of normality is not rejected. ζ 3 is linearly related to d, since ζ 3 = 1 -d/dmex. 
Hence, the hypothesis of an asymptotically normal distribution of ¡¡a is not rejected. 
We investigated whether ζ
β
 would approach ζ if the number of levels of both attributes 
goes to infinity. Let the attribute sets A and В be as in Section 4. Let the reference cell be 
(IJ) , i' = i,...,r,j = l,...,c. Then there are (r-/)(/-l) + (i-l)(c-j) cells with which this 
reference cell forms a dilemma. Summed over all reference cells, this number of 
dilemmas is 
Σ Σ (г-00-1) + 0'-1)(с-Л = гс(г-1)(с-1)/2. 
/=1 /=1 
However, obviously all dilemmas are counted twice. For instance, say a cell (a,b) forms 
a dilemma with cell (x,y), with (a,b) as the reference cell. Then this dilemma will also be 
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counted when (x,y) is the reference cell. This holds for all dilemmas. Hence, the number 
of dilemmas is rc(r-l)(c-l)/4, which is (2X2)· Since the total number of pair 
comparisons is obviously ( " ) , the proportion of dilemmas in a design with a priori 
ordered levels of two attributes is (¿X^/C^) = (rc-r-c+l)/(2rc-2). For r and с going to 
infinity, this proportion goes to .50, thus also the proportion of trivial pair comparisons 
goes to .50. Hence, even for large r and c, ζ» will not tend to be equal to ζ, since there 
will always be a significant proportion of 2-dilemma triads. 
Table 3. The number d of circular triads, their expected and observed frequencies for a 
ЗбхЗб-matrix. The number of simulations is 25000. 
d 
662-
641 
626 
613 
600 
588 
575 
560 
538 
0-
1078 
•661 
-640 
•625 
•612 
-599 
-587 
-574 
-559 
537 
expected 
2549 
2486 
2444 
2473 
2650 
2444 
2473 
2444 
2577 
2459 
observed 
2551 
2509 
2463 
2534 
2693 
2435 
2480 
2363 
2521 
2451 
7. Discussion 
Kendall & Smith's measure of circularity ζ assumes that, in principle, every triad can be 
circular. Since this is usually not true for frequently occurring designs with prior 
knowledge, we generalized ζ such that it immediately applies to such designs. The case 
of ordered levels of two attributes has been elaborated in Sections 4 to 6, and the adjusted 
measure, like the original ζ, seems to be asymptotically normally distributed. It is 
emphasized that our generalization of ζ can be adopted in all designs that can be 
represented by a tournament, and allows occurrence of circular triads, be it that the 
minimal sum of squared scores should be determined or approximated. Note that this also 
comprises, for instance, triple comparison designs. In such designs the number of 
χ
2
 = 6.545, df = 9 
sign. = .684 
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possible circular triads, and hence dmax, may also be reduced, since a triple comparison 
imposes transitivity upon the preferences within a triple. However, it is inappropriate to 
use the term prior knowledge here. The generalization can be done irrespective of the 
number of attributes and/or levels. 
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CHAPTERS 
ON SOLVING iNTRANsmvrms1 
Summary 
A method is presented to transform intransitive, possibly incomplete, preferences 
between objects into a transitive order. In most cases the method provides a unique 
solution which is easily computed, also if many objects are involved; tractability and 
applicability have been the principa] motivations for the development of the method. It 
takes into account information about stability or intensity of preferences. Preferences are 
represented as arcs in a digraph. The number of arc reversals that form the solution often 
coincides with the minimal number of arc reversals known as Slater's i. A Monte Carlo 
study is reported that strongly supports the method. The method is shown to require 
polynomial computation time. 
'A sketchy version of this chapter appears in W. H. Loke. (Ed.). Judgment and Decision Making. New 
York: Scarecrow Press. This chapter is the paper 'On solving intransitivities' by Maas, Α., Bezembinder, 
Th., & Wakker, P. P. (1991). University of Nijmegen, ΝΙΟ, Department of Mathematical Psychology, 
Nijmegen, The Netherlands. 
1. Introduction 
In the method of pair comparisons a set Ζ = (ДЕ, у, ζ,...} of η à 3 objects is presented 
in pairs to one judge. The method is very popular in the social sciences and is used 
primarily when the objects to be compared cannot be measured in a physically meaningful 
way. In practical applications ties are often not permitted, that is, each judgment consists 
of a strict preference (in some sense) for one of the two compared objects. Let us 
consider the simple case of three objects x, y, and ζ to be judged once by one person, so 
that there are three pairs to be compared: (дс, у], [у, ζ) and [χ, ζ). Let >- denote a binary 
preference relation on Z, where χ >- у means that χ is strictly preferred to y. As each 
comparison has two possible outcomes, this yields eight possible experimental results. In 
six of these results one object is preferred twice, a second object is preferred once, and 
consequendy the third object is not preferred to any other object. In the other two results 
each object is preferred once, that is, 
either [x >• у, у >· ζ, ζ >• χ], or [у >• χ, χ >- ζ, ζ >- у] 
has been observed. Such results are called circular triads (Kendall & Smith, 1940). 
Obtaining a linear order from such results is a problem that occurs in several fields. 
A circular triad may be regarded as an inconsistency of the judge, and several 
explanations for the occurrence of a circularity can be given (e.g., Tversky, 1969; David, 
1988). It should be noted that circularities are not restricted to the case of three objects: m 
objects may give rise to a circular m-ad; we refer to any circular m-ad as an intransitivity 
(m £ 3). However, while intransitivities may occur, researchers are often interested in 
establishing a transitive order. This may be the case if a prespecified model (e.g., 
unfolding, conjoint measurement) or a prescriptive application (e.g., in decision analysis) 
require transitive data. One widely known procedure (Slater, 1961) consists of finding a 
linear order on the basis of the observations, such that the number of preference reversals 
is as small as possible; this number is known as Slater's i. Given intransitive data, all 
linear orders obtained from the data by exactly i preference reversals are called nearest 
adjoining orders. Algorithms for finding all nearest adjoining orders can be found in 
Remage & Thompson (1966) and Phillips (1967; 1969); an efficient algorithm for finding 
i and one nearest adjoining order for η < 10 objects is given by Bezembinder (1981). See 
also AH, Cook, & Kress (1986), and Barthélémy (1990). 
Slater's procedure has been formulated for the case of one judgment per pair of 
objects. We present a method that reckons with the extent to which a judge is stable in 
his/her preferences over repeated trials; this stability will henceforth be interpreted as a 
measure of the intensity of preference. A natural starting point under replicated choices is 
the majority preference relation: χ is majority preferred to y if χ has been chosen from 
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[x,y) in the majority of cases. This way preferences are dichotomized (given an odd 
number of replications): χ is strictly preferred to y, or y to x. Problems arise if the 
majority preference relation turns out to be intransitive. Often in the literature then, ad 
hoc, a nearest adjoining order is taken with respect to the majority preference relation. 
However, dichotomization has led to a loss of information. Our method reckons with all 
the information of replicated choices. In this respect our method contrasts with Slater's 
procedure, in which all observed preferences are implicitly assumed to be of equal 
importance; see Example Π below. There exists a large literature on the scaling of a set of 
objects from a set of pairwise relative choice frequencies (here interpreted as intensities of 
preferences) that may or may not violate transitivity of majority preference; see Category 
Q 3 in Section 7. The problem of solving intransitivities is typically a "non-static 
problem", in the terminology of Hubert & Schultz (1976). Often a goal function is 
chosen that should be maximized. For a survey of related theories, and many 
sophisticated procedures, see Hubert (1976). 
This chapter proposes a new method for solving intransitivities. Our method aims at 
being tractable and natural for practice, and will be tested as such in a computer 
simulation. It will not consist of maximizing a function. As most of the methods 
discussed in Hubert (1976), or Hubert & Schultz (1976), and in contrast to Slater 
(1961), our method can be applied to incomplete digraphs representing, e.g., the ordinal 
information embedded in a (conditional) proximity matrix. We will describe our method 
for the general case of incomplete digraphs, and give some examples and applications, 
such as to Guttman's scalogram model, and social choice theory. For the latter 
application a feature of our method is that the unanimity principle is satisfied. 
Stable preferences, i.e., preferences that remain the same throughout all replications, 
are considered of particular importance in this chapter. They contain all preferences of 
high reliability. Intensity of preferences is considered here as something gradual: stable 
preferences are highly intense, unstable preferences can be very intense, moderately 
intense, not intense, etc. Intensities of preferences are also thought of as the degree of 
belief (Tritchler & Lockwood, 1991). Stable preferences should not be confounded with 
unstable preferences, which evidently cannot be highly reliable. Cycles occurring in 
stable preferences are more likely to represent genuine cycles than those that occur in 
unstable preferences. Davis (1958, p. 26) stated that "The empirical existence of stable 
intransitivity or circular triads would challenge the usefulness of the above assumption 
[i.e., transitivity] to economics.". Imposing a transitive order on a cycle of stable 
preferences may very well be inappropriate. Hence in that case our method stops, and 
reconsideration of the data is recommended. Fishbum & LaValle (1987) argue for the 
normative acceptability of intransitivity, and present a model that allows for 
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intransitivities. Also regret theory (Loomes & Sugden, 1982; Bell, 1982) allows for 
intransiti vi ties. 
Section 4 shows that our method requires polynomial computation time. This reflects 
the simplicity and tractability mentioned above. About Slater's procedure, David (1988, 
p. 24) wrote that "... the calculation of / (and a nearest adjoining order) continues to 
present a formidable challenge except when [the number of objects] is small". Phillips 
(1969) showed that the finding of nearest adjoining orders requires exponential 
computation time. Hence tractability is especially important for the dealing with many 
objects, and for the programming of the method. It does not allow for indifferences; inter 
alia, Singh & Thompson (1968) deal with indifferences. Our method preserves 
completeness, i.e., if data satisfy completeness, then so does the solution. The method 
can without any problem be applied to incomplete preferences. In addition, the method 
almost always gives a unique transitive order. 
After the preliminaries in Section 2, the method is explained in detail in Section 3. 
Section 4 shows that the computation time of the method is polynomial. Section 5 gives 
examples, Section 6 a Monte Carlo study. In Section 7 a general framework is given in 
which our method can be related to other existing methods in the literature. Section 8 
contains the discussion. 
2. Preliminaries 
Let Ζ = {дс, у, ζ,...) be a nonempty set of η objects. A binary relation R on Ζ is 
(i) asymmetric ifxRy => not yRx, for all x, у e Ζ, 
(ii) transitive if xRy, yRz =* jtRz, for all x, y, ζ e Ζ, 
(iii) complete if xRy or yRx, for all χ Φ у e Ζ. 
R is a linear order if it satisfies (i), (ii) and (iii), a tournament if it satisfies (i) and (iii) 
and a partial (or transitive) order if it satisfies (i) and (ii). Obviously, a transitive 
tournament is a linear order. The transitive closure of R, denoted by R', is defined by 
xR1)" if xRziR...Rz
m
R;y for some zi,..., z
m
 e Ζ. 
Let —» be an asymmetric binary relation on Z. D = ( Z, -*) is a directed graph, or 
digraph for short, with objects called nodes, and a relation between nodes called an arc. 
We will frequently refer to an arc xy (yx) meaning an arc from χ to y (y to χ). A walk in a 
digraph is an alternating sequence of nodes and arcs, where the nodes before and after an 
arc are its beginning and endnodes, respectively. A path is a walk in which all nodes are 
distinct. A cycle is a walk with at least three nodes, where all nodes arc distinct except the 
first and the last A cycle containing m nodes is called an m-cycle. 
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The indegree id(x) of a node χ is the number of incoming arcs yx, the outdegree odOc) 
is the number of outgoing arcs xy. Obviously, the sum of in- and outdegree of a node 
never exceeds л - 1. 
A tournament Τ of л nodes contains N = (2) arcs, and may be used to represent all N 
pairwise preferences within a set of л objects. We call s = (od(l),...,od(fl)) with od(l) 
>...£ οά(η) the score vector of T, where od(/) is the outdegree of node / for / = 1,...,л. Τ 
is transitive if and only if s = (л - 1, л-2,..., 1,0); see Moon (1968, Theorem 9). 
An observed choice between two objects, made by a judge, will henceforth be referred 
to as a manifest choice. It is assumed to reflect the latent (or true) choice. However, an 
observed choice may have been distorted by random errors. For this reason, choices are 
usually replicated a number of times. It is assumed throughout this chapter that each pair 
of objects presented to the judge is presented exactly к times, with к S 1 odd. I.e., there 
have been к replications. No requirement of completeness is needed, i.e., not all pairs of 
objects need be presented. Common values in experiments involving one judge are к = 3 
and к = 5. We write xPjy it χ is preferred to 3» in precisely k—j replications. Ρ denotes the 
majority preference relation, i.e., xPy ifxVjy for some; < (k—\)l2. Because к is odd, χ 
is majority preferred voy, от у to χ, for every pair {x,y) presented to the judge. 
Of special interest are the stable choices, i.e., those pair comparisons in which the 
same choice is made in all replications. For instance, in an experiment on the seriousness 
of crimes, a judge generally will have no difficulty in choosing the most serious crime 
from murder and driving through a red light. In other words, if χ is murder, and у is 
driving through a red light, then xPoy is very likely. 
3. The construction of a transitive order 
Our method is based on the following assumptions; comments are given below. 
Assumption 3.1: True preferences are transitive. 
Assumption 3.2a·. The more intense an observed preference is, the more likely it is to 
be the true preference. 
Assumption 32b·. Stable preferences have priority over unstable preferences. 
Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2a require no explanation. For Assumption 3.2b, think of the 
example of choosing the most serious crime from murder and driving through a red light. 
Here there will be no (or exceptionally small) random errors in preferences, and observed 
preferences will be stable. Obviously, stability of preferences does not ensure absence of 
random errors. Instability of preferences, however, does ensure presence of random 
errors. Hence stable preferences should have special priority over unstable ones. As a 
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consequence of Assumption 3.1, transitive closure will be applied after every step in the 
algorithm. As a consequence of Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2a, a preference will be 
overruled by the transitive closure of intenser preferences. As a consequence of 
Assumption 3.2b, stable preferences will never be reversed. If stable preferences contain 
cycles, we reckon with a genuine intransitivity. Rather than imposing transitivity, we 
then recommend reconsideration of Assumption 3.1, or of the data. The possibility of 
revealing genuine intransitivities is in our opinion an advantage of binary choices over the 
direct ranking of the objects. Practice shows that the direct ranking of objects is 
problematic, probably because this is more remote from everyday experience than binary 
choices. 
If stable preferences do not contain cycles, the method is applied. It constructs a 
sequence of transitive digraphs 
Do,...,Dl· D/. /5я(я-1)/2, (1) 
with an increasing number of arcs. The final result D/gives the solution, i.e., the desired 
transitive relation. Under completeness (all pairs of objects have been presented to the 
judge) Of will be a tournament, thus the constructed transitive relation has preserved 
completeness. For Do, the starting digraph, we take the digraph corresponding to the 
transitive closure of the stable preferences. 
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Figure 1. Flowchart of the method. 
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For the remainder of the procedure, see the flowchart in Figure 1. A majority 
preference xP^ y is called incorporated in D, if either the arc xy or the arc yx is present in 
D/. In the latter case (yx present) we say that a preference reversal has occurred. Now 
suppose that some Dj has been constructed. If all majority preferences have been 
incorporated in D,·, the method stops. So, suppose some majority preference has not yet 
been incorporated. The method then proceeds by selecting one of the most intense of 
these majority preferences, say xPjy, incorporating the arc xy, and extending by 
transitive closure. The particular choice from these most intense majority preferences is 
motivated by considerations of efficiency. Details are as follows. 
Take the minimal У such that a majority preference xPjy has not yet been incorporated. 
(Note that this integer j must be increased in comparison to the similar j * used in the 
construction of D,_i only if all majority preferences P/* have been incorporated in D,·.) 
Let the score vector 5(0,) = (od(7),...)od(/),...,od(«)), where nodes xi,...jcn have been 
reordered such that od(l)2...>od(n). An ordering based on outdegrees is also used in 
Roberts (1990). For the moment, the ranking of nodes with equal outdegrees is arbitrary 
(this arbitrariness will be dealt with below). We will often refer to χι, the node 
corresponding to od(/), as /. Note that x/ in s(D,·) need not refer to the same node as */ in 
s(D,+i), because the ordering of outdegrees depends on D,·. Pairs of nodes are written 
with highest outdegree first, and are subsequently ranked in a reversed lexicographic 
way, i.e., as (/,2),(i,5),...,(7,n), (2,3) (2,л).···. (n-l,n)2. In this order we choose 
the first pair (x,y) in which the Ρ,-relation has not yet been incorporated in D,·. Note that 
the search for the pair (x,y) can often be accelerated, for instance if id(7) + od(7) = л-1, 
then node 1 can be ignored, because arcs with all other nodes then are already present in 
D,. IfxPj-y, the arc xy is incorporated; if yPjX, the arc yx is incorporated. Note that 
incorporation of xy (or, similarly, yx), cannot create a cycle: The remainder of that cycle 
would constitute a path from у to χ in D,, and hence, by transitivity of D,·, an arc yx This 
cannot be. So, transitive closure can be applied, resulting in the digraph D,-+i. 
After a finite number of steps the method stops, and all majority preferences have been 
incorporated. Note that the selected pair of nodes is always ordered in accordance with 
the majority preference. Reversals only occur through transitive closure, in agreement 
with the consequence of Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2a as described below those 
assumptions. As an example, if хРоу,уР<Р, and zPix, then χ —» ζ will result. 
Let us now deal with the arbitrariness of the ordering of outdegrees as mentioned 
above. Suppose some nodes have an identical outdegree. Then these are ordered by 
increasing indegrees. Of course, in a computer program the score vector s(D,·) can 
^Thus. (1J2) denotes the pair of nodes 1 and 2, that have the highest and second highest outdegrees, hence 
ihcy have the first and second position in s(D,). 
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immediately be constructed in this way. Now there will almost always be an 
unambiguous ordering of nodes and χ and y are selected. If there still does not exist an 
unambiguous ordering, the method may select one pair at random. Then possibly the 
solution is not unique, though often the solution will not be affected by the particular 
choice of pair. This completes the description of the method. 
Uniqueness can be further increased by a modification, which has been used in the 
simulations. The price for this greater uniqueness is that the computation time is non-
polynomial. Roberts (1990) emphasizes that uniqueness is a problem for many 
combinatorial optimization procedures. Let us now describe the modification. All pairs of 
nodes that can be selected are considered. One of those pairs is selected and the solution 
is determined. Next another pair is selected, and again the solution is determined. This is 
done for all possible pairs. Finally, the solution with the minimal number of majority 
preference reversals is chosen. If there are two or more such solutions, then no unique 
solution has been obtained. However, such occurrences are very rare (see Section 6). 
Note that if od(l) > od(2) > od(3) = od(4) = od(5), then the ordering of xj, xt, and X5 
need not be determined immediately, because the first selection may involve nodes / and 
2. If by this selection 1P¿2 or 2Pj7 will be incorporated, then this may affect the ordering 
o f Jt3, JC4, a n d JC5. 
The procedure is greedy, i.e., it makes the best possible choice at each single step. 
This does not guarantee the finding of optimal solutions, but will usually lead to solutions 
close to optimal solutions. The solution is locally optimal in the sense of Assumption 3.2, 
i.e., reversals of arcs in the solution ("pairwise interchanges") will not improve the 
fulfillment of Assumption 3.2. 
Finally a way is mentioned to partition the digraph representing the majority 
preferences (arc xy if and only if majority preference xPy) into 'strong components', in 
order to reduce calculations. A digraph is strong if it contains a walk through all nodes 
with same beginning and endnode. A subdigraph of a digraph D is a digraph whose 
nodes and arcs are nodes and arcs of D. A strong component Dj of a digraph D is a 
maximally strong subdigraph, i.e., there is no strong subdigraph D2 (* Di) of D that 
contains all nodes and arcs of Di. Obviously, cycles in majority preferences only occur 
within strong components of the digraph that represents the majority preference relation. 
Between strong components, all majority preferences have the same direction, and the 
strong components can be ordered correspondingly. Hence it suffices to apply the 
method to each single strong component; next the solutions of all these separate strong 
components are embedded in one overall transitive solution in the obvious way. 
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4. Polynomial computation time 
As mentioned in the introduction, David (1988) qualifies the computation of all nearest 
adjoining orders as a 'formidable challenge'. Its computation requires exponential 
computer time (Phillips, 1969, p.100), and such problems are said to be Non Polynomial 
(NP) (Even, 1979). For many procedures it is not known whether or not they are NP. 
Roberts (1990) expresses strong suspicion that the "linear ordering problem' is NP. Our 
method will now be shown to require only polynomial computation time. If, as in our 
method, the number of operations to arrive at a solution varies, the order of the 
polynomial is to be determined for the case in which the number of operations is 
maximal. Below, for each step in the method as shown in Figure 1, the highest number 
of operations required to move to the next step is determined. 
In the appendix it is shown that incorporating one arc to a transitive digraph, followed 
by transitive closure, requires a calculation time proportional to n2/4, i.e., is an n2-
algorithm. Thus, construction of Do (incorporate one arc after the other, and apply 
transitive closure each time) is an n4-algorithm. Let us now consider the extension of Di­
to D|+i, with symbols as in Section 3. Finding j , establishing 5(0/), and selecting χ and y 
are all n2-algorithms. Incorporating the arc between χ and y plus transitive closure is, 
according to the appendix, an n2-algorithm. So, the extension of D, to D,+i is an л
2
-
algorithm. Such an extension of a digraph occurs at most л(и-1)/2 times (see formula 
(1)). Hence the method is an n4-algorithm, i.e., it is polynomial. Indeed, our method has 
been programmed in FORTRAN with a fixed number of n-dependent (nested) loops, 
with no transitions between loops. It is well-known that this ensures polynomial 
computation time (Carey & Johnson, 1979). 
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5. Examples 
Figure 2a. Preference matrix of Example I. The values of the cells represent the number 
of times the row object is preferred over the column object in three replications. The 
solution of our method is vvxyz. This is a nearest adjoining order. 
w 
X 
y 
ζ 
w 
-
1 
1 
2 
χ 
2 
-
0 
0 
У 
2 
3 
-
1 
ζ 
1 
3 
2 
-
Figure 2b. Preference relations Po (left) and Pi (right). 
>-x 
Figure 2c. Digraphs Do (left) and Di (right). 
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Example I. Figure 2a shows observed preferences which form the 4-cycle of majority 
preferences wPxPyPzPw; Slater's i is 1 (reverse zw). The relations Po and Ρχ are given 
in Figure 2b. Do can be created on the basis of Po, as shown in Figure 2c. Note that 
transitive closure does not result in any more arcs. Now, s(Do) = (2,0,0,0), in which the 
first 0 is the outdegree corresponding to node w, because of its lowest indegree (id(w) = 
0). The ordering of pairs to be selected is (,x,w),(x,y)Xx,z)Xw,y)Xw,z),(y,z), where it is 
noted that the ordering of (x,y),(x,z), and (W,3'),(H',Z) is arbitrary. It is easily verified 
that an arc between χ and w is not yet present, so (wjc) is selected. The preference Рідс 
(see Figure 2b) is incorporated as the arc wx. On the basis of transitive closure, wy and 
wz are incorporated, resulting in digraph Di (see Figure 2c). Now the only P\ -preference 
not yet incorporated isyPiz; this is incorporated subsequently. Note that the ambiguity in 
the ordering of y and ζ in s(Do) does not affect the unambiguity of the solution. A nearest 
adjoining order has been obtained. One majority preference zPw has been reversed into 
the arc wz. 
Figure 3. Preference matrix of Example II. The values of the cells represent the number 
of times the row object is preferred over the column object in three replications. The 
solution of our method is xyzw, involving two (unstable) preference reversals. The 
nearest adjoining order is wxyz, involving one (stable) preference reversal; Slater's i = 1. 
w χ y ζ 
w 
χ 
y 
ζ 
. 
1 
1 
3 
2 
-
0 
0 
2 
3 
-
0 
0 
3 
3 
-
Example II: Suppose we have observed all preferences between every pair of four 
objects w, x, y and ζ in three replications. The resulting preference matrix is given in 
Figure 3. Note that the matrix can be represented by a 4-cycle wPjcPyPzPw. Slater's i is 
1, and there is only one nearest adjoining order, namely, the one that can be created by 
reversing the majority preference zPw, hence constituting the linear order wxyz. 
However, Slater's procedure does not reckon with the intensities of the preferences, i.e., 
all arcs are regarded as being of equal intensity. From a psychological standpoint this is 
debatable. After all, the judge has three times preferred ζ over w, i.e., the majority 
preference zPw is highly intense. If our method is applied then it is easily seen that, 
because there is a path xyzw in Do, the linear order xyzw emerges from transitive 
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closure. This implies that we reverse wPy and wPx. In both [wjc] and {w,y} the 
observed preferences are not the same in all replications. So, the majority preferences in 
these pairs show more uncertainty than does the majority preference in lw,z}. OUT 
method thus reckons with intensities of preferences: we have more confidence in a more 
intense preference. In this case the solution is a transitive tournament, but not a nearest 
adjoining order. 
Figure 4. The description of the objects in Figure 3, based on three dimensions; 
dimensions I and Π are important for the decision rule. 
Dimensions 
I II 
и» e 4ε 
χ 2ε 5e 
y 3ε 3ε 
ζ 4ε ε 
We can consider these preferences from another point of view, similarly to Tversky 
(1969). Suppose the objects have two dimensions, which are ordered a priori with 
respect to their importance, and a judge uses the following decision rule (see Figure 4): If 
the difference between two objects on the first dimension is strictly greater than 2ε, 
choose the object with the higher value. If no decision based on dimension I can be 
made, choose the object with the higher value on dimension II, provided that the 
difference is strictly greater than ε. If, according to this decision rule, no preference 
between objects can be stated, then choose at random. Application of this rule yields the 
stable preferences ZPQW (based on dimension I), xPoz, хРоУ and yPoz (based on 
dimension II), and between the objects in the pairs [wjc) and [w,y} a random choice is 
made. This decision rule could result in the preference matrix given in Figure 3. In our 
view it would be undesirable to change the stable preferences. 
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Figure 5. Example III: A preference matrix with 12 nodes, each cell represents the 
number of times the object in the row is preferred to the object in the column. 
a b c d e f g h i j k l OJ 
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A cell marked with χ , where χ is a number between 1 and 10, means that the edge 
representing this cell was directed in digraph D
x
, either by incorporating an arc or due to 
transitive closure. The arc is directed from row object to column object. The preference 
reversals are underlined. 
Figure 6. Example III: Out- and indegrees in Do, i.e., after transitive closure of the 
stable preferences. 
nodes a b c d e f j f h i j k I 
od(x) 0 0 1 1 2 4 6 3 8 7 9 10 
idCt) 10 7 7 7 5 5 4 3 1 2 0 0 
Example III. The matrix in Figure 5 results in majority preferences between 12 objects 
enclosed in one single strong component. This strong component comprises the cycle 
/P/tPyP/PgP/PcPaP¿»PeP¿P/iP/. Slater's i is 4. PQ contains no cycles, hence Do can be 
created and our method can be applied. In- and outdegrees of Do are given in Figure 6. It 
is left to the reader to verify that after application of our method, the linear order 
Ikjihgefdcab results. This order is a nearest adjoining order (i.e., contains four preference 
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reversals). The small digits in the cells of Figure 5 indicate which edges have been 
directed in the same 'run' (i.e., resulting from a selection of nodes and subsequent 
transitive closure). 
This example has been taken from a medical study we are performing at the moment 
In this study, patients are able to choose between two treatments for laryngeal cancer, 
namely radiotherapy and surgery. To help patients to choose, pair comparisons are 
presented to them, in which one object has a higher life expectancy and a worse speech 
quality than the other object. This finally leads to a preference for one of the two 
treatments (see Chapter 2). Our procedure can be used to establish a transitive order if, 
after three replications, intransitivities are present 
6. Monte Carlo study 
We assume that the true latent preferences are represented by a real function f, i.e., χ 
is preferred to y if and only if f(x) > f(y). Manifest choices, denoted by >-, are 
probabilistic in accordance with Luce's (1959) model, i.e., 
π (
* ^
) =
Γ ( χ ) % ? ) ' 
where π(χ >~ y) is the probability of choosing χ over y in a single choice. Scale values 
f(x),f(y),... are chosen such that for all x,y with consecutive scale values the probabilities 
π(.χ >• y) are equal. Hence, for objects x, y, z,...,v, w (with decreasing scale values), the 
equations 
m f(y) _ _ f(v) «χ 
fCx) + t(y) - f(y) + f(z) - - - f(v) + f(w) w 
need to be solved. Without loss of generality, f(i), being the highest scale value, can be 
fixed at 1.0. The lowest scale value, f(w), is fixed at .001 (not at 0, because π(χ >~ w) = 
1.0 is not allowed in Luce's model). Now, (2) becomes 
ι f(y) M m 
ι + НУ) ~ f (у) + Hz) ~ " ~ f(v) + .ooi · w 
With η objects, the solution of (3) is f(y) = [{(.w)]1/^), and f(z) = [f(y)]2 f(v) = 
[fGO]"-2. 
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Table 1. Results of the Monte Carlo study with Luce's choice model. 
η = number of objects, к = number of replications, proportion = proportion of solutions 
that is a nearest adjoining order, interval3 = 5% confidence interval for proportions of 
previous column, cyclic = proportion of digraphs showing cyclic stable preferences, and 
not unique = the proportion of matrices in which no unique solution could be determined. 
η 
5 
7 
7 
9 
9 
11 
11 
13 
13 
15 
15 
k 
3 
3 
5 
3 
5 
3 
5 
3 
5 
3 
5 
proportion 
.971 
1.0 
1.0 
.893 
.938 
.818 
.811 
.606 
.614 
.501 
.462 
interval 
.85 - 1.0 
.93 - 1.0 
.90 - 1.0 
.82 - .94 
.86 - .97 
.76 - .87 
.73 - .87 
.51 - .69 
.52 - .70 
.40 - .60 
.36 - .56 
cyclic 
0 
0 
0 
.016 
.004 
.015 
0 
.033 
.008 
.101 
.010 
not unique 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
.005 
0 
.008 
0 
0 
0 
In Table 1, results of the Monte Carlo study are given. It is obvious that especially for 
low values of n, our method almost always produces a nearest adjoining order. This is 
partially due to the fact that probabilities are rather high. The proportion of solutions that 
is a nearest adjoining order gradually decreases with increasing n, and is around .50 
when η =15. Proportions do not vary much over 3 and 5 replications. The proportion of 
cyclic stable preferences is low, the proportion of digraphs with nonunique solutions 
with an equal number of preference reversals is very low. 
The solutions were computed on an Olivetti M28 personal computer. Computing the 
solution, according to our method, of 100 matrices with 15 objects and three replications 
required exactly 20 minutes on this computer. This means that on the average, 12 
seconds per matrix was required. 
The uniqueness of the method can be viewed in different ways. We consider two 
aspects. First, does the algorithm give unique results in the sense that only one solution 
emerges? The simulations given in Table 1 show that in this respect our method almost 
always gives a unique solution. A second aspect is whether another sequence of 
3For this interval the usual formula ρ ± l.%Vp(p-l)/n is used. 
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incorporating arcs would have yielded another solution. We investigated this question 
extensively for one special case: suppose that £=5, that there are no 3-cycles in PQ, that 
there is a 3-cycle in P2, and that all other preference relations are in Pi. Furthermore, we 
arranged the structure such that transitive closure of PQ did not result in the breaking of 
cycles in Ρ2. In Figure 7, an example of a matrix is given which satisfies the mentioned 
restrictions. 
Figure 7. The matrix representing the preference structures which have been 
investigated with respect to uniqueness. 
a b e d e 
5 
0 -
0 0 
1 ог4 
5 
5 
2 
3 
1ог4 
3 2 
- 3 
2 -
From Figure 7 it can be seen that there is stability in the ranking abc, and in P2 there is 
a 3-cycle cdec. The quadrants in the matrix that are marked '1 or 4' contain all preference 
relations belonging to Pi, namely the relations [a,d), [а,е], [b,d), and [b,e). So, cell 
(a,d) contains either a 4, or a 1 (and consequently cell (d,a) contains a 1 or a 4, 
respectively, because of asymmetry). The number of ways to fill the quadrants, i.e., the 
number of different preference structures, is 24=16, since there are four cells that can 
assume one of two values. Since there are, on the level of Pi, four relations to 
incorporate, there are 4! = 24 sequences of incorporating arcs. In all 16 preference 
structures our method gives one solution (and, in this respect, is unique). We have 
investigated whether another sequence of arcs would give the same solution. That is to 
say, we varied the sequence of incorporating arcs systematically, but still applied 
transitive closure after each incorporation. In this way it was investigated whether the 
selection of pairs as done by our method was arbitrary. There are 24 sequences in each of 
the 16 preference structures, which together gives 24*16 = 384 transitive orders. These 
transitive orders coincide with the solution of our method in 294 cases, which is 76.6%. 
In Table 2, the proportion of coincidences is given per number of 3-cycles in the 
preference structure. 
Table 2. The number of 3-cycles in the preference structure, the proportion of transitive 
orders that coincides with the solution of the method, and the degree of circularity ζ (see 
Chapter 4). 
number of 
3-cycles 
1 
2 
3 
4 
proportion of 
coincidences 
1.0 
1.0 
.857 
.450 
It is clear that the higher the number of 3-cycles in a preference structure, the lower the 
proportion of coincidences. Of course, we cannot draw conclusions from this small 
investigation. However, since our method is applied in those cases that respondents are 
not 'too' intransitive (see Chapter 4), this investigation suggests that results obtained in 
those cases are almost always unique. The investigation to uniqueness of matrices will 
become more complicated if larger matrices (i.e., the number of objects greater than 5) 
are used. 
7. A categorization of methods for obtaining transitive orders from intransitive data 
In order to compare our method to other existing methods, we give a categorization 
based on two distinctions. The first distinction concerns the matrix from which the 
transitive order is derived. This matrix can contain either (data transformed into) majority 
preferences (a 0-1 matrix) or (data that can be transformed into) choice frequencies. The 
second distinction concerns whether or not special attention is paid to the stable 
preferences. Note that for 0-1 data the distinction between stable or unstable is 
meaningless. Hence, strictly speaking, the category Q2, to be introduced below, is 
empty. 
Of course many categorizations are possible; we chose this one because it is suited to 
compare our method with other methods. The four resulting categories, numbered 
Q'.—.Q4, are presented in Table 3. For a thorough and extensive survey of heuristics 
and methods to obtain a linear order, see Hubert (1976). 
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Table 3. A categorization of the methods to derive transitive orders from intransitive 
data. 
0/1 data 
choice 
frequencies 
no special attention 
to stable preferences 
O1 
o
3 
special attention 
to stable preferences 
O2 
си 
Examples of Q1 are Slater (1961), Remage & Thompson (1966), Phillips (1967, 
1969), Flueck & Korsh (1974), Hubert & Schultz (1976), Ali, Cook & Kress (1986), 
Roberts (1990), and Delver, Monsuur & Storcken (1991). Hubert (1974, p.135) 
considers the case where data are not separated into two classes (0-1), but into three: the 
class [Ο,Ι/2-ε], the class ]1/2-ε,1/2+ε[ (designating choices not sufficiendy different 
from random), and the class [l/2+ε,Ι], where e is a small positive number. This can be 
considered intermediate between the categories Q1 and Q3. Similarly, our method could 
be modified into a method intermediate between Q2 and Q4: preferences are divided into 
four classes, stable preference, majority preference but not stable, and the reversed 
classes of stable dispreference or majority but not stable dispreference. As pointed out 
above, category Q 2 is empty. 
Well-known examples of category Q3 are the scaling methods based on pairwise 
probabilistic choice models such as Thurstone's (1927) and Luce's (1959). Other 
methods in Q3 are given in Ranyard (1976), Batchelder & Bershad (1979), Remage & 
Thompson (1966), Flueck & Korsh (1974), and Hubert & Schulz (1976). The latter 
three contain special cases belonging to category Q1. 
The method as presented in this chapter belongs to category Q4. It is remarkable that 
none of the other methods belongs to Q4, since Q4 reckons with an important 
psychological observation: All highly reliable preferences are stable, so that the latter 
deserve special attention. Techniques of the quadratic assignment problem can be adapted 
to fit into category Q4: Let Py denote the choice frequency with which object i has been 
chosen over object j . The quadratic assignment problem will seek to maximize ZPp(i)p(j). 
i<j 
i.e., find the linear ordering (denoted here as a permutation) ρ on the objects that 
maximizes the sum of the above-diagonal entries; see for instance Hubert & Schultz 
(1976). To adapt this to category Q4, the above sum should not be maximized over all 
permutations p, but only over those permutations that do not reverse any stable 
preference. An adaptation of the quadratic assignment problem in the spirit of our 
Assumption 3.2a (preferences with higher intensity have priority over preferences with 
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lower intensity) would be more problematic. It does not seem possible to translate the 
notion of more intense preference into a subset of the set of possible permutations. 
Our method can be described, similarly to methods in Hubert & Schultz (1976), as 
follows: 
(1) Create a, usually incomplete, preference structure based on stable preferences, and 
apply transitive closure; check whether the resulting structure is acyclic. 
(2) Incorporate relations into this structure which do not violate the previously 
determined order, based on the heuristic as described in Section 3. 
(3) Report the final solution, and possibly repeat the process to ascertain the finding of 
an optimal solution in terms of the minimum number of arc reversals within the heuristic. 
8. Discussion 
It has been shown that the presented method almost always gives a unique solution, 
which is a nearest adjoining order a large number of times, especially for η < 10. The 
Monte Carlo study strongly supports the method. It will be of use in practice if 
researchers and/or judges adhere to a formal decision, or want to prepare data, in the 
context of a prespecined model that assumes transitivity. In contrast to the algorithms for 
finding all nearest adjoining orders of Remage & Thompson (1966) and Phillips (1967; 
1969), our method is polynomial and therefore suitable for large numbers of objects. In 
practice our method is straightforward and can be done by hand, even with 15 objects. It 
has not been our aim to arrive at nearest adjoining orders because, as shown in Example 
II, a nearest adjoining order need not be a proper solution if intensities of preferences are 
relevant. The asymmetric proximity functions discussed in Hubert (1976) and Hubert & 
Schultz (1976) can be used to model intensities of preferences as derived from repeated 
pairwise choices. 
As we have seen, the number of arc reversals in one empirical case (Example III) 
coincides with Slater's i. For other methods such an example, consisting of a strong 
component with twelve nodes, is complex. We have collected more real data as in 
Example III, and until now our method always produced a nearest adjoining order. The 
method fairly often gives one solution established in a few minutes without a computer. 
Another advantage is the wide applicability of the method. For instance, the 
requirement of replications can be relaxed by asking respondents to directly state 
intensities of preferences on a, say, 3- or 5-points scale. The method can be applied to к 
judges instead of к replications, where the judges are interpreted as replications of each 
other. This makes the method applicable to social choice problems, where different 
preferences of different judges must be aggregated into one group-preference order. The 
most characteristic feature of our method is that it then guarantees verification of the 
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generally accepted unanimity principle: if all judges agree upon a certain choice between 
two objects, our method will preserve that undisputed choice. The latter distinguishes our 
method from methods that maximize real-valued functions. 
If high numbers of replications are involved, then the method can be modified. It can 
then be made more tractable by collapsing Py-relations. For example, let P*o:=Po, let P*i 
be the union of P i , . . . ,^ , P*2 the union of Pk1+i,...,Pk2. etc. Another possibility is to 
enlarge the class of preferences to be treated as the stable preferences in our method. For 
instance, if the relative choice frequency for a particular choice significantly exceeds 
randomness (Coombs, Bezembinder & Goode, 1967), then this may be treated as a 
stable choice. The remaining choices are then treated as the unstable preferences in 
Section 3. 
All examples and applications given so far concerned tournaments. We give two 
examples of incomplete preference structures to which our method can be applied. 
A. If we collect dominances of similarities between pairs [x,y], with χ fixed, y * 
χ, then these could be interpreted as meaning that if (;t,>>) >• [χ,ζ], then χ and y are 
judged to be more similar than χ and z. If there are η nodes, then there are M = 
( 2 ) such pairwise comparisons with fixed x. These M comparisons form a 
tournament T
x
. We similarly obtain Ty,T
z
,..., yielding η tournaments altogether. 
Such dominances of similarities are typically derived from a "conditional proximity 
matrix", or result directly from "conjoint paired comparisons" (Bezembinder, 1991). 
Such data may easily show cycles, in particular between tournaments. For instance, 
it is possible that (уд}—> {χ,ζ} within Ύχ and [χ,ζ]—> [z,y) within T
z
, but 
{z,y)—»{уд) within Ту. As for distinct x,y,z,w, no arc between (χο>) and [z,w} 
is given in the data, methods for solving intransitivities are called for that, like our 
method, do not require completeness in the data. 
B. Complete bipartite digraphs. These are denoted by D(Vi, V2), in which Vi and 
V2 are disjoint sets of objects such that there is an arc connecting every node of Vi 
with every node of V2, while there are no other arcs. An example is Guttman's 
scalogram (1944) with η subjects and m items, which can be represented by such a 
structure. Here our method can also be applied. Relations between nodes of the same 
set should then not be inserted as a result of transitive closure. 
In summary, some advantages of the presented method are: 
1. The solution is easily obtained in little (polynomial) time, and the method can easily be 
programmed. 
2. The method has a psychological basis because it reckons with stability/intensity of 
preferences, and avoids the confounding of stable preferences with the evidently 
unreliable unstable preferences. 
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3. Almost always a unique solution results. 
4. The method is widely applicable. 
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Appendix: The maximum number of directed arcs resulting from transitive closure 
Say we have a transitive digraph D with η nodes. An arc between χ and y is not yet 
present in D, and the arc xy is to be incorporated. Let A be the set containing χ and all 
nodes a from which an arc goes to x. Let В be the set containing у and all nodes b such 
that an arc goes from у lob. A and В are disjoint since yzx for ζ e Α η В together with 
[not yx] would violate transitivity of D. Say A contains s nodes, В contains t nodes. 
Transitive closure will generate at most jf-1 new arcs, i.e., all nodes from A to В except 
xy. This is maximal for s=i=n/2. So altogether, at most л2/4 arcs are incorporated. 
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CHAPTER 6 
FROM RISKLESS TO RISKY UTILITY FUNCTIONS1 
Summary 
This chapter provides an alternative procedure for eliciting risky utility functions. 
Instead of presenting some risky questions to determine a risky utility function u, a 
riskless utility function V is first determined by means of additive conjoint measurement. 
This determination of V is described in Chapter 2. Then, one risky question suffices 
theoretically to determine a risk parameter, such that a risky utility function can be 
determined. Reliability of elicitation of risky utility functions may be improved. An 
example is given in which identification of u and V is not appropriate. Results of two 
experiments are given. 
'This chapter is a rewritten version of the paper by Maas, A. & Wakker, P. P. (1991), 'Additive conjoint 
measurement for multiattribute utility'. University of Nijmegen, NICI, Department of Mathematical 
Psychology, Nijmegen, The Netherlands. 
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1. Introduction 
It is generally known that most decision makers have little awareness of the concept of 
probability, and that risk induces many biases. The important feature of the approach we 
propose in this chapter is the minimization of the role of probabilities and risk. An 
alternative procedure, relying heavily on the elicitation of a riskless utility function V, is 
described. This procedure is applied to a two-attribute medical decision problem. In Maas 
& Wakker (1991), it is proven that one risky question, i.e., a question about a preference 
between risky alternatives, in which one of two attributes can be held constant, suffices 
then to determine a risky utility function u. By this procedure we reduce the number of 
risky questions to the minimum. Our procedure involves the following steps: First, a 
riskless utility function is determined by using additive conjoint measurement (see 
Chapter 2). Second, the relation between riskless and risky utility is narrowed down to a 
one-parameter class. In principle, this (risk) parameter can be estimated by asking one 
risky question. This chapter is an extension of Chapter 2: The same procedure is used, be 
it that one risky question is added such that insight is gained in the risk perception of 
patients. 
In Section 2 we describe the relation between riskless and risky utilities, with 
emphasis on applications in medical decision making. In Section 3 we describe a medical 
problem, to which our procedure is applied. In Section 4 two experiments are presented. 
The first experiment is an extension of an earlier procedure (see Chapter 2). In the second 
experiment we examine some questions concerning the risk parameter that remained 
unsolved in the fint experiment. Section S concludes and discusses. 
2. Riskless and risky utility functions 
Let Xi,X2,...,Xn be non-empty sets, η £ 2. Alternatives are elements of the Cartesian 
product X = XixX2X...xX
n
, and are denoted by x,,...,xm, me IN. The probability that a 
particular alternative x' results is denoted by p'. By P={P,Q,R,...} we denote a set of 
probability distributions over alternatives of X. Elements of Ρ are called risky 
alternatives. The usual notation for a probability distribution is (p1,x1;...;pm,xm). me IN. 
A preference relation is denoted by ¡=, this relation satisfies the von Neumann-
Morgenstem (1944) axioms. Jensen's (1967) version of these axioms is: Ρ satisfies 
mixture independence, meaning Ρ & Q <=> aP + (l-a)R ^ aQ + (l-a)R, 0 < a < 1. 
Further, ^ satisfies mixture continuity, i.e., for each Ρ >• Q there exist 0 < α,β < 1 such 
that Ρ >- αΡ + ( l-a)Q and βΡ + (l-ß)Q >- Q. Further, we assume that ^ satisfies 
completeness and transitivity. These axioms are necessary and sufficient for the existence 
of a cardinal risky utility function u. A degenerate probability distribution assigning 
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probability one to an alternative is called a riskless alternative. This induces a weak order 
Εχ over the riskless alternatives. So the relation ^  (p ^
c
) refers to preferences between 
risky alternatives, while ^c refers to preferences between riskless alternatives. 
The model we will use for preferences between riskless alternatives is the model of 
additive conjoint measurement Data are collected that determine a preference ranking of 
the riskless alternatives. This can, for instance, be done by the method of pair 
comparisons. If all axioms of additive conjoint measurement are satisfied, riskless 
utilities for the alternatives can be estimated on the basis of the preference ranking. Note 
that at this moment we only have riskless utilities. The additive riskless utility function 
will be denoted by V. 
In medical decision making, an equivalent of the method of pair comparisons is often 
used, namely the time tradeoff method. This method presents riskless alternatives, for 
instance living 10 years in a bad health state. A respondent has to indicate a number of 
life years a, such that (s)he considers a second alternative, namely living a years in a 
good health state, to be equivalent to the presented alternative. Of course, 0 < a < 10. 
Hence, in the time tradeoff method riskless utilities are estimated. A second popular 
method in medical decision making is the certainty equivalent (CE) method: usually a 
probability distribution (.SO.x'i.SO.x2) is presented, and a respondent has to indicate a 
riskless alternative to which this probability distribution is equivalent. In this method, 
probabilities are used, and hence risky utilities can be estimated. 
The utilities, determined by these two methods, are incomparable, since they are 
conceptually different. The time tradeoff method estimates a riskless utility function, and 
the certainty equivalent method estimates a risky utility function. Hence, the time tradeoff 
method does not consider the risk attitude of a respondent. In the past, riskless and risky 
utilities have often been identified (Bernoulli, 1738; Ramsey, 1931; Allais, 1953), and 
this identification has been left without discussion. Recently it has been discussed 
extensively (see for instance Fishbum (1989) and Wakker (1990)). In many situations 
such an identification is not reasonable. Consider the following medical example, similar 
to an example of Pliskin, Shepard & Weinstein (1980): 
Example 1: A preference between two risky alternatives must be determined: 
A = (.50, (living 10 years in good health); .50, (living 2 years in bad health)) 
В = (.50, Giving 2 years in good health); .50, (living 10 years in bad health)) 
Alternative A offers a .50 probability of living ten years in good health, i.e., a .50 
probability to have the best levels of both attributes combined. In alternative В there is a 
.50 probability to have the best level of life years, and a .50 probability to live in good 
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health. Alternative В gives certainty that an event occurs that possesses precisely one of 
the optimal levels2. Choosing for A suggests risk proneness, it is an all-or-nothing 
alternative: the best levels of both attributes either both occur, or both do not occur. 
Choosing for alternative В could indicate an equity principle: being sure that precisely one 
of the levels is optimal may seem to give more certainty. Searching for certainty may be 
viewed as avoiding risk; hence the equity principle is related to risk aversion. The equity 
principle underlies the following reasoning (if applied to the example): If I only live two 
years, at least I will live them in a good health, and: If I live in a bad health, at least I will 
live another ten years. Thus, the equity principle reflects the idea that a bad outcome on 
one of the attributes is compensated by a good outcome on the other attribute. An additive 
risky utility function requires that people are indifferent between A and B. When the risky 
utility functions for life years and quality of life are denoted by ui and иг, respectively, 
then indeed the utility for both alternatives is .50[ui(2 years) + Ui(10 years) + U2(bad 
health) + U2(good health)]. Fishbum (1965) showed that necessary and sufficient for 
additive decomposability of the risky utility u (so u=V) is that risky alternatives are 
judged indifferent as soon as they induce the same marginal probability distributions, 
i.e., as soon as there is no interaction between attributes. Since most people do not 
consider A to be equivalent to B, the additive model is rejected here, hence u*V. The 
interaction between the attributes is that choosing A would indicate a higher valuation of 
good health when it is combined with a longer life. 
The majority of people prefers alternative A to B. There are reasons to consider this a 
normative choice. For instance, if '2 years' in both alternatives is replaced by '2 days', 
then the events in which 'living 2 days' occurs are more or less equivalent, i.e., health 
quality is rather unimportant since it will only last for two days. Hence, the choice 
between A and В then is mainly led by the decision between '10 years in good health' 
and '10 years in bad health', which obviously leads to a preference of A over B. Hence, 
extreme cases with equal marginal probability distributions, in which the lowest level of 
number of life years approaches 0, lead to a preference for the all-or-nothing alternative. 
Thus the equity argument does not hold in such extreme cases. If the lowest level of 
number of life years does not approach 0, the equity argument may be valid. It is 
obvious, in any case, that people will often not be indifferent between A and B. Hence, 
the assumption of additive risky utilities, which implies indifference, will often be 
violated. 
The study of McNeil, Weichselbaum & Pauker (1978) is a good example why risk 
attitude is of importance. They showed that the expected utility of radiotherapy for lung 
cancer tends to be higher if the utility of life years is risk averse, and the expected utility 
^ f course, within the context of the presentation, i.e. 10 years and good health are the optimal levels. 
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of surgery tends to be higher if the utility of life years is risk prone. Hence, the risk 
attitude is likely to influence the choice of treatment 
In the literature, riskless utility functions for length of life are often chosen a priori. A 
risk parameter (r) then specifies the relation between riskless and risky utility functions. 
For instance, Pliskin, Shepard & Weinstein (1980) adopted log/power families, i.e., 
V(x) = x, u(x) = V(x)r = xr, for n*l, and u(x) = log V(x) = log x, for r=l. Miyamoto & 
Eraker (1985, 1988) adopted linear/exponential families, i.e., V(x) = e\ u(x) = V(x)r = 
e™, for 1*0, and u(x) = log V(x) = x, for r=0. After having chosen parametric families to 
model riskless utilities, only one parameter of risk aversion remains to be determined. In 
our procedure, we determine a riskless utility function by means of additive conjoint 
measurement rather than by choosing parametric families, since we consider such a 
choice as somewhat ad hoc. So, in our procedure the identity function and the logarithmic 
function are just special cases, i.e., numerous other riskless utility functions may emerge, 
depending on the answers of the patient. 
5. An application to medical decision making 
The research leading to this chapter was initiated by a medical decision problem (see 
Chapter 2). For patients suffering from laryngeal cancer3 a choice must be made between 
two treatments, namely radiotherapy or surgery (laryngectomy). 
The choice between radiotherapy and surgery is essentially a two-attribute utility 
problem. A choice must be made between risky alternatives, i.e., probability distributions 
over two-attribute alternatives. One attribute refers to length of life, the other to quality of 
voice (this is extensively explained in Chapter 2). It is well-known that people have 
problems in understanding the notion of probability. Also in this project it was found that 
patients have great difficulty in understanding risky alternatives. They have difficulties 
deliberating risky decisions, and their judgments are unreliable. There is an extensive 
literature on the biases induced by risk. Hence we decided to rely as much as possible on 
information inferred from riskless choices. First, patients are asked to choose between 
many pairs of riskless alternatives (none of these involving 0 years of life). From these 
choices an additive value function is derived, representing choices under certainty. Next 
choices between risky alternatives are elicited from patients. The number of these choices 
are kept to the minimum. Finally, the elicited risky utilities of the patients are used to 
foimulate an advice. 
The most basic problem encountered in prescriptive decision making is that in practice 
people violate transitivity. A procedure was developed to resolve intransitivities, see 
3To be precise, with tumors of the Tj- or Тз-category. 
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Chapter 4, or Maas (1991b). If patients are "too" intransitive (see Chapter 5) no solution 
is constructed and no advice is given. The method of pair comparisons makes it possible 
to detect intransitivities. It was preferred to the method of direct ranking of alternatives, 
because the latter was found to give unreliable results. For the nine patients considered 
thus far, one was too intransitive. For the other eight patients a perfectly additive 
representation was found. Note that additive representability of riskless choices is implied 
by utility independence; utility independence was tested and confirmed in Miyamoto & 
Eraker (1988). The choices under certainty do not provide all information needed to 
obtain the patients' risky utility functions. Preferences between risky alternatives must be 
observed. For these preferences utility independence was assumed. It is known (Keeney 
& Raiffa, 1976) that utility independence is necessary for additive or multiplicative 
decomposability of u. With additive representability of ?=
c
 presupposed, this result can be 
strengthened (see Theorem 1). It suffices to require utility independence for one attribute. 
This was also shown in Fishbum & Keeney (1974), Keeney & Raiffa (1976), and von 
Stengel (1990), for at least three attributes, and under continuity of the risky u, instead of 
only continuity of the riskless V as we have in our case. In view of the application in 
Section 4, an extension to two attributes would facilitate the task (of giving answers to 
risky questions) for patients. The following theorem (see for the proof. Maas & Wakker, 
1991) gives the required extension. 
Theorem 1. Under additive representability of riskless preferences, utility independence 
of one attribute implies that u is a linear or exponential transform of the additive 
representation V of ?=c· Thus it implies utility independence in full strength, and 
continuity of u. 
A corollary of the above theorem is that, as soon as u is additively or multiplicatively 
decomposable, then it satisfies utility independence, so is a linear or exponential 
transform of V. The function u has one of the following forms: 
u (xi,...,xn) = e X V l ( x i ) χ ... χ e X V n ( X n ) for λ>0 (la) 
u (xi x„) = Vi(xi) + ... + V
n
(x„) for λ=0 (lb) 
u (xi,...,xn) = - e ^ i ^ i ) χ ... χ e X V n ( X n ) for λ<0, (1c) 
where λ is a risk parameter. Each of these forms can be multiplied by any positive real 
number, and any real number can be added up. Note that from the riskless data the risky 
utility functions are revealed up to a parameter λ. In principle one observed nontrivial 
indifference between risky alternatives, in addition to the riskless preferences ^c. will 
suffice to reveal the entire preference structure 'f. 
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The riskless preference function is supposed to measure all personal characteristics, 
other than risk aversion. Hence, for riskless choices λ is meaningless. In risky decisions 
this λ is a measure of risk aversion, i.e., the lower λ, the more risk averse a patient is. 
We will exemplify this with Example 1: Suppose Vi(2) = .20, Vi(10) = .90, V2(bad 
health) = .10, and Vaigood health) = .80. Then the alternatives A and В would have the 
same riskless utility, namely 1.0. If a patient is indifferent between alternatives A and B, 
then this implies that u=V, and equation (lb) holds, hence λ = 0. If λ = 1.0, then the 
risky Utility Of A, U(A) = .5eVl(10)+V2(goo<l health)
 + 5 с КгН гСЬаа health) = 5^1.7 + e.3) 
= 3.41, and u(B) = ¿(e1 + e1) = 2.72, hence A >- B. If λ = -1 0, then u(A) = -.46, and 
u(B) = -.37, hence В >- A. Thus choosing for the alternative that offers a .50 probability 
to have the best levels of both attributes is preferred by patients who are less risk averse. 
Based on equity arguments, namely being certain to have precisely one best level, one 
may choose alternative B, which is a more risk averse choice. Note that equity arguments 
thus lead to a negative λ, while favoring the more risk prone alternative leads to a positive 
λ. 
4. Experiments 
4.1. First experiment 
The first experiment was carried out among 45 students. First binary choices were 
elicited for riskless alternatives, i.e., all combinations of the voice qualities, mute, 
artificial, and normal, and the lengths of life 2,4,6,9,12, and 15 years. For each subject 
an additive representation V (Kmskal's stress is 0) was obtained from his/her choices by 
means of the program Unicon (see Roskam, 1974; see also the remarks in Chapter 2 
about this and other similar programs). Note again that this representation is implied by 
utility independence as tested and confirmed for instance in Miyamoto & Eraker (1988). 
So again utility independence was assumed. The additive representation V does not give 
direct information about the intermediate values of number of life years, for instance 
1,3,5 years. A choice of a parametric family of value functions, with parameters 
subsequently determined to give best fit with respect to the observed values in 
2,4,6,9,12,15, may easily introduce unwarranted phenomena and restrictions. Hence we 
decided to use interpolation to estimate the intermediate values. Finally risky choices were 
presented to estimate the risk parameter λ, and to study its behavior. By Theorem 1, 
these risky choices are allowed to be presented by keeping one attribute constant, and are 
given in Figure 1. In these risky choices, only the number of life years was varied, and 
the quality of voice was kept constant at the level 'normal voice'. Thus, per subject we 
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collected values for all levels of both attributes from which a value function for life years 
was derived, and five estimates for a risk parameter. 
In the experiment students had to indicate a length of life y such that they were 
indifferent between a pair of gambles. Five indifferences were presented; they are 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. The five indifferences I1...I5. Students were asked to indicate the value y for 
which they were indifferent 
.50/10 
y T c C 
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.50/15 
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Il to I4 involve certainty equivalents (CEs), and are called CE-indifferences. I5 
involves a gamble equivalent (GE), and is called a GE-indifference. From each 
indifference λ was calculated, giving five values of λ for each student. An example for 
finding λ is the following: Say the certainty equivalent of Ii for a subject is 8 years. If 
V(8) > [V(3) + V(10)]/2, then λ > 0, and the equation ελν(8> = .50(ελν(3> + βλν(10)) (see 
formula (la)) has to be solved for λ. If V(8) < [V(3) + V(10)]/2, then λ < 0, and - €λν<Β) 
= .50(- β λ ν(3) - βλν<10)) (formula 1(c)) will give a solution for λ. Finally, if V(8) = 
[V(3) + V(10)]/2 (formula 1(b)), then λ = 0. Since no simple expression for λ could be 
found, an iterative procedure solves the equations for λ. The mean of these five estimated 
X's, μ, was taken as an estimate for λ. 
Fourteen students were discarded for being too intransitive. Also we discarded eight 
students who violated dominance; the latter was only observed in risky decisions. That 
is, suppose a gamble of the form (.SO.x'i-SO.x2) has a certainty equivalent Ζ for a 
respondent. Then, as a principle of rational choice, it is assumed that x1<Z<x2. In I5, a 
GE has to be judged. Rational choice implies that 2<y<18. If y<2 or y>18, then it is said 
that dominance is violated. In our study dominance was violated several times. Finally, 
five students were discarded who exhibited lexicographic preferences among the 
presented riskless alternatives. For the latter students no nontrivial tradeoffs could be 
determined, and too little information could be obtained about the riskless additive V. 
Thus 18 transitive non-lexicographic students remained; their data were analyzed. 
Table 1 presents the 18 obtained values μ, as well as the standard deviations σ, per 
student. Note that σ is rather high. This confirms the often observed unreliability of risky 
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choices. Analysis of variance showed a significant effect (p=.002) of person on 
parameter λ; this is of course a minimal requirement to exclude total randomness. 
Table 1. Values of μ and σ per student's λ in experiment 1. 
μ .728 1.02 4.70 -.801 1.16 1.85 -.575 2.07 2.91 
σ .832 1.83 1.52 3.59 .839 .914 1.58 2.90 2.45 
μ .634 -.057 .678 2.93 1.17 .006 .446 .909 .720 
σ 1.56 .942 2.35 2.65 .893 .171 1.39 .922 1.24 
It is well-known that the CE-indifferences Ii,...J4 meet more systematic biases than 
I5. By t-tests however we did not find a significant difference between values of λ as 
calculated for CE-indifferences, and those calculated for I5 (t=l.ll, df=17, p=.284). 
This was contrary to our expectation that, due to the certainty effect as found in Cohen & 
Jaffray (1988) and numerous other studies, λ would be lower for the CE-gambles, 
suggesting more risk aversion. Also note that we asked for substitution of values of life 
years, as opposed to probability values. It is well-known that subjects will then pay 
relatively less attention to differences in probabilities, thus will insufficiently distinguish 
between li and I4. This can be seen to lead to greater risk aversion, i.e., lower λ, for I4. 
For instance, if a subject's 'true' certainty equivalent for Ij is 6 years, and the subject's 
'true' certainty equivalent for I4 is 8 years, then (s)he may partly ignore the .75/.25 
probabilities4 in I4, and give 7 years as a certainty equivalent. By doing so, (s)he gives 
an equivalent that has a lower number of life years than the 'true' equivalent, and hence 
(s)he seems more risk averse. Indeed we found a significant difference (t=4.66, df=17, 
p=.000, with mean λ for li is 1.84, and mean λ for I2 is .28) in the expected direction. 
Nine out of 18 estimates of λ were negative for I4. Apart from the nine negative X's in I4, 
14 negative λ'5 were found among the remaining 90 - 18 = 72 estimates. For three out 
of 18 students μ, the mean of λ, was negative. 
42. Second experiment 
In the second experiment we tested more extensively whether the estimates of λ did 
depend on the kind of question (CE versus GE). Furthermore, we included gambles in 
^Reading it, as it were, more like a .S0/.S0 gamble. 
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which one of the .50-probabilities was living one year or a half year. The offered 
gambles are given in Figure 2. 
Figure 2. The ten indifferences J1...J10. Students were asked to indicate the value y for 
which they were indifferent. 
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Riskless pair comparisons were first presented, and they only differed from the first 
experiment in one way: instead of six, only four lengths of life were offered, namely 3, 
6, 9, and 12 years. There were two practical considerations for this reduction. First, the 
number of pair comparisons decreases from 45 to 18, which, we hoped, would keep 
concentration of the students high. Second, we conjectured that the number of 
intransitivities in the observed preference structure would decrease. 
An experiment was carried out among 49 students, whom we offered both pair 
comparisons and gambles. Three of them were lexicographic among the presented 
riskless alternatives. Fourteen students had too many cycles in their answers; the 
proportion of these students between the first (.31) and the second (.28) experiment did 
not differ much. Seven students had cycles that could not be solved by our method, and 
three students violated dominance in the gambles. The remaining 22 students were 
analyzed in the same way as in the first experiment. 
We excluded the two most extreme cases (i.e., the highest and lowest estimate of λ)5, 
because of the supposedly unreliable measurement. All the following analyses are done 
with exclusion of extreme cases. In Table 2 means and standard deviations of λ are given 
for each student. Again, as in the first experiment, the standard deviations are rather high. 
5
 Exclusion of outliers was not performed in the first experiment, since the number of observations was 
too small. 
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This shows that there is much bias in the data, and that hence the obtained estimates of λ 
are unreliable. 
Table 2. Values of μ and σ per student's λ in experiment 2. 
μ .491 -.880 .305 .586 -1.25 1.39 -.073 .784 -.818 
σ .824 .587 1.60 .301 1.20 2.16 2.69 1.23 1.67 
μ .607 1.23 .701 -1.08 .541 1.39 -.130 .760 1.21 
σ .584 1.01 .528 1.31 1.20 .412 .678 .945 1.36 
μ 2.27 1.03 .750 -.342 
σ .883 .721 .994 1.11 
The minimal requirement of respondents having effect on λ was met (p=.032). Since 
we now only had three estimated values of the riskless preference function V (namely 
V(3), V(6), and V(9), V being normaüzed such that V(0)=0, V(12)=l), we tested 
whether there was an effect of respondents on V, which was the case (p<.0001). 
Our main aim was to test whether there is a difference of values of λ between CE- and 
GE-indifferences. Due to a certainty effect we supposed that X's elicited by CEs are 
lower than \'s elicited by GEs. However, we did not find such an effect (t = .25, df = 
21, ρ = .806). To exclude that this result was somehow obscured by the different content 
of questions (i.e., depending on whether or not low numbers of life years appear in the 
gambles), we checked whether Ji to J3 [Je to Jg] elicited significantly different \'s than 
did J4 and J5 [J9 and J10]. This was not the case (Ji to J3 versus J^Js: t = .50, df = 21, ρ 
= .620; Je to Jg versus JgJw'· t = -.27, df = 21, ρ =.790). Further, we tested whether Ji 
to J3 yielded significant different \'s than Je to Jg (t = .46, df = 21, ρ = .653), and 
whether J4, J5 yielded significant different X's than J9, J10 (t = -.25, df = 21, ρ = .805). 
We did not find any significant difference between the four subgroups of questions. A 
conclusion we apparently have to draw is that GEs do not seem to offer any additional 
information, and that thus CEs suffice to determine a risk parameter. Though this 
conclusion is not in conformity with other results, it can be concluded from both our first 
and our second experiment 
One remark applies to the answers that students gave to risky questions. Examination 
of these answers led us to the conviction that students possibly use certain heuristics to 
give equivalents. For instance, if Ji is presented, many students gave 6 years as CE-
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indifference. This suggests that students do not use their V-function to answer the risky 
questions, but return to expected values (or, alternatively, for these respondents V(x)=x). 
However, we could not find students who did this consistently, i.e., for all indifferences. 
If such heuristics are employed, this will certainly affect the estimation of λ. 
5. Discussion 
The usefulness of multiattribute utility can be improved by invoking results from 
additive conjoint measurement for riskless choices. Risky preferences can be determined 
in a more reliable way by observing, as much as possible, riskless decisions than by 
presenting only risky alternatives. This contributes to the reliability of determining risky 
preferences, since risky questions induce more biases than riskless questions. The 
analysis also contributes to the discussions on risky versus riskless utility. It is argued 
that, rather than choosing a riskless utility function ad hoc, this function should be 
estimated from observations. Miyamoto & Eraker (1989) reported violations of both 
log/power and linear/exponential families of riskless utility functions. Our procedure may 
be a useful extension. 
Going by the experiments it appears that there is no difference in estimations of λ 
between CEs and GEs. Since this is in contrast with other research, some further 
research is needed to support this result. For practical purposes this outcome would be 
very welcome, since respondents, and especially poorly educated patients, will have 
difficulties with GEs. 
Elicitation of the riskless preference function V has to be refined before firmer 
conclusions can be drawn. Though estimating only three points of a riskless or risky 
utility function is not unusual in decision making literature (e.g., McNeil et al, 1981), it is 
a rather low number. Small fluctuations in the function are not observed, and especially 
in the low numbers of life years this may give rise to bias. It is therefore essential in 
future research to measure more points of V in order to capture such fluctuations. This 
will probably affect the value of λ in many cases. A more extensive measurement of V 
may lead to using a method other than the method of pair comparisons, since, say, ten 
different levels of number of life years make pair comparisons an impracticable task with 
135 binary choices (assuming the same three levels of quality of speech). 
Another point that needs further consideration is the large number of negative X's. In 
the first experiment the proportion of negative X's was 23/90 = .26, in the second 
experiment this proportion was 53/176 = .30. A negative λ can be shown to be irrational 
in Example 1 by replacing '2 years' by '2 days'. A negative λ would imply a choice for 
alternative B. Choosing this alternative suggests that the equity principle is applied. 
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Hence the equity principle can be shown to be irrational in such cases. The model as we 
propose it is violated if negative X's are observed. 
It is noted that the robustness of estimation of λ varies. That is, if a respondent gives a 
certainty equivalent of, say, six years, then his/her 'true' certainty equivalent may for 
instance lie in the interval [5.5, 6.5]. In principle estimates of λ can be made for all 
observed certainty equivalents lying in this interval. If a and b (a>b) are life years offered 
in (.50,a; .50,i>), then the range R of this gamble is V(a) - V(i>). The difference between 
estimates of λ at the boundaries of the interval is denoted by Δ. In Table 3, a simulation 
is given of the V-values of the certainty equivalents for 5.5, 6, and 6.5 years, which are 
set at .55, .6, and .65, respectively. V(a) and V(b) are varied from 1.0 to .70, and from 0 
to .30, respectively. 
Table 3. Simulation of λ-estimations. The V-values .55 - .65 are the boundaries of the 
values to which the 'true' certainty equivalent belongs. Δ is the difference between 
highest and lowest estimate for λ. 
V(CE) 
.55 
.60 
.65 
V(fl) 
1.0 
V(b) 
.00 
.403 
.823 
1.28 
.877 
V(fl) 
.90 
V(b) 
.10 
.632 
.131 
2.08 
1.45 
V(a) Уф) 
.80 .20 
1.13 
2.41 
4.06 
2.93 
V(a) 
.70 
V(i>) 
.30 
2.61 
6.09 
13.78 
11.17 
Theoretically, assuming a constant interval in objective life years for the 'true' 
certainty equivalent, there is a negative correlation between R and Δ: the larger R, the 
smaller Δ. Hence, the accuracy of the estimation of λ is dependent on R. Thus, it will be 
advisable to use gambles with a large range. Though R cannot be known a piori, the 
difference in objective value, a-b, is assumed to be positively correlated with R. 
However, the assumption of a constant interval for the 'true' certainty equivalent, i.e., 
the observed values plus or minus a half year, may very well be invalid. It is possible that 
this interval covaries with the range R of the gamble: Empirically a respondent has only a 
few choices (for the certainty equivalent) when a-b is very small, and has many choices 
when a-b is large. It is possible that the theoretically smaller variability in the estimation 
of λ is largely due to a larger R. If this is the case, then this smaller variability would 
largely be an artefact of the chosen gamble. Furthermore, it is noted that as the certainty 
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equivalent approaches V(a) or V(fc), λ increases very fast. (This can for instance be seen 
by the fact that if CE = a, then λ = «>). Thus, when very risk seeking CEs are observed, 
the estimation of λ is very unstable, and many observations must be made to provide a 
reliable and valid estimate of λ. 
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CHAPTER? 
SOME FURTHER APPLICATIONS OF A PROCEDURE TO ELICIT 
PATIENT PREFERENCES BETWEEN TREATMENTS 
Summary 
We present a general structure for decisions between cancer treatments, that can be 
handled by the procedure we have given in the previous five chapters. Some specific 
cancers are presented to which this structure applies. We will mention some limitations of 
the procedure. 
¡.Introduction 
A procedure to elicit patient preferences between treatments for laryngeal cancer has 
been described in a previous paper (Stalpers & Maas, 1991), and in Chapter 2. Here we 
will try to show that this procedure can be applied to treatment decisions for other cancers 
as well. 
In Section 2 a useful format will be given for the description of decisions between 
cancer treatments with an underlying decision structure similar to that of laryngeal cancer. 
That is, a tradeoff between at least two attributes can be made. The description of other 
cancer treatment decisions is given in Section 3. There may still be a lack of knowledge 
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with respect to the attributes. Two of those lacks are mentioned explicitly. First, survival 
rates of cancer treatments are often only roughly known. To apply decision analysis, 
survival probabilities must be estimated accurately, and hence several years of 
(longitudinal) research may be necessary before actual application. Second, quality of life 
research is a new field of research, with little standard methodology or universally 
accepted definitions and/or outcomes (Aaronson & Beckmann, 1987). Research often 
tries to catch the main possible symptoms; thus far few attempts have been made to 
combine these results into a model for quality of life (however, see Chapter 3). For 
instance, until now it often has not been studied which relevant levels of quality of life 
can be distinguished. Some researchers have given multidimensional approaches to 
describe quality of life (Aaronson et al., 1987; Fayos & Beland, 1981), others define 
specific aspects which would be important for quality of life (Liu, 1974; Hömquist, 
1982). It is therefore still premature to give relevant levels of quality of life, and this will 
hence be avoided. 
We will confine ourselves to cancer treatments, though our procedure may very well 
be suitable for other kinds of diseases. Medical choice problems, as described in Section 
3, mainly come from Zwaveling, van Zonneveld, and Schaberg (1991), and Rubin 
(1983). Section 4 concludes and discusses. 
2. Some remarks onfiimre applications of the procedure 
Four aspects are important when a decision between cancer treatments has to be made: 
I. Tumor type and size, 
Π. Available treatments, 
Ш. Relevant attributes on which the decision is based, 
IV. Measurement model. 
Laryngeal cancer may serve as an example (compare Chapter 2): 
I. Tj/iyiaryngeal cancer, 
II. Radiotherapy and surgery, 
ΠΙ. Length of life and quality of voice. Radiotherapy gives a lower life expectancy 
than surgery, but a better quality of voice. Relevant levels of quality of voice are mute, 
artificial and normal speech, 
IV. Additive conjoint measurement 
We elaborate on the four aspects, and specify the type of information they cany: 
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I. Tumor type and size. 
Tumors are indicated by the TNM-classification; this classification is composed of the 
categories T, N, and M, which we will first describe. The size of the primary tumor is 
given by its Τ category. This Τ category is directly related to the extent and volume of the 
tumor, and is indexed from To (no indication of a primary tumor) to T4 (extension of the 
primary tumor to adjacent structures). The N category indicates whether there are 
metastases in the lymph glands; category No means that there are no such metastases. The 
M category indicates whether there are distant metastases; again, Mo means there are 
none. For our procedure, we assume that both No and Mo apply, and only the relevant Τ 
categories, and the type of tumor, are given. 
II. Available treatments. 
To speak of a decision problem it is necessary that more than one appropriate treatment 
is available. These treatments should be more or less medically equivalent for certain 
tumor classifications. Medical equivalence is defined in Chapter 1 (page 3). This notion is 
different from the notion of medical necessity. That is, if a tumor is such that treatment in 
the near future is essential for a patient to survive, we can speak of medical necessity: not 
treating the patient would mean death of the patient in the near future. Medical 
equivalence and medical necessity can coexist; neither of them is implied by the other. 
Relevant treatments, i.e., treatments that apply to the categories given under I, are given. 
Ш. Relevant attributes (plus some additional information if available). 
Treatments should have different outcomes on different attributes. That is, if treatment 
A has a better outcome on attribute X than treatment B, then treatment В should have a 
better outcome than A on attribute Y. The number of attributes may vary, but must at least 
be two. The attributes X and Y must have sufficiently many realistic levels to allow for 
application of conjoint measurement. For instance, with only two different levels the 
double cancellation axiom cannot be tested. Also, then, the (restricted) solvability axiom 
may be violated (see Maas & Wakker, 1991 and Chapter 2, for definitions of these 
axioms). 
The attributes will often be life duration and quality of life, but this is not necessarily 
so: It is possible that two aspects of quality of life are different but both very important, 
while life expectancy is more or less the same for each treatment. As an example in 
oncology, consider the choice whether or not to do a palliative treatment for advanced 
lung cancer. As with many palliative treatments, they are not done to increase the life 
expectancy, but mainly to ease a certain form of pain or serious discomfort. This may be 
the prevention of a vena cava superior syndrome, which causes tightness of the chest 
The price to pay for the reduction of pain is toxicity of the patient. Hence, in this case 
there is no gain in life expectancy, but there are two aspects of quality of life, namely pain 
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reduction and toxicity, that are important in the decision whether or not to do a palliative 
treatment. 
There often is no unequivocal knowledge about relevant levels of quality of life, due to 
the little attention this topic has received in the context of medical decision making. 
Relevant levels of length of life are always dependent on the life expectancy of a patient 
Г . Measurement model. 
In the application to the case of laryngeal cancer (Chapter 2) an additive model was 
assumed. However, there may be situations in which the hypothesis of additivity will be 
rejected. Specifically, if there is interaction between life years and quality of life, an 
additive model seems inappropriate. That is, if there is a quality of life q~, which is 
perceived as worse than death, then a patient would rather die than live with health quality 
q- for some years. Suppose there is some quality of life ^ + perceived better than death. 
An additive model then assumes independence of attributes, e.g., the ordering of life 
years is the same for each quality of life. For health states q~ and q+, attribute 
independence does not hold: The longer one lives in health state q~, the lower the utility 
of the combination (life years, health quality); the longer one lives in health state q+, the 
higher the utility of the combination. The apparent interaction between quality and length 
of life (and hence a violation of attribute independence) then seems to reject additivity. 
However, conjoint measurement can reckon with such occurrences by using the more 
general multiplicative model. The state of death (or, equivalently, living 0 years) then is 
fixed at utility 0, and the health state(s) which is (are) judged worse than death, has 
(have) a negative utility. 
Figure 1. An example of a preference ranking that is to be solved by a multiplicative 
model. 1,2, and 3 are life years, - = health state worse than death, + = health state better 
than death. 
Preference ranking 
Q 
ι 
Y 2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
3 
2 
1 
Marginal utilities, and their 
multiplicative combination UqUy 
Uq 
- 1 1 
1 
Uy 2 
3 
- 1 
- 2 
- 3 
1 
2 
3 
A simple example is given in Figure 1 (see Miyamoto & Eraker, 1988, for the testing of a 
multiplicative model). The axiom system underlying the multiplicative conjoint 
measurement model will be given in the appendix (see also Krantz et al., 1971); for the 
axiom system of an additive conjoint measurement model we refer to Chapter 2, and 
Maas & Wakker (1991). Whether additivity or multiplicativity is to be assumed may vary 
per patient, and will certainly vary per cancer. That is, one patient with bladder cancer 
may find the use of a stoma so humiliating that he/she would rather die. Conversely, 
another patient may perceive it satisfactory to live with a stoma. The preferences of the 
first patient can be described by a multiplicative model, the preferences of the second 
patient can be described by an additive model (assuming that both patients satisfy the 
appropriate axioms). These are differences between two patients with the same tumor. In 
the case of laryngeal cancer additive conjoint measurement seems an adequate model. 
However, treatments of other cancers, such as the aforementioned bladder cancer, may 
result in qualities of life that are perceived worse than death. If it is not clear a priori 
whether an additive or a multiplicative model should be assumed, both are given as 
possibility under IV. 
There are practical consequences for the pair comparisons when one or more health 
states are valued worse than death. We will consider two cases, namely that one health 
state is valued worse than death, and that two or more health states are valued worse than 
death. 
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If only one health state is valued worse than death, this will significantly reduce the 
number of pair comparisons. Indeed, one year in such a health state, denoted q~, is 
worse than one or more years in any other health state. Furthermore, more than one year 
in q- is valued less than one year in q-. Hence, no number of years in q~ will be valued 
better than any number C¿\) of years in any other health state, which means that 
alternatives with q~ need not appear in the pair comparisons. 
If two or more health states are valued worse than death, then pair comparisons should 
be presented in which those health states (together with a number of life years) are 
compared with each other. Also in such cases it is preferable that there is an ordenng of 
health states from most to least preferred, since again trivial pair comparisons can be 
eliminated from presentation. 
In both cases, a tournament can still be constructed, and the rest of the procedure will 
remain the same, be it that a multiplicative model must be used for the estimation of the 
utilities of attribute levels. 
5. Possible applications to other cancers 
We give some examples of cancers for which, as in the case of laryngeal cancer, a 
treatment decision must be made. To the examples below our procedure can immediately 
be applied. 
I. T2/T3-bladder cancer. 
Π. Radiotherapy and surgery. 
III. Length of life and quality of life. Surgery gives better life expectancy than 
radiotherapy (65-80% vs 55%), but cystectomy and urcthrectomy result in a loss of 
bladder and potency, and the use of a stoma. 
IV. Additive or multiplicative conjoint measurement. There may be patients who value 
the loss of bladder and potency as worse than death. If this is the case for an individual 
patient, a multiplicative model has to be assumed. Otherwise, an additive model has to be 
assumed. 
I. T2/T3-prostate cancer. 
Π. Radiotherapy and surgery. 
Ш. Length of life and quality of life. Surgery (prostatectomy) has a higher probability 
of complications, mainly impotence. Prostatectomy gives a 5 years survival rate of 60-
70%, and there is a surgery-related mortality (for radical prostatectomy 2-3%). 
Radiotherapy gives a 5 years survival rate of 60-80%, and no therapy-related mortality. 
The disadvantage of radiotherapy is that only after years it becomes clear whether the 
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treatment had the desired effect. In this case it is yet not clear which relevant levels of 
quality of life can be distinguished. 
IV. Additive or multiplicative conjoint measurement. Loss of potency may be valued 
as worse than death, and hence an additive model cannot be assumed a priori. 
I. Ti/iytongue cancer. 
Π. Radiotherapy and surgery. 
HI. Length of life and quality of life. Surgery gives a somewhat better life expectancy, 
but radiotherapy is less mutilating: the volume of the tongue remains larger. 
IV. Additive conjoint measurement. It is unlikely that people will value a mutilated 
tongue as worse than death, but no research supporting or rejecting this statement is 
known to the author. 
Another treatment decision, different from the ones above concerns the decision 
whether or not a preventive treatment should be applied. Here no immediate decision is 
needed, that is, there is time to think about the treatment decision because there is yet no 
medical necessity. The great advantage in this case is that patients can (and often want to) 
be extensively tested. This is the case for women in whose families breast cancer often 
occurs (Verhoef et al., 1991). Some of these women might consider prophylactic 
mastectomy to avoid a life time risk of up to 50% to develop breast cancer. Here, the 
decision is to do either surgery, or no treatment at all. In this case there is no tradeoff 
between attributes of two treatments. That is, the treatment, if applied, would be 
prophylactic and hence the option of applying no treatment is relevant, since there is no 
medical necessity. The possibility is mentioned because of the extension of our procedure 
to prophylactic treatments. The same holds for palliative treatments: an option is to apply 
one (of possibly more) treatment to ease the pain, or to do no treatment at all. 
To show the inappropriateness of conjoint measurement in some other cases, we will 
now give an example of non-small cell lung cancer, which cannot be treated in the same 
way: 
I. Ti/iyiung cancer (non-small cell). 
II. Radiotherapy and surgery. 
III. Length of life. Surgery gives a (ca. 5-10%) higher 5 years survival rate than 
radiotherapy, but the surgery-related mortality is 0-10%, while radiotherapy has no 
therapy-related mortality. Part of the reason for the difference in 5 years survival rates of 
radiotherapy and surgery is that after surgery sometimes a total cure is reached, i.e., there 
is no relapse. Radiotherapy will never result in a total cure. The difference in quality of 
life between surgery and radiotherapy is very difficult to describe and is dependent on die 
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individual condition and situation of the patient. Thus there is only one attribute which in 
general can be used to judge what treatment is applied, namely length of life. 
IV. Since there is only one relevant attribute, namely length of life, conjoint 
measurement cannot be applied. In this case the gamble method, or any other method that 
presents risky preferences, may be used in order to determine how willing patients are to 
take a risk of immediate death. 
We note that possible use of our procedure to solve one of the above problems is not 
hampered by computational or algorithmic problems due to the methods included in this 
procedure. All methods (e.g., of solving intransitivitìes, of computing ζ or λ) do, of 
course, not depend on the kind of problem under scrutiny. 
4. Conclusions and discussion 
We have given some examples of cancers that have the same structure as laryngeal 
cancer with respect to making a treatment decision. That is, one of two treatments gives a 
better quality of life, the other treatment gives a lower probability of recurrence of the 
tumor, i.e., a higher life expectancy. Not all cancer treatment decisions have this 
structure, an example of lung cancer is given at the end of Section 3. Neither is the 
survey of cancers that have this structure complete. That is, other cancers, such as (the 
rarely occurring) penis cancer, also have this structure. 
The main disadvantage of conjoint measurement is that the method is more laborious 
(for the researcher) than other methods like the time tradeoff and certainty equivalent 
methods. Some advantages of conjoint measurement compared to these more traditional 
methods have already been mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2. We will repeat the main 
advantages here, since they do not depend on a particular cancer. 
1. The possibility of testing axioms as mentioned in Chapter 2. That is, the axioms of 
conjoint measurement are not presupposed without any testing. This offers the possibility 
to reject the use of an additive model. 
2. The attribute that is traded off or gambled with in the tradeoff and certainty 
equivalent methods becomes salient. By using pair comparisons this saliency effect is 
avoided. 
3. The consistency of a patient's answers can be tested against randomness. 
These advantages definitely outweigh the disadvantage of laboriousness (for the 
researcher). Moreover, in treatment decisions one should be very careful in giving advice 
to patients/physicians based on tests. Hence such tests should be as good as possible, 
whether it is laborious or not. 
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Appendix: An axiom system for multiplicative conjoint measurement 
Let two attributes A, and A2 denote quality and length of life. Let A) be partitioned into 
A! -, Ai0, and Ai+, denoting sets of levels of quality of life being worse than death, 
equivalent to death, and better than death, respectively. Let A2 be partitioned into A2
0
 and 
A2
+
, denoting sets of levels of length of life 0 years, and more than 0 years, respectively. 
Let - and >• denote indifference and strict preference, respectively. Let Α-B denote set 
A without the elements of B. The axioms of multiplicative conjoint measurement for two 
attributes are a modification of Krantz et al. (1971): 
1. ì= is a weak ordering of A = Α,χΑ^ This implies completeness and transitivity. 
2. Solvability. For all a,be A, with a¡e A,—A,0, i = 1,2, with either a^e A^, or 
ДіАе Ar, there exists с e A such that 
3. Double cancellation. For all аДс e A, whenever 
(aubù ~ (&1.C2) 
(bbch) - (cM 
and either ¿^  « АД or b2 e A2
0
 then a ~ с 
4. Sign dependence. К/еСА^хАг*), g e(A^xA^uíA^Aj0), and h е^АсхАг*)* 
then 
5. All elements of the set (A10xA2)u(AiXA20) are equivalent. 
Note that the set ( А ^ А ^ и ^ х А г 0 ) is equivalent to death. An Archimedean axiom 
must also be added, but this has no empirical content (Luce, Krantz, Suppes & Tversky, 
1990; Adams, Fagot & Robinson, 1970), and hence is not formally defined here. If a 
multiplicative model is assumed, axioms 3 and 4 should be tested. Moreover, transitivity 
should also be tested if it is not a priori satisfied. If these axioms are satisfied, then the 
utility of a combination of Aj and Aj, Ща,,^), is obtained by multiplying the utility 
functions of quality of life, U(ai), and length of life, ІДог): 
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U ( a I Ä ) = U(a1)U(a2). 
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CHAPTERS 
DISCUSSION 
1. Discussion 
The aim of this thesis is to develop a procedure to help patients with making a decision 
between medical treatments. In the preceding seven chapters we hope to have set out the 
lines along which such a procedure works. The particular oncological problem we have 
chosen, namely laryngeal cancer, is a disease of which the relevant aspects are described 
with relative ease. We tried to show that the procedure can be applied to this particular 
problem. 
A description of quality of life after laryngectomy has been given. This will at least be 
necessary to explain to patients what they may expect, i.e., what the consequences of a 
particular decision may be. Special attention has been given to intransitive preference 
structures, since such structures turned out to occur frequently. A last aspect that we 
judged to be important is the risk perception of patients. The estimation of risk perception 
is incorporated in the procedure. In Chapter 7, possible applications to other cancers are 
given. That is, oncological choice problems are given that essentially have the same 
decision structure as laryngeal cancer. 
We do not aim to generalize results to a larger population on the basis of this study. 
First, the procedure has been applied to, altogether, ten patients with laryngeal cancer. 
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For only one of them the procedure was used to give an advice. Second, so far the 
procedure has not been applied to patients with other forms of cancer. Determining the 
practicality of the procedure will involve a follow-up: how do patients look back at the 
procedure, say, one year after the treatment. The procedure can be applied to other 
cancers, for instance those mentioned in Chapter 7 (bladder cancer, prostate cancer, 
tongue cancer). At the Radboud Hospital, some experience has recently been acquired 
with patients with breast cancer. It soon turned out that the procedure has its specific 
problems when applied to this disease. For instance, one health state, namely living with 
metastasized breast cancer, is valued as worse than death by some patients (Lia Verhoef, 
personal communication). Hence a multiplicative model seems to be called for in such 
cases. 
Extending the procedure to other cancers, and maybe also to non-oncological diseases, 
requires research. First, research has to focus on the definition of quality of life after 
treatments, such that relevant levels of quality of life can be constructed for incorporation 
in the test. Second, it is necessary to estimate probabilities of events which occur after 
application of a treatment. In principle, however, we think that the procedure is apt to 
suffice in medical problems that have the same underlying decision structure as laryngeal 
cancer. 
One of the methodological aspects that may cause problems is already mentioned, 
namely a health state which is valued worse than death. In Chapter 7 it is described how a 
multiplicative model can account for violations of independence as defined in Chapter 2. 
Violations of transitivity can be handled by the method described in Chapter 5, provided 
that ζ„ ä .95, and no stable intransitivities have been observed. Violation of double 
cancellation may be more difficult to solve, see however remark 3 in Section 2. A last 
problem is the estimation of the risk parameter λ. Like the patient described in the 
appendix of Chapter 2, not every patient will be able to give certainty equivalents to 
gambles. It is possible to cope with such a shortcoming by reckoning with it in the 
sensitivity analysis. If more data about λ are collected, it may be possible to calculate an 
aggregated value of λ for patients who are not capable of giving answers to risky 
questions. 
Most decision models and theories do not incorporate rime as a relevant factor. That is, 
time is not used to predict a particular choice. This omission in decision models is often, 
such as in this thesis, taken for granted. It is, however, likely that a decision maker (DM) 
comes to a decision in gradual stages. In other words, decision making is a constructive 
process, in which the DM considers different points of view, more than once trades off 
different options, etc. From this standpoint it is not surprising, maybe even expected, that 
patients give inconsistent and intransitive answers, because their preference is not fixed. 
For instance, 28 of the 94 students (30%) described in the two experiments of Chapter 6 
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were 'too' intransitive. Most of these students became acquainted with the decision 
problem at the time of testing. Also, for the students there was no actual choice problem 
between cancer treatments. Hence, 'moving' preferences are likely to occur, and this may 
be a reason for the observed intransitivity. Of the ten patients, only one was 'too' 
intransitive. Though this latter sample is rather small, it suggests that the proportion of 
patients being 'too' intransitive will be lower than that of the students. This may be partly 
due to the fact that patients have, for some time, deliberated the tradeoff between quality 
and quantity of life. Hence patients may be somewhat less intransitive because their 
preferences have taken shape. 
2. Future research 
Some topics that have been dealt with in this study need further research. 
1. Before application of the procedure as described in Chapter 7, there should be 
research into the notion of quality of life after specific treatments. In Chapter 3, such 
research is done for the case of laryngectomy. Not always will one specific and clearly 
defined quality be the most important indicator of quality of life. Two or more attributes 
may all be very important for the final evaluation of the quality of life. 
2. Further research is needed to examine whether patients give more reliable answers 
to risky questions than students do. Up to this moment risky questions have been 
presented mostly to students, who in general will have less interest in the experiments 
than patients. Indeed, standard deviations of λ are rather high in both experiments 
reported in Chapter 6. We have presented indifference questions between riskless 
alternatives (i.e., time tradeoffs) to five patients, but they all had severe difficulties 
answering them. This did not motivate us to present indifference questions between risky 
decisions (e.g., certainty or gamble equivalents). 
3. In Chapter 4 an upper bound for the number of circular triads is proposed. This 
bound gives the possibility to judge whether an observed preference structure is judged to 
be too intransitive. Since double cancellation can be interpreted as transitivity of 
differences (see for instance. Coombs, Dawes & Tversky, 1970), it is possible that the 
search for a circularity measure, equivalent to Kendall's ζ, applied to differences is 
fruitful. 
Arbuckle & Larimer (1976) have done a Monte Carlo study with respect to violation of 
double cancellation. They define a regular table as an rxc-matrix (containing a preference 
ranking) with its entries increasing from top to bottom, and from left to right. In our 
research we have used ordered attribute levels, namely levels of number of life years and 
quality of speech. The a priori knowledge we have, due to this ordering, excludes all 
irregular tables. Hence, the proportion of tables satisfying double cancellation, out of a 
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set of randomly sampled regular tables that satisfy independence is .327 for two attributes 
with 3 and 6 levels (see Table la, Arbuckle & Larimer, 1976). Thus, more than 67% of 
the preference rankings satisfying independence does not satisfy double cancellation. 
Whether in practice double cancellation is often violated while independence holds, is 
unknown. 
4. Whether the elicited (riskless or risky) utility function may be used in a Markov 
model that allows transitions from one health state to another is debatable and needs 
further research. 
5. In Chapter 6 some problems have been mentioned that we encountered in the 
estimation of λ. More experiments are needed to study the behavior of λ in different 
situations. For instance, if immediate death has probability .SO in a gamble, does this 
affect λ and, if so, in what way (as argued in Chapter 1, immediate death was not taken 
as an alternative because of the many biases it may induce). 
6. As argued in Chapter 6, the method of pair comparisons may require too many 
questions if many points of a V-function are to be measured. Estimating more points of 
this function would supposedly give more robust estimations of λ. By imposing some 
transitivity, the number of questions may significantly be reduced. For instance, if two 
alternatives A and В are presented: 
A. Living m years with quality of life p, 
B. Living η years with quality of life q, 
where m>n, and q P= p. Then A >* В implies (by transitivity) that A is also prefeired to 
all alternatives with a number of life years й η and a quality of life equally or less 
preferred than q. Reversely, В t= A implies (by transitivity) that В is also preferred to all 
alternatives with a number of life years < m and a quality of life equally or less preferred 
than p. The implied preferences in principle need not be presented. This will reduce the 
number of pair comparisons. However, the extent to which this number is reduced 
depends on the given answers. 
Another promising alternative is Adaptive Conjoint Analysis (Johnson, 1987). In this 
approach respondents first give a valuation of all attribute levels, which are then treated as 
initial estimates. Questions are based on these estimates and on answers to previous 
questions. Consistency (i.e., giving the same answer to the same question) is checked by 
control questions. Hence, respondents are able to eliminate those levels which they 
regard unacceptable. By this approach a number of pair comparisons can be eliminated, 
so that the total number of presented pair comparisons is reduced. Since we do not have 
experience with this approach, we do not know how well it is suited for medical decision 
making in general, and for our procedure in particular. However, it is possible that this 
approach significantly reduces the number of pair comparisons, and thus allows an 
increase of the number of levels of the attributes under study. 
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SUMMARY 
This thesis deals with patient participation in treatment decisions. To achieve this 
participation, a fully worked out procedure is presented that starts from very simple 
observations of preferences and finally comes up with an advice of which treatment a 
patient is likely to prefer. 
In the first chapter underlying ideas of our research are given. For instance, it is 
explained why we think that patient participation in treatment decisions is a goal worthy 
to achieve. Further, we have tried to exemplify the intuitive appeal of the method of pair 
comparisons. Three conditions are given that are to be met to allow patient participation. 
First, information about the possible course of the illness, the probability of a complete 
cure, and the quality of life after the available treatments needs to be passed on from 
physician to patient Second, patients should be emotionally capable to answer questions 
that concern their own health state. Third, the treatments between which a choice is made, 
have to be medically equivalent; the latter concept is defined. Conflicts about treatment 
decisions that may occur within a patient, or between the physician and the patient, are 
described, guided by the theory of Coombs & Avninin (1988). It is explained how the 
method of pair comparisons can help to solve intra-personal conflicts. The resolution of 
the interindividual conflict may be difficult, but solving it is not incorporated in our 
procedure. 
The resolution of the intra-individual conflict is extensively, and more formally, 
explained in Chapter 2. The preferences are collected by the method of pair comparisons. 
This is a very elementary form of preference elicitation, and should be preferred to the 
usual indifference questions as presented in most of the medical decision making 
research, namely time tradeoff or certainty equivalent questions. Reasons for this point of 
view are, among others, 1. the possibility of reliably measuring consistency, 2. the 
possibility of testing assumptions, and 3. avoiding saliency of attributes. The preferences 
should satisfy the axioms of (additive) conjoint measurement. Three of these axioms can 
be tested by asking pairwise preferences, namely transitivity, independence, and double 
cancellation. It is explained how the pair comparisons can be used for the estimation of 
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utilities, and how these utilities are used in a Markov model, to determine the patient's 
treatment preference. Finally, results are given of the testing of nine patients, three of 
whom were laryngectomized, and six of whom were following radiotherapeutic treatment 
during the testing. Violations of transitivity were allowed to some extent (see Chapter 4). 
Furthermore, the consistency of answers was examined. Since three replications of the 
same test were carried out, it could be examined how consistent patients were in their 
answers (i.e., to what extent did they give the same answer to the same question in all 
replications). Of the nine patients, eight patients did all three replications; only one of the 
latter group was both too intransitive and too inconsistent. Since our method is rather 
restrictive compared to other methods, in the sense that axioms and consistency are 
actually tested, this can be regarded a good and promising result. 
In Chapters 3 to 6 some problems concerning the procedure as described in Chapter 2 
are solved. First, the reduction of quality of life to quality of speech, as is done in our 
procedure as well as in other studies, is not beyond dispute. In Chapter 3 we examine 
this problem in detail. As mentioned before, we allow some intransitivity in the 
preferences. However, none of the existing measures of circularity could serve as a 
measure for our study, hence another measure is developed in Chapter 4. As soon as 
some intransitivity is allowed, these intransitivities are to be solved in order to be able to 
continue the procedure. Hence, in Chapter 5 a method for solving intransitivities is given. 
In Chapter 6 we propose a parameter that represents risk attitude. This parameter is 
introduced since in the procedure in Chapter 2 only riskless alternatives are presented. 
These four chapters are summarized in the sequel. 
In Chapter 3 the reduction of quality of life to quality of speech is examined. This is 
done by means of a literature study on relevant aspects of life after laryngectomy. 
Resulting from this study, we propose a theoretical model for quality of life after 
laryngectomy. By combining findings from literature, relevant factors for determining 
quality of life are presented. The importance of these factors is exemplified by interviews 
with laryngectomees. The practical purpose is to embed this model in the procedure as 
described in Chapter 2. It is argued that a treatment decision is at best made by a 
collaboration of patient, physician and social worker or psychologist 
As mentioned above, no measure of circularity in the literature pertains to the design 
that we work with. Hence, in Chapter 4 a measure of circularity is presented that is 
appropriate for designs in which some preferences are known a priori (i.e., some circular 
triads will never occur). This measure is an adjustment of the well-known measure of 
circularity of Kendall & Smith (1940). The case of two attributes with ordered levels is 
fully elaborated: Mean and variance of the adjusted measure for this case are theoretically 
deduced, and strong evidence is given that the measure is asymptotically normally 
distributed. The measure may also be applicable to all other designs from which a 
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tournament arises. For instance, triple comparisons (i.e., ranking three alternatives) 
impose some transitivity on the preference structure, hence not all triads can be circular. 
The admission of intransitivides inherently poses the problem of solving them, since a 
transitive structure is needed to estimate utilities. In Chapter S, a method is presented to 
transform intransitive, possibly incomplete, preferences between objects into a transitive 
ordering. This method starts from three assumptions: First, it is assumed that true 
preferences are transitive. Second, the more intense an observed preference is, the more 
likely it is to be the true preference. Third, stable preferences have priority over unstable 
preferences, and should receive special attention. In most cases the method provides a 
unique solution which is easily computed, also if many objects are involved. 
Practicability and tractability are two of the main advantages of this method, compared to 
other methods. The method takes into account information about stability or intensity of 
preferences. Preferences are represented as arcs in a digraph. The number of arc reversals 
that form the solution often coincides with the minimal number of arc reversals known as 
Slater's i. A Monte Carlo study is reported that strongly supports the method. The 
method is shown to require polynomial computation time. The method is also applicable 
to incomplete structures such as occurring in Guttman's scalogram analysis and 
conditional proximity matrices. 
A shortcoming of the procedure described in Chapter 2 is the absence of risky 
questions. It is well-known that people may have different risk attitudes, i.e., they may 
be risk neutral, risk averse, or risk prone. This aspect is not captured in the original 
procedure. The reason for this is that risky questions give unreliable answers, since these 
questions induce many biases. Chapter 6 uses a result of Maas & Wakker (1991, 
Theorem 3.1) to determine a risky utility function on the basis of one risky question that 
is as simple as possible. Thus, this chapter provides an extended procedure for eliciting 
patient preferences. Instead of presenting some risky questions to détermine a risky utility 
function u, a riskless utility function V is first determined by means of additive conjoint 
measurement. Then, one risky question suffices theoretically to determine a risk 
parameter, such that a risky utility function can be determined. Reliability of elicitation of 
risky utility functions may be improved. An example is given in which identification of u 
and V is not appropriate. Results of two experiments are given. These results indicate that 
further research is needed, since the value of the risk parameter still fluctuates, hence the 
measurement of the parameter still seems to be unreliable. 
Finally, in Chapter 7 we present a general structure for decisions between cancer 
treatments. Cancer treatment decisions that fit in this structure can be handled by the 
procedure we have given in the Chapters 1 to 6. Some specific cancers are given to which 
this structure applies; also an example of a cancer treatment decision that does not fit in 
our procedure is described to exemplify the practical limitation of the procedure. 
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In Chapter 8 the previous seven chapters are discussed shortly, and areas of further 
research are given. 
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SAMENVATTING 
In deze dissertatie staat de deelname van patiënten aan de keuze tussen behandelingen 
centraal. Om deze deelname te bewerkstelligen, wordt een volledig uitgewerkte procedure 
gegeven. Deze procedure vraagt in beginsel om preferenties van de patiënt en geeft 
uiteindelijk een behandelingsadvies, gebaseerd op deze preferenties. 
In het eerste hoofdstuk worden de onderliggende ideeën van ons onderzoek gegeven. 
Er wordt bijvoorbeeld uitgelegd waarom we van mening zijn dat deelname van patiënten 
in behandelingskeuzen nastrevenswaardig is. Voorts trachten we met voorbeelden aan te 
tonen dat de methode van paarsgewijze vergelijkingen intuïtief aantrekkelijk is. We 
noemen drie condities waaraan voldaan moet zijn om deelname van patiënten te 
rechtvaardigen. Ten eerste moet informatie over mogelijk verloop van de ziekte, kans op 
herstel en kwaliteit van leven na de diverse behandelingen van de arts worden 
overgebracht aan de patiënt. Ten tweede moeten de patiënten emotioneel in staat zijn om 
vragen met betrekking tot hun toestand te beantwoorden. Ten derde moet er geen 
medische voorkeur bestaan voor één der behandelingen. Een patiënt kan tijdens het 
keuzeproces conflicten met zichzelf krijgen met betrekking tot de vraag wat hij/zij nu 
eigenlijk prefereert. Tevens kan een conflict ontstaan tussen arts en patiënt. Deze 
conflicten worden beschreven aan de hand van de theorie van Coombs en Avrunin 
(1988). Er wordt uitgelegd hoe de methode van paarsgewijze vergelijkingen kan helpen 
bij het oplossen van intra-persoonlijke conflicten. Het oplossen van interpersoonlijke 
conflicten kan moeilijk zijn, maar de oplossing hiervan valt niet onder onze procedure. 
Het oplossen van een i η tra-individueel conflict is uitgebreid en meer formeel 
beschreven in Hoofdstuk 2. De preferenties worden verzameld met behulp van de 
methode van paarsgewijze vergelijkingen. Deze elementaire vorm van preferentie-vragen 
moet worden geprefereerd boven de gebruikelijke indifferentievragen, zoals die worden 
gepresenteerd in het meeste medisch besliskundig onderzoek, namelijk time tradeoff dan 
wel certainty equivalent vragen. De redenen voor dit standpunt zijn, onder andere, 1. de 
mogelijkheid voor het betrouwbaar meten van consistentie, 2. the mogelijkheid 
assumpties te toetsen en 3. het vermijden van saillantie van attributen. De preferenties 
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moeten voldoen aan de axioma's van (additief) conjunct meten. Drie van deze axioma's 
kunnen worden getest aan de hand van de paarsgewijze vergelijkingen, namelijk 
transitiviteit, onafhankelijkheid en dubbele cancellatie. Verder wordt uitgelegd hoe de 
paarsgewijze vergelijkingen kunnen worden gebruikt voor het schatten van utiliteiten en 
hoe deze utiliteiten kunnen worden ingepast in het Markov-model om de 
behandelingsvoorkeur van de patiënt te bepalen. De resultaten van een onderzoek bij 
negen patiënten worden gegeven. Drie van hen hadden een laryngectomie gehad, zes van 
hen waren onder radiotherapeutische behandeling. Schendingen van transitiviteit werden 
tot op zekere hoogte toegelaten (zie Hoofdstuk 4). Bovendien werd de consistentie van de 
antwoorden onderzocht Dit was mogelijk omdat drie replicaties van dezelfde test werden 
uitgevoerd, zodat de consistentie van antwoorden van patiënten kon worden onderzocht 
(dat wil zeggen, de mate waarin zij in alle replicaties hetzelfde antwoord op dezelfde 
vraag gaven). Van de negen patiënten voltooiden er acht alle replicaties; slechts één 
patiënt van deze groep was zowel te intransitief als te inconsistent. Omdat onze methode 
vergeleken met andere methoden nogal restrictief is in de zin dat axioma's en consistentie 
daadwerkelijk worden getest, kan dit worden beschouwd als een goed en 
vertrouwenwekkend resultaat. 
In de Hoofdstukken 3 tot 6 worden enkele problemen met de procedure, zoals 
beschreven in Hoofdstuk 2, opgelost. Ten eerste is de reductie van kwaliteit van leven 
naar stemkwaliteit niet onbetwistbaar. In Hoofdstuk 3 wordt deze reductie nader 
beschouwd. Zoals al eerder opgemerkt is, wordt enige intransitiviteit in de preferenties 
toegestaan. Geen enkele van de bestaande circulariteitsmaten kon echter worden gebruikt 
als een maat in onze studie. Daarom werd een nieuwe maat ontwikkeld in Hoofdstuk 4. 
Als intransitiviteit wordt toegestaan, is het volgende probleem hoe die op te lossen om 
voortgang van de procedure mogelijk te maken. Daarom wordt in Hoofdstuk 5 een 
methode voor het oplossen van intransitiviteiten gegeven. In Hoofdstuk 6 wordt een 
parameter voorgesteld die risicohouding weergeeft Deze parameter wordt geïntroduceerd 
omdat in Hoofdstuk 2 alleen risicoloze alternatieven worden gepresenteerd. De 
Hoofdstukken 3 tot en met 6 worden nu samengevat. 
In Hoofdstuk 3 wordt de reductie van kwaliteit van leven naar stemkwaliteit 
onderzocht Dit gebeurt aan de hand van een literatuurstudie naar relevante aspecten van 
het leven na een laryngectomie. Het resultaat van deze studie is het voorstel van een 
model voor kwaliteit van leven na laryngectomie. Door het combineren van de 
bevindingen uit de literatuur worden relevante factoren voor het bepalen van kwaliteit van 
leven gepresenteerd. Het practische doel is om het model op te nemen in de procedure 
zoals beschreven in Hoofdstuk 2. We geven aan dat de beslissing het best kan worden 
gemaakt door een samenwericing van patiënt, arts en psycholoog of sociaal werker. 
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Zoals hierboven vermeld bestaat er geen circulariteitsmaat die toepasbaar is op het 
design zoals wij dat gebruiken. Daarom wordt in Hoofdstuk 4 een circulariteitsmaat 
gegeven die geschikt is voor designs waarin sommige preferenties a priori bekend zijn 
(dit betekent dat sommige circulaire triaden niet voor kunnen komen). Deze maat is een 
aanpassing van de bekende circulariteitsmaat van Kendall & Smith (1940). Het geval van 
twee attributen met geordende niveaus wordt uitgebreid uitgewerkt: Gemiddelde en 
variantie van de aangepaste maat voor dit geval worden theoretisch afgeleid, en sterke 
evidentie wordt gegeven dat deze maat asymptotisch normaal verdeeld is. De maat is 
inprìncipe toepasbaar op alle andere designs die een toumooi opleveren. Een voorbeeld is 
de rangordening van drie alternatieven (triple comparisons), die enige transitiviteit oplegt 
aan de preferentiestructuur, zodat niet alle triaden circulair kunnen zijn. 
Inherent aan het toelaten van intiansitiviteiten is het probleem om ze op te lossen. Zo'η 
oplossing is nodig om utiliteiten te berekenen. Een methode is in Hoofdstuk S 
gepresenteerd om intransitieve, mogelijk incomplete, preferenties te transformeren naar 
een transitive ordening. De methode steunt op drie assumpties: Ten eerste wordt 
aangenomen dat ware preferenties transitief zijn. Ten tweede: hoe intenser een 
geobserveerde preferentie is, des te waarschijnlijker is het dat het de ware preferentie is. 
Ten derde hebben stabiele preferenties prioriteit boven instabiele preferenties en verdienen 
zij een speciale behandeling. In de meeste gevallen zorgt de methode voor een unieke 
oplossing die makkelijk kan worden berekend, ook als er veel objecten zijn. Twee 
belangrijke voordelen van deze methode boven andere methoden zijn de makkelijke 
practische toepasbaarheid en de handelbaarheid. De methode houdt rekening met 
informatie van stabiliteit en intensiteit van preferenties. Preferenties worden 
gerepresenteerd als pijlen in een gerichte graaf. Het aantal pijlomkeringen die de 
oplossing vormen, valt vaak samen met het minimale aantal pijlomkeringen dat bekend 
staat als Slaters ί. Een Monte Carlo studie geeft veel steun aan de methode. Bovendien 
wordt aangetoond dat de methode polynôme berekeningstijd vereist. De methode is ook 
toepasbaar op incomplete structuren zoals die voorkomen in Guttmans scalogramanalyse 
en conditionele nabijheidsmatrices. 
Een tekortkoming van de procedure in Hoofdstuk 2 is de afwezigheid van 
risicovragen. Het is bekend dat mensen verschillende risico-attituden kunnen hebben, dat 
wil zeggen, ze kunnen risico-neutraal, risico-mijdend of risico-zoekend zijn. Met deze 
onderscheiding wordt in Hoofdstuk 2 geen rekening gehouden. De reden daarvoor is dat 
risico-vragen vaak onbetrouwbare antwoorden opleveren, omdat zulke vragen veel ruis 
veroorzaken. Hoofdstuk 6 maakt gebruik van Stelling 3.1 uit Maas & Wakker (1991) om 
een risicovolle utiliteitsfunctie te bepalen door middel van één risicovolle vraag die zo 
eenvoudig mogelijk gehouden wordt. Daarmee geeft dit hoofdstuk een uitgebreidere 
procedure om behandelingsvoorkeuren van patiënten te bepalen. In plaats van het stellen 
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van verschillende risicovragen om een risicovolle utiliteitsfunctie u te bepalen, wordt eerst 
een risicoloze utiliteitsfunctie V bepaald met behulp van additief conjunct meten. Dan is 
één nsicovraag theoretisch voldoende om een risicoparameter te bepalen. De 
betrouwbaarheid van de bepaling van een risicovolle utiliteitsfunctie kan hiermee worden 
verbeterd. Er wordt een voorbeeld gegeven waarin identificatie van u en V niet redelijk 
lijkt. De resultaten van twee experimenten worden gegeven. Deze resultaten indiceren dat 
verder onderzoek nodig is, omdat de waarde van de risicoparameter nogal fluctueert en 
aldus nog steeds onbetrouwbaar gemeten lijkt 
Ten slotte wordt in Hoofdstuk 7 een algemene structuur aangegeven voor beslissingen 
tussen kankerbehandelingen. De beslissingen die in deze structuur passen komen in 
aanmerking voor de procedure zoals voorgesteld in de Hoofdstukken 1 tot 6. Enkele 
specifieke voorbeelden van beslissingen die in deze structuur passen, worden gegeven. 
Een ander voorbeeld van een beslissing tussen kankerbehandelingen die niet in deze 
structuur past, wordt gegeven om de practische begrenzing van de procedure aan te 
geven. 
In Hoofdstuk 8 worden de vorige zeven hoofdstukken kort bediscussieerd en worden 
richtingen voor verder onderzoek aangegeven. 
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STELLINGEN 
1. Het breken van cycles ten behoeve van preferentiemodellen die transitiviteit eisen is ten 
onrechte meestal op het gebruikte algoritme in plaats van op psychologische inzichten 
gebaseerd (dit proefschrift). 
2. Kendall & Smith's ζ is een onderschatting van de circulariteit van een preferentiestructuur 
in geval sommige relaties a priori bekend worden verondersteld (dit proefschrift). 
(Kendall, M. G. & Smith, В. В. (1940). On the method of paired comparisons. Biometrika, 
31, 324-345.) 
3. Risicoloze utiliteitsfuncties dienen niet ad hoc gekozen maar geschat te worden (dit 
proefschrift). 
4. Niet de utiliteitsmeting maar de definitie van kwaliteit van leven is veelal het grootste 
struikelblok in medisch-besliskundig onderzoek. 
5. Cuius universitas, illius et opinio. 
6. De zin 'Haar begrip hing in kringen rond haar ogen, holde haar wangen uit, stond in flessen 
en potjes en buisjes naast haar bed' zou de aanzet kunnen zijn tot een betere 
operationalisatie van psychologische concepten. 
(Mulisch, H. (1959). Het stenen bruidsbed, p. 12.) 
7. De door Torrance gerapporteerde 'satisfactory' criteriumvaliditeit, gebaseerd op de gevonden 
correlatie tussen time tradeoffs en standard gambles, is inhoudelijk betekenisloos daar 
theoretisch niets verwacht wordt over de correlatie tussen beide methoden. 
(Torrance, G. W. (1976). Social preferences for health states: an empirical evaluation of 
three measurement techniques. Socio-Economie Planning Sciences, 10, p. 133.) 
8. Die Sprache verkleidet den Gedanken. 
(L. Wittgenstein. Tractatus logico-philosophicus, Stelling 4.00.2) 
9. Het getuigt van weinig esthetisch inzicht de cycles van Escher te breken. 
Stellingen behorende bij het proefschrift van Arne Maas, The use of conjoint measurement in 
medical decision making', Nijmegen 5 oktober 1992. 
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